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Thirty years after the bloodiest coup in its modern history, Turkey is now a 
democratizing country with a liberal market and a blooming civil society. This 
transformation is attributed to the democratic potential and deeds of Turkey’s Islamic 
bourgeoisie, which has been an ardent supporter of the internationally monitored 
program of market liberalization and the EU integration/reform process since the 1990s. 
Muslim businesses’ curious relationship with the secular Turkish state and traditional 
business elites presents a compelling case for interest group theory. This dissertation 
evaluates the interest group theories’ propositions on policy-based interaction between 
state institutions and business interest groups to conclude that in most countries, hybrid 
models emerge, bringing together elements of pluralism and corporatism. The 
dissertation discusses the evolution and application in Turkey of interest group theories 
– particularly corporatism, clientelism and pluralism – and identifies the secular and 
Islamic business communities in Turkey to assess Islamic business associations’ 
economic and political influence on AKP era policies and business-state relations.  
 
The research offers two conclusions: Turkey’s Islamic business associations are able to 
access AKP government’s economic and social policymaking via traditional and new 
corporatist structures and to enjoy a close working relationship with the government and 
the state institutions. Their enhanced policy influence is as much a result of the moral, 
sociocultural and religious alignment between their members, Turkey’s Muslim 
conservative capitalists, and the AKP leadership as a consequence of the 
professionalism and organizational capacity of Islamic business associations. The 
prevalence of Muslim conservative actors in Turkey’s society, culture, politics and 
economy, as observed via Islamic business associations in this dissertation, do not pose 
a clear and imminent threat to the secular and democratic foundations of the Turkish 
Republic because Muslim conservative businessmen are pragmatists, who recognize 
and respond to domestic and transnational social, economic and political dynamics. 
Also, their religious affiliation is exaggerated to the extent that their Muslimness 
became a red herring, diverting the attention of spectators and analysts from the real 
problem with Turkey’s democratization and marketization process: the failures in the 
practice and implementation of the essential legal/institutional reforms that would bring 
about a plural, transparent and accountable policymaking environment.  
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Turkey’s State-Business Relations 
Revisited 
Islamic Business Associations and Policymaking in  the AKP era 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
An off white French colonial building in Istanbul’s Pera neighbourhood is home 
to the Turkish Industry and Business Association, TUSIAD. Across the street from 
TUSIAD lies a long stretch of Western-styled cafes, restaurants and hotels offering the 
city’s most spectacular views from their rooftop cocktail bars. Pera is quintessentially 
European-chic and multicultural, and TUSIAD’s choice of this particular location for its 
headquarters reflects the cultural, ideological and social positioning of Turkey’s most 
established voluntary business association. A five-minute walk from the pristine and 
lofty headquarters of the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, 
AKP) on the banks of the Golden Horn takes one to the doorstep of the Independent 
Industrialists’ and Businessmen Association, MUSIAD. Overlooking the old town, the 
MUSIAD headquarters blends effortlessly into the beige, post-soviet façades of the rest 
of the Golden Horn real estate. A chaotic, booming metropolis of fourteen million, 
Istanbul domiciles Turkey’s two leading business associations, which are often 
represented as the exact opposites of one another. Mirroring the differences in the 
Istanbul neighbourhoods in which they are based, TUSIAD is considered to be a beacon 
of modernity, global capitalism and the tenacity of Turkey’s Republican secular elite to 
hold onto power whereas MUSIAD is thought to belong to Turkey’s provincial 
heartland, Anatolia, and to represent the business prowess of Anatolian capitalists and 
the political cunning of its neighbour on the Golden Horn, the AKP.  
The diversification of Turkey’s business community in conjunction with global 
and domestic political, economic and social dynamics has often been captured in the 
obvious dichotomy between TUSIAD and MUSIAD. Business-state relations in the 
twenty-first century in Turkey is as much about diversification and change, epitomized 
in the transfer of wealth and power from an established, West centric, urban elite to an 
emergent, devout and conservative bourgeoisie, as it is about continuity reflected in the 
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survival of certain traditions and structures of business-state relations. Change is best 
captured by the mind-blowing pace with which new generation peak-level business 
associations, TUSKON and TIM, have raised their socioeconomic and political profiles; 
whereas continuity is conveyed in the survival strategies and paths of long-standing 
business community organizations, TOBB, TISK and TUSIAD. This dissertation refers 
to interest group theories to examine business-state relations in Turkey from 1999 to 
2012 – a period defined by the country’s adaptation to the accession protocols of the 
European Union and responses to turbulent events in the region and around the globe. 
Attempting to move beyond the mainstream academic and popular observations of two 
distinct and separate camps of “secularists” and “Islamists” in contemporary Turkey, 
this dissertation concentrates on the corporatist and pluralist elements in the structures 
of policy bargaining/interest mediation to formulate conclusions on how and whether 
business-state relations changed in Turkey.  
This first chapter introduces the four themes that flow through this dissertation: 
Locating business interest groups in the state-business-society spectrum and within the 
broader themes of civil society and democratization; discussing the evolution and 
application in Turkey of interest group theories – particularly corporatism, clientelism 
and pluralism; identifying the secular and Islamic business communities in Turkey; and 
assessing Islamic business associations’ economic and political influence on AKP era 
policies and business-state relations. Furthermore, it describes the key research 
parameters and methodology and makes the case for why this particular inquiry on 
business-state relations in modern-day Turkey is significant and timely. Finally, the 
chapter provides a roadmap for the reader to navigate through the body of the 
dissertation. 
Why revisit interest group theories? 
A strong regional player in the intersection of Europe and the Middle East, 
Turkey experiences a mind-blowing social, political, economic and systemic 
transformation. One key dimension to Turkey’s great leap forward is business and the 
way in which business communities altered their internal organization, competition and 
outreach to the state and transnational actors. Prompted by an Islamic civilizing mission 
and a collection of capitalist incentives, Turkey’s devout Muslim business families 
achieved a steep rise in their social status and international recognition as ‘Anatolian 
Tigers’. The most direct route to a deeper understanding of the values, morals, 
 11 
expectations of Turkey’s Islamic bourgeoisie and to a substantial study of their dealings 
with the Turkish state and other social and transnational actors is through the new and 
highly-acclaimed associations that represent their lucrative businesses.  Although 
extensive research has been carried out on the relationship between democracy, 
Europeanization and voluntary business associations in Turkey, no single study exists 
which traces the elements of corporatism and clientelism in present-day, arguably 
pluralizing business-state relations. Recent academic scholarship on the Islamic 
bourgeoisie in Turkey focuses on the themes of state-building and democratic 
consolidation and social class transformation; however, these themes fail to address the 
changes in Turkey’s policymaking structures.   
Theories of interest group politics establish meaningful connections between 
interest groups - specifically business associations, chambers and peak associations – 
and state and society actors. By maintaining the primary focus of academic inquiry on 
the interest group and the individuals that are assembled by a shared interest, interest 
group theories look to the broader social, economic and political context within which 
the representation of interests does and ought to occur. Dahl (1971) in his classical work 
on participation and pluralism explained that collective action is best nurtured in 
pluralist environments. Streeck and Schmitter (1985) argued that Western European 
corporatism has hampered the development of independent associations and the process 
of collective interest-mediation. Ranging from systems with state-serving structures, i.e. 
Central and Eastern Europe (Traxler, 1993), Eastern Asia (Dore, 1997; Unger and 
Chan,) to pluralist and representative systems in the United States and arguably in 
Western Europe, collective engagement in policy making has been observed through 
associational mobility and independence. Democratization is coined with civil society in 
the extensive literature on Latin American and post-communist transitions in Central 
and Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Lindau (1998) and Samstad (2002) equate 
feasibility of democratic institutions in Latin America with the emancipation and 
proliferation of non-corporatist civic associations. In the case of Turkey, the state, the 
media, politicians and relevant legislation treat business associations as ‘civil society 
actors’, therefore, this dissertation builds the connection between civil society and a 
business interest group is formed by way of interest group theories. Specifically, plural 
policymaking mechanisms assist the development of a vibrant civil society and a 
vibrant civil society demands pluralism in national and international policymaking.  
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Furthermore, market liberalism and pluralism in policymaking go hand in hand 
because the dynamism and the challenges of a global marketplace are best captured in 
plural structures. Business networks have the ability to foster populism and patronage 
ties in centralized, hierarchical and rigid structures whereas the competition posed by 
multiple actors in plural systems keep public and private actors, including big business 
in check. Finally, Islamisation and the surge of conservatism are easily detected in the 
transformation of business-state relations in Turkey and in some other Muslim 
countries. Business-state relations provide a useful template to observe the possible 
impact that Islam has over both sides of the relationship and the mechanisms that 
facilitate the business-state relationship. 
Why study Turkey’s business associations? 
Turkey’s voluntary business associations and state corporatist, peak-level 
associations matter because they monopolize the representation of the interests, 
convictions and policy agendas of their member businesses, the sectors or industries 
they serve, and the communities and shareholders they affect. Business associations, 
chambers, vocational unions, and peak-level associations are significant actors in 
corporatist systems, such as Turkey, because state institutions, policymaking structures 
and government officials recognize and engage with these registered and official 
organizations, almost exclusively. 
This research does not presuppose that organized interest groups and civic 
associations, representing businesses, are the only channels of interaction between the 
secular business elite, the Islamic business elite and the state. Moreover, this 
dissertation refrains from treating Turkey’s thousands of business associations as 
rational actors that are abstracted from the geographical, sociocultural and economic 
context in which they operate. However, voluntary associations are especially crucial to 
understand the evolution of pluralism in policymaking in a democratizing regime like 
Turkey’s because voluntary associations, unlike private or semi-public entities, 
represent collective business interests independently. Voluntary business associations in 
Turkey implicitly and explicitly communicate their affiliation with a particular 
ideology, faith, sect or ethnicity. Free market liberalism and fundamentalism often 
merge in the ideological composition of these establishments but their administration 
and their projects do not reflect partisan behaviour. Rather, most associations exist and 
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act to obtain profitability and sustained capital gains for the small to medium-sized 
businesses they represent.  
The institutionalization of voluntary business associations in Turkey is 
domestically and internationally motivated. Turkey’s capitalists acquired access to 
international markets with the onset of market liberalization after the 1980s and used 
their access to accrue more bargaining power. Subsequently, they push for a broader 
democratization agenda and more pluralism in policy bargaining because they 
increasingly depend on their member businesses, domestic and international 
communities and the favourable public opinion to ensure legitimacy and to secure 
physical and material resources. 
As capital accumulation reaches a certain threshold and business becomes 
internationally competitive, it becomes less dependent on state resources in a more open 
and liberal environment where direct access to international finance is possible through 
borrowing from international banks or by entering into strategic partnerships with 
transnational corporations. Consequently, reduced economic dependence on the state 
creates pressure for greater democratization, which is synonymous with a project of 




So, instead of seeking formal acceptance from the state, Turkey’s secular 
Republican business community presented itself as a progressive force in Turkey’s civil 
society. Devrim Yavuz
2
 argued that it is the strong association that compels the 
entrepreneur to stay committed to democracy even to point of risking carefully guarded 
ties with the state. While Yavuz underlined the almost irresistibility of democracy 
promotion by Turkey’s prominent voluntary business associations, Öniş and Türem 
suggested that business’ calls for democratization were functional: 
It is true that the business associations are not genuinely interested in democracy as an 
end in itself, however the presence of a ‘strong’ and centralized state, with a continued 
ability to distribute certain economic resources and political patronage, prevents these 
associations from acting in harmony and unity to be able to push in the direction of 
democracy, because this would tend to undermine the current political system and 
therefore risk the possible benefits that can be generated from the state.
3
  
Öniş and Türem’s depiction of a business community displaying a balancing act 
with the state elite across the associational landscape is convincing for many reasons.  
First of all, for those businesspeople, who afforded to lose credibility and favours with 
                                               
1 Önis, Z. and Türem, U. (2001) ‘Business, Globalization and Democracy: A Comparative Analysis of 
Turkish Business Associations’, Turkish Studies, 2: 2, 94 — 120 
2 Devrim Yavuz (2010) ‘Testing Large Business’s Commitment to Democracy: Business Organizations 
and the Secular–Muslim Conflict in Turkey’, Government and Opposition, 45(1), 73-92. 
3
 Ibid. Öniş and Türem, p.112. 
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the state also tended to alternate or forego their attachment to business organizations – 
voluntary and corporatist. For instance, Devrim Yavuz argued that a minority of 
TÜSİAD members, particularly Cem Boyner, Bülent Eczacıbaşı, İshak Alaton and 
İbrahim Betil, broached traditionally controversial and difficult themes, such as the 
Kurdish Question, desecuritization and social, cultural and human rights. Those figures 
did not confine their outreach and advocacy to their positions in TUSIAD; they 
established/supported political parties or movements, i.e. the New Democracy 
Movement (Yeni Demokrasi Hareketi, YDH), and think tanks and NGOs to alternate the 
mechanisms through which they would lobby for democratization. The same may be 
said of top leadership of state corporatist structures. The post of TOBB Chairman is a 
steppingstone to ministerial or other high posts in the government, as the careers of 
former TOBB presidents such as Necmettin Erbakan, Ersin Faralyalı, Ali Coşkun, 
Yalım Erez and Fuat Miras demonstrate. Yet, these former TOBB chairs carefully 
calibrated their politics to avoid confronting the state directly and jeopardizing the 
business interests they are bound to represent, during their tenure at TOBB.
4
  
A third interpretation of business-state relations in Turkey offers a pessimistic 
take on pluralism in the interest mediation landscape and the prospects of democratic 
consolidation in Turkey, achieved through the democratic zeal of business associations. 
Ahmet İnsel and Ümit Kıvanç base their understanding of Turkish state’s self-
conceptualization on the document, ‘the Concept and Extent of the State’, prepared and 
publicly shared in 1990 by National Security Council (Milli Güvenlik Kurulu, MGK) – 
a corporatist institution. The core argument on the MGK document was that the state 
was constant, or in other words, the independent variable, in the relationship between 
the state, institutions and society. Therefore, all institutions and all social actors and 
Turkey’s society depended on the state and belonged to the state.5 This assertion was 
adapted to the realm of business-state relations by scholars such as Ayşe Buğra, Ziya 
Öniş, and Erinç Yeldan who demonstrated the ways in which an established business 
elite glorified and complemented Turkish state. Furthermore, businesspeople, personally 
or through associations they established, partook in designing and executing national 
security strategies. They too resorted to criminal methods occasionally. Yet, more often, 
                                               
4 Fikri Türkel (2009) ‘TOBB Niye Hedef Tahtasında (Why is TOBB Being Targeted?)’ Taraf, 
01/09/2010, http://www.taraf.com.tr/fikri-turkel/makale-tobb-niye-hedef-tahtasinda.htm 
5  Ahmet Insel and Ümit Kıvanç (2008) Ergenekon’a Gelmeden… Türkiye’de Devlet Zihniyeti, İstanbul: 
Birikim. 
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businesspeople expressed their reservations against entering into politics in Turkey.
6 
They sought to avoid imprisonment or death at the hands of Turkey’s legitimate and 
underground security forces and instead performed a supporting role in maintaining the 
secular order. This line of argument, made by the likes of Ayşe Buğra, Ahmet İnsel and 
Erinç Yeldan, concludes that despite their best efforts, the secular business community 
and the (deep) state elite failed to reserve all avenues to policymaking and interest 
mediation and all agencies of social control for the members of their group/coalition.  
Certainly, however, liberalization and marketization incentivized voluntary 
business associations and state corporatist organizations, which were programmed to 
maintain the status quo in business-state relations, i.e. TOBB, TİSK (private and public 
employers confederation) and KESK (public servants confederation), to reconfigure 
their institutional identity over the course of 1990s and after the EU accession agenda 
intensified democratic and liberal reforms. For instance, TOBB’s ‘Southeastern Turkey 
Report’, which proposed to expand economic opportunities and grant cultural and social 
rights to Turkey’s Kurds, was a clear challenge to the state-sponsored policy of 
responding to the Kurdish Question militarily because TOBB proposed instead a 
democratic solution to resolve the conflict.
7
 Though the democratic credentials of their 
proposal were disputable, TOBB nevertheless articulated a counter-establishment 
position. Evidently, business interest groups were able to swing between corporatist and 
pluralist positions and adopt varying agendas.  
Voluntary business associations mimicked involuntary and state corporatist 
structures in their organization and internal management. Business associations were 
formed according to sector, industry or region (city or district in Turkey). SIAD is a 
term used to describe industrialist and businessmen associations in Turkey. SIADs in 
Turkey have individuals or companies as members and are located above members in a 
hierarchy of organizations representing business interests. Most organized forms of 
interest representation in Turkey’s business environment are either institutionally or 
ideologically aligned with TUSIAD. TUSIAD, founded in 1971 by a group of Turkey’s 
leading industrialists and businessmen, is the largest independent business organisation 
in Turkey with close to 600 members representing close to 3500 highest revenue-
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 TUSIAD is the umbrella association for smaller, district-level 
businessmen and industrialists associations, SIADs. TUSIAD’s organizational structure, 
which includes member associations, committees and subcommittees that are vertically 
aligned, to the lack of a democratic tradition in electing the president and committee 
members, renders this landmark voluntary association a derivate of traditional state 
corporatist confederations, such as TOBB. TUSIAD’s commitment to pluralism and its 
adherence to the democratic principles it purports were therefore found questionable.
9
  
Centralized and powerful voluntary associations are not the only players in the 
pluralizing associational landscape in Turkey. Local chambers of commerce and 
industry and local voluntary associations are influential players too and their positions 
determined the ability of peak confederations or Istanbul-based business associations to 
accrue legitimacy and to strengthen their policy positions. Local chambers and 
associations served primarily as places of socialisation for their members and for the 
larger part of the history of the Republic, local businesses tapped into solidarity 
networks built around these chambers to finance and support their business. Where state 
corporatist arrangements failed to respond to the needs of or excluded certain groups of 
businesspeople on the basis of their values and familial or confessional ties, provincial 
capitalists created alternatives mechanisms to establish pressure/interest groups. 
Business solidarity networks based on tradition, family values, and faith supplanted the 
state in providing safety nets, credits and business opportunities to local businesses.
10
 
Although the ‘Islamic’ character of the members of local business associations and their 
informality have constantly been scrutinised and criticised by the secular establishment 
in Turkish state and business sphere, local businesses never suffered from a lack of 
interest from small investors.
11
 Ultimately, the exclusion from state corporatist 
arrangements encouraged local businesses to coalesce around alternative associations. 
The debate in Turkey about business associations – or perhaps the broader 
debate about the security and survival of the Turkish Republic – revolves around issues 
of identity, culture and social class. In other words, business associations are attached 
                                               
8
 ‘TUSIAD by numbers’ (2013), TUSIAD, Online. Accessed 11 September 2013, 
www.tusiad.org/tusiad/tusiad-by-numbers/ 
9 Ziya Öniş and Umut Türem (2002) ‘Entrepreneurs, Democracy, and Citizenship in Turkey’, 
Comparative Politics, 34(4), pp. 439-456. 
10 Ozcan, G. B. (1995) ‘Small Business Networks and Local Ties in Turkey’, Entrepreneurship and Local 
Development, 7(1995), 265-282. (p.279) 
11 Özcan G. B. and Murat Çokgezen (2006) ‘Trusted Markets: The Exchanges of Islamic Companies’, 
Comparative Economic Studies, 48(2006), 132-155. 
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certain labels, such as ‘Islamic’, ‘conservative’, ‘modern’, ‘independent’ and ‘young’, 
that are either endorsed or rejected by their bearers and these labels define not only the 
economic, social or financial policy positions of associations but also their 
memberships’ values, lifestyle choices and personalities. More pronounced are those 
labels or categories associated with businesspeople, who are openly pious and 
practicing Muslims. This dissertation asks whether the label ‘Islamic’ is a meaningful 
qualifier to define a group of devout practising Muslim businesspeople, assembled 
under the umbrella of a business organization or confederation to lobby for their 
collective interest. Islamic business associations and Islamic corporatism are valid terms 
to refer to business groups and policymaking structures in other Muslim majority 
countries. For instance in Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood earned support of the civil 
society by winning over small and large business associations, which were once 
considered secular and liberal. The young, educated professionals enrolled in Egypt’s 
business associations responded to the Brotherhood’s message of social equality and 
power primarily because they were economically disenfranchised and politically 
marginalized by their state (Walsh, 2003: 33). Across the Middle East, periods of 
openness and privatization as part of efforts to join the global market produced 
urbanizing middle classes. However, inconsistent development, high inflation teamed 
with high unemployment caused economic imbalances in these economies of transition, 
most of which were not buffered against global economic shocks. Clark (2000) and 
Wickham (1997) have observed that nascent middle classes and poverty-stricken lower 
classes in Egypt feel a combined sense of frustration and anger towards the state. 
Similar dynamics exist in Turkey where some religious and conservative sections of the 
post-1980s bourgeoisie feel disenfranchised and abandoned by the state.  
The political Islamist Welfare Party (RP) highlighted the collective grievances 
of the conservative middle classes in central and peripheral Turkey as part of a 
successful campaign that earned the RP substantial seats in the Turkish Grand National 
Assembly and the ability to form a coalition government in 1994. Subsequently, 
MUSIAD was founded to represent the interests of the emerging companies and 
business of conservative businessmen from central and peripheral Turkey. MUSIAD 
and other peripheral business organizations financed and supported politically the post-
1980 surge of religious conservatism in Turkey, which culminated in the decade-long 
rule of the AKP in the 2000s. MUSIAD quickly transformed into a key actor in policy-
making and a powerhouse for Turkey’s booming economy, thanks to its members from 
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emerging agro-businesses and industrial capitalists of Central Turkey. It became a 
symbol of the transfer of decision making power from one group of capitalists, the so-
called white Turks, to another, identified as ‘green’ capital owners for their conservative 
Islamic identity.  
MUSIAD’s policy agendas and communication with its membership and the 
Turkish governments were closely scrutinized as the microcosm of the larger struggle 
between the secular establishment and the emergent Islamic elite. TUSIAD faced its 
direst democratic challenger during the late 1990s in its response to MUSIAD and to the 
advent of alternative capitalists in general. And it is a challenge that TUSIAD of the 
1990s failed.
12
 TUSIAD and other voluntary business associations preached democratic 
values when doing so was functional and pragmatic. Other times, they remained either 
non-responsive or reactionary to democratization of the associational landscape.
13
 
Throughout the two decades of their existence, voluntary associations remained faithful 
to their particular relationship with the state and to their institutional ties to state 
corporatism. All the while, they cherished and protected their status as higher ranking, 
culturally superior, elitist capitalists.  
Subsequently, the emerging peripheral bourgeoisie, whose capitalist interests are 
represented by MUSIAD, TUSKON federations, TUMSIAD, ASKON and others, 
aligned with a new generation of political Islam, developed and promoted by the AKP. 
The AKP brand of political Islam responded to the demands and expectations of a 
nascent Muslim capitalist community, whose members esteem status quo, conserving 
national and family values, and the unity and strength of the Turkish state. Unlike 
Muslim conservative human rights activists, journalists, politicians and political 
activists of the Islamic right wing parties, Muslim conservative landowning and trading 
families of Anatolia have not been abused and assaulted by the state and public 
institutions. While the former developed a narrative that highlights the stigma towards 
practicing Muslims by a secular and authoritarian Republic, the latter employed a 
discourse of solidarity, nonpartisan to the secular authoritarian state and preoccupied 
with accruing wealth and status in Turkey.  
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Why focus on business-state relations in present-day Turkey? 
Observing business-state relations in Turkey in the 2000s reveals whether 
countries in the process of building free, liberal markets also nurture associations, which 
represent democratic minded, competitive and liberal individuals, to influence policy 
through direct and legitimate channels or whether a polity’s commitment to market 
liberalization does not yield a plural, representative and democratic policymaking 
landscape. In other words, the story of policy bargaining through associations in Turkey 
tells a tale of the concentration and transfer of power in a policy environment composed 
of business and civil society actors, politicians and public servants during democratic 
and market transition. 
Moreover, business-state relations in contemporary Turkey speak to Turkey’s 
society and the international community, seeking answers to questions about the 
Turkish Republican and secular regime’s stability and continuity. Turkey’s political, 
academic and cultural establishment, secular and Ataturkist citizens, non-Muslim 
communities and a minority of public servants hold deep-seated social anxieties about 
the imminent death of the Turkish Republic and their worries may partially be explained 
by a failure to fully grasp Turkey’s socio-political transformation. Are the methods of 
communication, outreach and interest mediation used by the marginalized or vernacular 
civic associations learned? Have the owners and employees of peripheral small and 
medium-sized businesses in Anatolia changed their conceptions on piety, social values 
and gender as they became exposed to international markets collectively through 
business associations? Have, for instance, European Union accession talks in Turkey 
‘liberated’ conservative businessmen to the extent that they are able to abandon custom 
or question their allegiance to Islam for profitable ventures with counterparts in Europe? 
Have their extra-communication and/or inter-communication shifted from radical to 
more liberal? Though the state hardly retreated from the public sphere in Turkey, is the 
Turkish state no longer the only point of reference for Anatolia’s nascent bourgeoisie or 
is the established political elite no longer the single gateway to power? Addressing the 
questions above is central to analysing and forecasting the future trends in political 
Islam in Turkey and in the Middle East.  
The perception of a divide between believers and non-believers is exaggerated 
and there is not convincing scientific evidence to testify that Turkey’s social problems, 
including on-going inter-communal violence, are the result of a primordial split across 
faiths or sects, alone. The fieldwork of this dissertation proves that devout Muslim 
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citizens and non-believers or secular/non-practicing Muslims in Turkey are not 
entangled in an on-going conflict over piety, with potentially terrorizing consequences. 
Efforts to nullify secular Turks fears about the imminence of an Islamist threat mask the 
sentiments of devout Muslims towards the existence of the overarching “Muslim” label 
and the class implications that their piety has. Secular or non-practicing Muslims 
surround Muslim men and women, who may be members of their immediate or 
extended family, neighbours, colleagues, etc. Often, devout and practicing Muslims feel 
as judged and stigmatized by secular citizens, including family members and loved 
ones, as secular citizens feel ill treated by pious Muslim citizens. Social mobility of 
provincial and urban pious Muslim families brought them closer to urban, secular Turks 
who were dismayed and disappointed by the apparent failure of the secular 
authoritarianism of the Republic to either eliminate piety or to confine the pious to low-
ranking classes. Social mobility of pious Muslims also has consequences that offend 
other devout Muslims, such as a fieldwork respondent from Ankara who curses the 
sight of a headscarved woman driving an expensive jeep. Another piece of evidence 
from my fieldwork shows how headscarved women professionals and their spouses 
complained that business associations, which represent practicing Muslim business 
owners, did not admit as members headscarved women entrepreneurs and business 
owners. However, at the same time, they rose to the defence of MUSIAD and similar 
business interest groups when asked to comment on the aftermath of the 28 February 
1997 soft coup experience and the subsequent process of democratization in Turkey. In 
short, Islam and Islamic practices are only a fraction of a larger social, cultural and 
economic debate on identities in Turkey and the complexities of Turkey’s wrangling 
with the Turkish identity reflect through the prism of business-state relations, too. 
I have been raised by my secular, Republican family to admire and parrot 
Western notions and practices of modernity. I was taught to regard the differences 
between Turkey and the West as failures of the former. I, therefore, accepted and 
cheered the stereotypical identity of a ‘white Turk’ and the privileges and protections 
granted by the (supposedly) consensual democratic regime, the Republic’s robust and 
independent democratic institutions, its flawless model of assimilation and dialogue. 
Sheltered by the selective coverage of a state-serving media, indoctrinated by the 
outright propaganda of the nationalist education system, and lectured by family 
members who have for generations been exposed to revolutionary European literature 
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and been fervent supporters of the revolution, I did not or could not question the 
compatibility of the fantasy of the Turkish state (Yashin, 2003) with the reality.  
Globalization and openness challenged my understanding and opinion of the 
relationships along the state-market-society axis. Furthermore, I have always been 
fascinated by the strength and motivation of business associations to represent the 
commercial and political interests of their members. Turkey’s business lobbies were 
undoubtedly the strongest and most efficient of all civil society organizations in interest 
mediation and policy-making, I thought. While analysing China’s transition from a 
revolutionary and overtly dogmatic society to a market-driven and opportunistic one by 
observing Chinese and foreign businessmen associations’ role in influencing policy for 
a master’s thesis at the LSE, I detected several parallels between Turkey and China. 
Consequently, I concluded that business associations continue to be solid reference 
points to observe and understand the transformation of authoritarian states, liberalizing 
markets and democratization societies.  
Throughout the research and writing phases of this dissertation, I worked for 
organizations that had and continue to have a very significant influence on and access to 
the AKP leadership and a handful of ministries. One such employer, TESEV, granted 
me the opportunity to design, carry out and channel into this dissertation the results of 
the policy research I coordinated on Islam, democracy, women’s rights, security sector 
reform and the Kurdish Question in Turkey. TESEV was established in late 1960s by a 
group of businessmen, enticed by Nejat Eczacıbaşı of the Eczacıbaşı Group to finance 
academic and policy research. Registered as a foundation in mid 1990s, TESEV 
changed over decades from an ivory tower, modern and decisively secular organization 
into a liberal think tank. Whereas in the 1990s, the think tank domiciled former 
diplomats attached to a Republican Foreign Service tradition, and businesspeople who 
firmly believed in the need to educate and modernize the masses in Turkey, in the 2000s 
TESEV was financed by a variety of grants programs, mostly by the Open Society 
Foundation, and democratic, liberal-minded businessmen and professionals.  TESEV 
Chairman and retired business executive Can Paker, whose proximity to Prime Minister 
Erdoğan and Deputy Prime Minister and former Speaker of the Parliament Bülent Arınç 
suggested TESEV’s partiality towards the AKP, was concerned exclusively with 
promoting democratization in Turkey. Neither Paker nor Mahçupyan, long-serving head 
of TESEV’s Democratization Program were offended by being perceived as AKP-
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enthusiasts, on the contrary, they publicly congratulated the party for having driven 
Turkey out of political and economic instability by enlivening and empowering a new 
middle class.  
My employment with TESEV on a work placement during my PhD gave me 
immediate access to political and business resources of all kinds and at every level. 
Research and policy work carried out through TESEV confirms the almost inevitability 
of the AKP rule in Turkey. However different my own political views may have been 
from those propagated by the party leadership, I did concur with ErDoğan and the AKP 
political elite in critical political and economic issues. I also admired the party’s ability 
to nurture a middle class and attract swing voters of a lower class status by successful 
pre-election concessions. Most crucially, I was able to grasp the inner workings of a 
political class, which included politicians but also businesspeople, business 
associations, media figures, lobbyists, and public servants.  
How was the research fieldwork carried out and what were the methods used? 
The first three chapters of this dissertation refers to a variety of secondary 
sources: Scholarly publications, articles, books and theses were borrowed from 
university libraries in London and Istanbul; thematic journals, magazines, brochures and 
various edited volumes of business associations were collected from the offices and 
waiting lounges of business associations across Turkey. Daily newspapers, weeklies and 
online articles from 2002 to 2012 were screened online and compiled in the form of a 
press review of how business-state relations were portrayed in mainstream Turkish 
press.  On the other hand, Chapters 4, 5 and 6 utilize findings from a set of primary 
sources, which are predominantly drawn from fieldwork research conducted as part of 
two independent research projects: Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation’s 
(TESEV) ‘Headscarf Ban and Discrimination: Professional Headscarved Women in the 
Labor Market’ and ‘Media and Democratization in Turkey: A Sectoral Analysis’. 
‘Headscarf Ban and Discrimination: Professional Headscarved Women in the 
Labor Market’ is a research project that was designed and managed for TESEV by Ebru 
İlhan and funded by the Open Society Foundation, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung in Turkey 
and Consulate General of Sweden in Istanbul. I was Program Associate at TESEV 
throughout the duration of the research project and a junior researcher on a research 
team, which included as senior researcher, Dilek Cindoğlu, Professor of Sociology at 
Bilkent University Ankara. Cindoğlu was author of the TESEV publication that 
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reflected on the findings of the research fieldwork. The research asked what the 
experiences of university-educated headscarved women in or looking to be in 
professional jobs and expected to analyse the overt and implicit forms of discrimination 
against the headscarf. Using qualitative research methods, the senior researcher and 
junior researcher relied on a number of sources, chiefly a six-month fieldwork 
conducted in Istanbul, Konya and Ankara between December 2009 and June 2010. 
Cindoğlu and I held twelve semi-structured interviews with a random sample of 
headscarved women professionals, who were either employed or seeking employment at 
the time, and their spouses. We also convened ten focus group workshops where 
employed and unemployed headscarved women – of two different age groups – and 
(separately) spouses of headscarved women participated. A total of 79 women and 25 
men were reached through the focus groups. Moreover, we conducted unstructured 
interviews and group discussions with opinion leaders, authors and businesspeople that 
defined themselves as pious Muslims and held strong views on Muslims’ freedom to 
practice Islam in Turkey. Two group discussions with headscarved and non-
headscarved women academics, journalists, civil society activists and politicians were 
held in Istanbul and Ankara on 11 November 2009 and 8 December 2009, respectively. 
In March – June 2010, interviews were held with AKP politicians, representatives of 
women organizations and businesspeople. Finally, on 11 November 2010, a closed 
workshop hosted by TESEV brought together AKP MPs, members of parliamentary 
commissions, women political activists and representatives of business associations and 
unions to discuss the issue of political, economic and social participation of women, 
particularly headscarved women, in Turkey. Some of the data collected throughout the 
fieldwork were used in the TESEV report, Headscarf Ban and Discrimination: 
Professional Headscarved Women in the Labor Market. This chapter utilizes, with full 
consent from TESEV and Dilek Cindoğlu, and in keeping with the research ethics 
guidelines of the College and TESEV, transcripts of four interviews, three focus group 
workshops for men, two closed workshops, and observations from the field – none have 
been used yet in another publication. 
‘Media and Democratization in Turkey: A Sectoral Analysis’ is a research 
project designed and managed by Ebru İlhan and TESEV Democratization Program, 
and funded by Friedrich Naumann Stiftung Turkey and the MATRA Program of the 
Royal Embassy of the Netherlands in Ankara. The researchers, Ceren Sözeri and 
Zeynep Güney, both members of faculty at Galatasaray University’s Faculty of 
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Communications and I sought to map out Turkey’s media sector (print and broadcast 
media) and to analyse the relationships between various actors within the media sector. 
Qualitative research methods were utilized; data collection involved unstructured and 
semi-structured interviews with key public figures and businesspeople, and four 
workshops: Workshop I in Ankara on 18 December 2010 on Human Resources and 
Labor Economics in Media; Workshop II in Istanbul on 21 December 2010 on Human 
Resources and Labor Economics in Media; Workshop III in Istanbul on 11 March 2011 
on New Law on Radio and Television Higher Board (RTUK); Workshop IV in Istanbul 
on 21 April 2011 on Market Competition and its Regulation in the Media Sector. Part of 
the data collected was channelled into the TESEV Report, Media and Democratization 
in Turkey: A Sectoral Analysis. This chapter utilizes, with full consent from TESEV 
and Ceren Sözeri and Zeynep Güney, and in keeping with the research ethics guidelines 
of the College and TESEV, notes from four workshops and observations from the field.  
Primary data also comes from fieldwork designed and conducted for this 
dissertation specifically. The author carried out fieldwork interviews in Gaziantep, 
Konya, Istanbul and Ankara with the top management of business associations, 
politicians, businesspeople, opinion leaders, and academics. Although care was given to 
securing written consent from all interviewees and to recording the conversations 
between the author and the interviewee(s), the delicate nature of the research question 
and the level of detail in the ethical consent form that researchers are expected to collect 
from interviewees impeded the satisfactory application of research ethics guidelines on 
this particular fieldwork. Only six out of several interviews in each of the four cities 
listed were recorded, transcribed and stored along with signed copies of Consent Forms. 
Though the Consent Forms were translated into Turkish and the English originals were 
attached, the interviewees were reluctant to sign a piece of paper stating that they 
conversed with a researcher. Furthermore, interviewees were hesitant and sometimes 
even hostile towards being recorded. An overwhelming majority of businesspeople 
preferred to engage in an informal dialogue with the researcher and many of the 
interviews were held in an office or a meeting room filled with several people. 
Therefore, the researcher refrained from coaxing the interviewee and others who 
accompanied him/her to sign the consent forms or to agree to be taped; instead, the 
researcher took notes during and immediately after each interview. Data collected 
through fieldwork interviews include specific findings on the policy areas to be 
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examined below and also broader findings on state-business relations and the 
representation of organized interests in Turkey. 
What lies ahead? 
The chapter following this introduction features a review of the literature on 
interest group theories and discusses the application of interest group theories to 
multiple historical and geographical contexts. The objective of the literature review is to 
establish connections between real-life examples of corporatism, pluralism, clientelism 
and hybrid forms of policymaking to stipulate whether other-country or global trends 
may apply to Turkey’s state corporatism, pluralizing elements and the current hybrid 
form of policymaking. Chapter 3 provides the history behind Turkey’s state corporatism 
and the emergence of voluntary business associations in a securitized, undemocratic and 
highly centralized policymaking landscape. Chapter 4 constitutes the longest and most 
fundamental chapter of this dissertation, which aims to serve as a bridge between the 
theory and history of interest group mediation and policy bargaining through 
associations in Turkey and the present-day practices and policy positions of Turkey’s 
Islamic business associations. Chapters 5 and 6 concentrate on two policy areas of 
media and gender that highlight the cultural and social differences between secular and 
Islamic business associations in Turkey. Recent developments in these two policies 
areas are discussed to gauge whether there is almost a complete alignment between the 
policy agendas of the AKP and the Islamic business associations. Finally, the 
dissertation concludes with a discussion of how the label, ‘Islamic’, in Turkey’s 
powerful business associations today offers only half the story on how and in what 
direction Turkey’s business-state relations transformed. In other words, the champions 
of 21
st
 century neoliberalism in Turkey, TUSKON, MUSIAD, TIM, TOBB and others, 
represent a privileged group of pragmatic capitalists, who choose to emphasize or 
conceal their faith in their commercial and political affairs. After demonstrating the 
context of the Islamic credentials of Turkey’s emergent business associations, the 
dissertation also offers as a Conclusion the potential policy implications for Turkey’s 
policy bargaining structures and mechanisms of the strengthening of Muslim 




Chapter 2: Exploring the relationship between 
contemporary business associations and policymaking 
Interest group theories emerged in the beginning of the twentieth century to 
explain the relationship between markets, societies and states by treating the market and 
society as groups or associations of consumers and citizens. A pioneer in interest group 
theory, Harold Laski, labelled the state as ‘the one compulsory form of association’14 
thereby assigning all forms of political communication in a nation state to group 
interaction. Through the evolution of interest group theory, Laski’s foundational 
argument was either strengthened by champions of competitive interest group 
interaction with and beyond the state or challenged by rival propositions that advocated 
centralized, organized, and hierarchical interest mediation in policymaking. Interest 
group theories diverged most markedly on the degree of state authority over interest 
groups in policymaking, even while agreeing on the centrality of the state to the process 
of public, especially economic, policymaking. Globalisation, particularly the 
proliferation of supranational and transnational actors in policy-making, encouraged 
interest group theorists to test their fundamental assertions about the role and functions 
of the state. With the discovery or redefinition in academia of networks of economic 
entities or associations above and beyond state borders, interest group theoreticians 
began to focus on the relationship between economic, social and political actors across a 
wider space, ranging from the local to the global and on multiple levels. Consequently, 
in order to capture the essence and span of relationships between markets, societies and 
states in toto, interest group theories evolved to accept and accommodate fluidity, 
change and diversity in all aspects of policy-based interaction.   
This chapter will revisit the literature on interest group theory to: (a) give an 
account of the evolution of interest group theories; (b) examine competing propositions 
on states and interest groups in advanced capitalist economies; (c) highlight the existing 
and potential functions of business associations as dominant interest groups in civil 
society; and (d) discuss the adaptation or re-interpretation of interest group theory – as it 
applies to business interest groups – in developing economies, particularly those in the 
Middle East. This revision of interest group theories will disclose the different layers of 
policy-based interaction at the local, national and global levels and help to identify new 
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actors and networks that stand out with their distinct religious, moral and political 
features.  
The literature on the relationship between states and business/capital is older 
than interest group theory; in fact, the Anglo-American and Continental European 
origins of the theory rely heavily on earlier literature on guilds, masons, and other more 
traditional types of business interest groups. Moreover, new research into interest group 
representation stalled in the late 1990s, so there are now fewer publications available on 
interest group theories than in the 1930-1950 and 1970-1990 periods. The literature on 
business associations in the Middle East is especially modest and out-dated. Scant 
resources are readily available on the effects of globalisation and Europeanization on 
policy-making processes involving business associations and networks in Turkey. This 
chapter attempts to bridge this gap by studying current patterns of continuity and change 
in interest group representation across business associations and in several 
countries/regions of the world, which will provide a base for reflecting on the case of 
Turkey in following chapters. I postulate that business interests are central to the 
welfare of national and transnational organizations and communities and that more 
representation through business associations contributes to the institutionalization of 
democratic policy negotiations, and, by extension, to the development of democratic 
states. I also argue that processes of interest group representation, both in theory and 
practice, are in constant transformation and hybridization, whereby elements of modern 
corporatism, clientelism and pluralism combine to accommodate changes in the 
structure and actors of policymaking and interest mediation. Contemporary business 
associations, often organized around or embedded in networks, provide the impetus for 
attaining more representative and pluralistic interest mediation processes even as states 
strive to maintain elements of traditional, often corporatist, arrangements.  
Revisiting interest group theories 
With groups as the basis of their analysis, interest group theorists offered fresh 
perspectives of political behaviour and systems. Yet, their analyses of interest groups 
were results of empirical and post facto observation of the formation of the particular 
group(s) with which they are concerned. Interest group theory was critiqued for this 
inherent dependency on zeitgeist.
15
 Another point of criticism was that classic interest 
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group theories assumed that shared interests defined groups, first and foremost. 
However, interest group theoreticians generally failed to offer a comprehensive political 
system based on interest groups, which was able to replace alternative political systems, 
i.e. the empires and other authoritarian regimes of the early twentieth century.  
Presumably, interest group analyses of the present are more reliable than their 
ambitious formulations of the future. In any case, by capturing the essence of a 
particular period, interest group theories accurately portrayed the processes of 
contraction-relaxation in state-market-society interaction. Interest group theories 
demonstrate that, in times of crises, unorganized or unmanaged interests present a 
potential threat. Fear or expectation of uncertainty or threat spurs lawyers, thinkers and 
leaders to invent or revert to mechanisms that ensure stronger regulation of market 
interests and a stronger and more protective state; eventually, the state responds by 
tightening its hold on markets, leading to contraction. Economic development, higher 
welfare and the expansion of liberties lead to a relaxation of the state’s grip on markets, 
allowing interest representation in national policy-making to become more pluralistic 
and competitive. Interest group theory – insufficient though it may be in offering a 
comprehensive system of governance – effectively documents the course most advanced 
capitalist nations have taken and are likely to continue taking in response to episodes of 
political, economic and social change.  
Contemporary theories of interest representation emerged in the early twentieth 
century as a ‘sociological revolt against legal formalism [where] group interaction 
constituted the reality of political life operating behind the formal legal-institutional 
disguises of society and the state.’16 Before the invention of the two prevalent theories 
of interest group politics, pluralism and corporatism, European and American states 
were decidedly monistic. The Oxford English Dictionary defines monism as ‘a theory or 
doctrine, which states that there is a single origin or destination for all the elements or 
beings within a system, or that there is a single force by which such elements are 
governed.’17 The monistic state, by monopolizing all forms of interaction between 
elements within a system, hinders interest group representation and mediation. Harold 
Laski argued that philosophers like Hegel, Bodin, Bentham and Austin created the idea 
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of a monistic state as a meaningful and reliable source of order, and subsequently 
lawyers ‘elevated the monistic state from the plane of logic to the plane of ethics.’18 
While a strong, Leviathan state may have been beneficial in lifting nations out of 
foreign occupation and war, its inability to accommodate multiple associations that 
exercise legitimate authority encouraged philosophers and lawyers to seek alternatives. 
Another traditional form of interaction between states and economic and social 
actors of various sizes and convictions was clientelism. Typically, in a system based on 
patronage, the state and the local or national elite provide welfare, protection and 
concessions to their clients in return for their loyalty and services. Clientelism, similar 
to other forms of state-market-society interaction, rests on the principle of 
interdependency. The fundamental difference in clientelism, however, is that the 
exchange between actors locked in the patron-client relationship is bound by tradition-
morality rather than (or in addition to) pragmatism or functionalism.
19
 In other words, 
the patron establishes a moral climate whereby he or she expects obedience and 
reciprocity from clients based on normative considerations. Despite the emphasis on 
morality and tradition, inequality, abuse and usurpation of interest groups by the state 
was manifest in clientelist systems in various parts of the world. Not only did states and 
political elites refrain from delegating decision making to their clientele, they also 
tended to serve particularistic interests instead of general ones. Furthermore, by serving 
their particular interests, patrons inadvertently encouraged the formation of ‘robber 
coalitions’ between the initiators of patronage relationships within state institutions and 
business or other interest groups, eroding the state’s ability to formulate representative 
policies addressing the welfare of the whole population.
20
 Finally, patronage 
relationships were informal, prolific and unmonitored, so in time, they either invaded or 
paralyzed centralized state mechanisms for policy formulation.  
The alternative to traditionally monist and clientelist structures and practices 
was classical pluralism - a direct and fundamental challenge to traditional jurisprudence, 
which rendered absolute sovereignty to the state. Classical pluralism attacked Anglo-
American political tradition in post-war Britain and the United States by introducing the 
active participation of various groups in society in policy making. Theodore Woolsey 
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wrote in 1893 ‘the quality of sovereignty does not necessarily imply unlimited power or 
unchecked power; much less undelegated power.’21 G.D.H. Cole, F. W. Maitland, 
Harold Laski, and J. N. Figgis, the four main theoreticians of British pluralism, writing 
in the early twentieth century, objected to unchecked state sovereignty exercised to the 
extent that Britain was pulled into a world war with clearly devastating consequences. 
They called on the state to claim the responsibility of its actions by stressing the 
normative and legal implications of state action. In fact, classical pluralists in Britain 
asked the state to share the moral burden of sovereignty with the rest of the society. 
Figgis, in support of pluralist policy-making, said, ‘if one were to accept the statement 
that there can be no rights except right of state and that ultimate/absolute authority rests 
in the Republic, then one denies higher morality, religion, family.’22 Two decades later, 
James K. Pollock documented the system of lobbying in the United States, where 
interest groups were already represented in Congress through their legislative agents.
23
 
On the whole, theories of group politics during and after the First World War 
acknowledged and advocated pluralism - the principle that multiple actors in society 
share political power.  
Classical pluralists, after pointing out the plurality of power-holders in modern 
societies, added that the modern state ‘however important it is and can be for [the 
people] is no more than the greatest and most permanent association or institution in 
society, and its claim to any such position will have to be carefully considered.’24 
Classical pluralism thus deconstructed the myth of state sovereignty by introducing 
association. Association is presented as the most basic and ubiquitous representative 
unit in British and American society; its recognition and use is expected to yield state 
liability, state accountability, and democracy based on active consent. In his essay, 
Personality of Associations, Laski defines an association as an entity to be treated as if 
it were an individual when subjected to law. Association, a term used in Laski’s work 
interchangeably with corporation, is a creature of the state and, like a state, ‘its purpose 
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exists only because it has secured recognition.’25 American classical pluralism held a 
similar view that association is foundational to the modern nation state: in an essay 
published in 1928, W. Y. Elliott declared that ‘the whole structure of modern society is 
associational.’26 While Elliott’s assertion may be an overstatement, classical pluralism 
relies heavily on associations in society as the most noticeable and effective form of 
institutionalized group interests.  
Pluralist systems are designed to accommodate multitudes of loosely organized, 
voluntary associations that lobby for the interests of their constituencies with the state, 
more often in competition than in coordination or cooperation. Pluralism endorsed 
association because it expected associations to deliver and enhance democracy, as 
expressed by Tocqueville’s claim that ‘liberty of association’ is a ‘necessary guarantee 
against the tyranny of the majority.’27 Several objections have since been raised to the 
idea that pluralism, in its simplest form, automatically engenders democracy. Even Paul 
Hirst, the foremost proponent of democracy through associationalism, posited several 
shortcomings of the idea. He wrote that a ‘system of cooperatively and associatively 
owned agencies that were to be managed by procedures which depended on democratic 
consent’28 would best replace conventional and competitive market relationships. He 
challenged the principle of competitive associationalism in classical pluralism further 
by arguing that when modern society utilized the associative and management capacity 
of the working class; a purer, even sanguine democratic system would be established. 
Hirst utilized the argument of associations to deconstruct the liberal capitalist maxims 
of a centrally organized but minimally interventionist state and a producer-oriented, 
competitive market society. He effectively severed the causality between pluralism and 
liberal democracy by suggesting that only those associations that were voluntary, 
worker-friendly organizations could resuscitate grassroots democratic representation.  29 
Whereas this idea bore incredible promise for expanding the theory of democratic 
pluralism, it failed because of the geographical limitations of its core assumptions and 
applicability. Associationalist democracy failed in practice outside of exceptional 
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countries such as Denmark, Norway and Sweden – where associationalism was 
traditionally ubiquitous and the culture of civic participation, dominant.  
Theorists of pluralism raised another objection to their own assumption that 
democracy could be built simply by pluralizing voluntary interest groups in society: 
relying on voluntary business associations’ representative capacity was naïve. Pluralists 
were apologetic about the influence that business interest groups had or ought to have 
on policy-making. They advocated interest group liberalism to curb the absolute power 
of the state, but recognized it had the potential to lead to ‘the ascendancy of private 
power over democratic public interest.’30 Rousseau noted that associations might be 
represented unequally in this system, thus exaggerating ‘certain aspects of a citizen’s 
interests against the other, perhaps broader attachments, loyalties, concerns, interests’ 
and contributing this way to a ‘deformed civic consciousness.’31 Both British and 
American pluralists accepted that, by the beginning of the twentieth century, the 
interests of the business elite were already widely represented in policy-making. Figgis 
attempted to clarify the position of pluralism on the role of big business in national 
policy-making by arguing that the pluralist defence of corporate rights to business 
associations did not mean a defence of ‘high finance’ or corporate societies.32 Both 
Pollock and Herring suggested that ‘sinister lobbying’33 by big business in America 
ought to be controlled by strong legislation enforced by the state. Thus, having 
recognized the strength that business interest groups could have over other groups in 
society, pluralists reaffirmed the need for some state control over the process of 
bargaining for national policies. Robert Dahl, one of the leading theoreticians of modern 
pluralism,
34
 argued that ‘the particular purposes of … associations need not conflict 
with the purposes of others or the common good; in fact, by fulfilling their purposes 
they would contribute to the common good.’35 In the same breath, however, Dahl 
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warned that organizational pluralism varied greatly and implied that neither the 
conditions he listed for polyarchic democracy nor the favourable policy outcomes of 
interest group representation were always attainable. Evidently, modern pluralism was 
potentially hazardous when and if unchecked power was concentrated in a handful of 
voluntary associations.  
Interest group theory diversified as scholars sought alternatives to the inadequate 
or inapplicable theories of pluralism in the post Cold War era. A milestone in the study 
of state-market-society relations was Lehmbruch’s 1974 re-introduction of corporatism 
as the main rival to pluralist interest representation.
36
 Corporatism was re-introduced in 
the 1970s after Keynesian economic policies were discredited by the international 
financial crisis and both laissez faire and protectionist economic policies were re-
evaluated to respond to the international economic slow-down.
37
 Also at the time, Asian 
markets were in full bloom and the Asian model of organizational hierarchy was 
championed as a foolproof recipe for economic growth. The resurgence of corporatism 
in South America and East Asia in the late twentieth century widened the theoretical 
debate on the definitions and limitations of corporatism, leading to the invention of such 
new terminology as neo-corporatism, societal-corporatism and state-corporatism. While 
classical corporatism, whose development is meticulously documented by Philippe 
Schmitter in his introduction to Trends Towards Corporatist Intermediation, is a largely 
continental European theory dating back to the 19
th
 century, the second generation of 
corporatist theory examined state-market-society relations in a wide range of countries 
in North and South America and Asia. In addition to distancing itself from theories that 
infamously inspired fascism and National Socialism in Europe, modern corporatism was 
primarily occupied with contesting the idea and practices of modern pluralism.
 38
  
The main feature of corporatism is that policies are determined ‘by an 
established structure of organized group interests’, unlike pluralism, where group 
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interests exist in an unorganized, competitive environment.
 39
 To corporatists, structure 
and organization are critical to ensure that non-competitive interest representation 
delivers equitable policy outcomes. Consequently, corporatist theories are inclined to 
emphasize systemic or structural aspects of interest representation. Schmitter underlines 
the systemic quality of corporatism in his frequently-quoted definition: ‘Corporatism is 
a system of interest representation in which the constituent units are organized into a 
limited number of singular, compulsory, non-competitive, hierarchically ordered, and 
functionally differentiated categories, recognized or licensed (if not created) by the 
state, and granted a deliberate representational monopoly within their respective 
categories and in exchange for observing certain controls on their selection of leaders 
and articulation of demands and supports.’40 Philip Schmitter’s systemic definition, 
which lays the foundation for theories of corporatism, is by no means exhaustive. 
Lehmbruch sees corporatism as simply a model of policymaking in liberal democracies 
whereby centralized business and labour interest associations engage in policy-based 
bargaining with governments in an institutionalized setting.
41
Whether presented as a 
system of representation or a model of national policy-making, corporatism rests on 
state-created or recognized hierarchical organizations of interest groups, 
institutionalized bargaining processes, and supporting structural arrangements. Bearing 
in mind the limitations of corporatism’s various definitions, this dissertation treats 
corporatism as a model of interest group mediation. 
Corporatist theorists, like their pluralist counterparts, rose to the defence of 
associations, which had long been treated by mainstream theories as ‘a basis for 
disorder.’42 Schmitter and Streeck (1985) argue that associations are in fact useful in 
guaranteeing order in capitalist market relations, which are characterized by parties with 
conflicting claims. Since societies are not naturally divided into associations of 
individuals with shared notions of faith, culture, and occupation, corporative associative 
orders are necessary to deliver equal protection and predictable treatment to all groups. 
In the corporative-associative order, the association is as crucial to the system as the 
state, market and the society are; association is the fourth model of social order. Unlike 
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pluralism, where theorists disclaimed allegations that the interests of capitalist class or 
business elites were overrepresented in policy-making, corporatism apologizes for its 
endorsement of a strong state in interest mediation. Schmitter asserts that corporatism is 
not a system that will undermine capitalism but rather one that seeks to rescue and 
consolidate capitalism. According to Panitch, this is exemplary of the apologetic 
manner that corporatist theories adopt when advocating for a more-than-minimal state 
in capitalist systems. Modern corporatist theory, in order to disassociate itself from non-
capitalist, authoritarian systems that classical corporatism engendered, pledged an 
allegiance with advanced capitalism. 
The state, the first model of social order, features indisputably at the centre of 
corporatist theories. In societal corporatism, according to Pearson, business associations 
become ‘facilitators of the state’s economic work’ and bridge the policy dialogue 
between companies, labourers (via trade unions) and other constituencies and the 
state.
43
 State corporatism is different from societal corporatism because in the former, 
the state manages associations to accrue benefits primarily to the state and the national 
economy. State corporatist arrangements are not entirely unfeasible for business 
associations, though. Generally, states institutionalize and incorporate business 
associations into a mechanism whereby associations are guaranteed access to decision-
making. However, institutionalized political status grants associations an ‘other-
determined agenda[s] of issues.’44 While they can omit the strenuous task of internal 
policy-making, they cannot devise original agendas according to internal bargaining 
among their membership – a right that associations have in societal corporatism. In state 
corporatism, business associations rely on regular flows of state subsidies. 
Consequently, states infuse the much-needed security and stability for associational 
development that pluralist or societal corporatist structures do not have.  
Both the theories and the practice of corporatism, similar to pluralism, have 
several shortcomings. First of all, corporatism fails to reduce the cost of compliance to 
actors in the interest mediation process. In other words, corporatist structures 
disenfranchise a range of interest groups and civil society organizations from decision-
making. Corporatism assumes an interdependence of interests, whereas pluralism 
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assumes that interests compete. When competition among business actors increases, 
they tend to organize around common interests instead of trying to diverge or 
marginalize, because individual members value the opportunity costs of membership 
more than competition within the organization.
45
 This impetus partially explains the 
proliferation of business associations in countries that are late entrants into integrated 
markets, such as the post-communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe. As larger 
companies join associations, their chances of mitigating the costs of non-compliance, 
which are proportional to corporate size, increase. However, the perception of costs and 
competition among members weakens governance within associations. The higher their 
expectations are of effective political and economic influence, the lower the chance of 
undemanding governance. However, when corporatist states delegate the monopoly of 
representation to designated associations, business loses the option of choice – of 
changing lanes or moving to associations where interests would be better served. 
Secondly, Panitch and Sabel claim that closely interwoven associations often complain 
about the overburden of cooperating with their states.
46
 In certain cases, states abuse 
organizational resources to the extent that resources are employed more for the benefit 
of state agencies than for the interests of shareholders. In others, states redesign or 
change rules and regulations governing association activity to accrue more benefit to 
state actors or agencies. Thirdly, corporatist theories overlook the role of non-state and 
non-business actors in policy negotiations, such as NGOs, multinationals, international 
organizations or domestic non-producer interests groups. Finally, individual/business 
action or inaction is often neglected because corporatist theory’s gaze is fixed on 




There may be differences between the two major interest group theories, but in 
practice corporatism and pluralism have often converged into hybrid forms of interest 
representation. Contemporary business associations function according to pluralistic 
corporatist or corporate pluralistic arrangements in order to accommodate country-
specific dynamics and mitigate the possible shortcomings of either arrangement. 
Modern business associations endorse corporatism because, in engaging with the state 
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through organized bargaining, they raise their public profile and acquire state-induced 
benefits, e.g. automatic recognition and preferential access. Similarly, associations 
support pluralism because they are more efficient, autonomous and responsive to 
member interests in a plural, diverse and competitive policy-making environment. Grant 
Jordan asserts that neither pluralism nor corporatism is divergent or original. 
Furthermore, he argues that the corporate pluralism presented by scholars like Kvavik 
or Heisler in the late 1970s was not novel either; their hybrid model merely portrayed 
the problems of corporatism and pluralism: ‘[Corporate pluralism] is a statement to the 
effect that there are patterns of regularity, although there are a growing number of active 
groups which introduce uncertainty and disorder to the system.’48 Even if the 
convergence of corporatism and pluralism does not result in a comprehensive theory of 
interest politics, the fact that convergence occurred shows the adaptability and 
applicability of hybrid interest group theories to various contexts.  
The discussion on interest groups so far has been premised on the assumption 
that communication between market actors and state/political elite occurs within the 
nation state. The boundaries of the nation state, therefore, determine the limits of 
associational activity and policy-based communication between associations and 
decision makers. It is within the confines of the nation state that theories of interest 
group interaction converged to form hybrid structures, and it is through those structures 
that national policy makers engaged in dialogue with associations – registered or 
voluntary – operating in their nation state. After highlighting the hybridisation of 
interest group theories in response to changing national economic conditions and 
national political or institutional environments, this paper asserts that globalisation 
expanded the conventional boundaries of policy-based interaction among associations 
and between states and associations.
49
 Moreover, globalisation, ‘in the process of 
creating a single, and increasingly undifferentiated field for world capitalism, integrate 
[d] the various polities, cultures and institutions of national societies into an emergent 
transnational or global society’.50 Therefore, associations in the global epoch reflect and 
represent the interests of both national and transnational societies. The spatial shift in 
state-market-society interaction via interest associations not only triggered structural 
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changes to accommodate new channels of interaction between states and interest 
groups, it also produced new associations, which, through reinvention, were adapted to 
transnational and global dynamics.  
Associations around the world, especially business interest organisations 
responded in myriad ways to globalisation. The expansion of the global economy 
diversified business and labour interests in nation states and proliferated national 
business interest groups as the so-called ‘third sector’ expanded. As new groups 
emerged, the agenda of issues grew more diverse and subsequently impeded traditional, 
centralised bargaining at the level of the business association. Moreover, increased 
interaction and diplomacy among firms and between business associations and nation 
states challenged and reduced the state, particularly in predominantly pluralist 
contexts.
51
 In corporatist contexts, on the other hand, the number of ‘quasi-autonomous 
NGOs and quasi-autonomous governmental organizations, which stand between 
business, government and trade union organizations’ increased substantially. 52  The 
interaction between these new actors with traditional business interest groups and states 
complicated the multilateral bargaining process of advanced capitalist states. Most 
importantly, globalisation advanced the internationalization of policy-making to the 
point where business associations were able to operate freely above and beyond the 
control of nation states, national electorates and legislative bodies. These transnational 
actors engage in policy dialogue with regional or international organizations, like the 
European Union and the World Trade Organization, to complement or replace their 
presence in national (economic) policy-making. Globalisation, therefore, blurred the 
boundaries between market, state, society and association in traditional interest group 
theories, as the realms of all four actors began to overlap.  
Transnationalisation and globalisation enabled and encouraged existing and new 
associations to operate above and beyond the control of nation states. Contemporary 
associations interact with national and supranational policymakers through new 
structures, i.e. transnational networks. Business communities in developed and 
developing countries either add new features
53
 to existing commercial networks so as to 
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operate globally or invent new networks of economic, political and social 
communication. Market integration in regional economic bodies, such as the European 
Union, accelerates the employment of economic/commercial networks to transmit 
business interests from the local to global level and vice versa. These networks cut 
across the conceptual boundaries of transnationalism.
54
 There is a vast and growing 
body of literature on the nature, structure, functions, composition and operations of 
transnational networks, and the tendency in most network theory is to underline the 
importance of a particular global or transnational business community in initiating, 
maintaining and sustaining these networks.
55
 This transnational business community is 
arguably involved in triggering, monitoring and evaluating social and economic 
development.
56
 Most of the business actors that constitute the transnational business 
community are predominantly from advanced capitalist states with developed and 
pluralistic market mechanisms. Consequently, local, national and global actors based in 
or originating from advanced capitalist counties are the leaders of rapidly changing 
transnational and global trends.  
The existence of transnational business networks does not mean that the 
individuals or groups constituting their membership have purely transnational or global 
interests. The membership base of transnational networks is not homogenous, and 
members of global organizations may well harbour communal or nationalistic interests, 
aspirations and connections. Hence, local-national elements often influence the nature 
and content of transactions between members of transnational networks. Carroll and 
Fenema argue that despite claims by Leslie Sklair in The Transnational Capitalist Class 
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and others that global capitalism has produced a globalizing business community, 




Moreover, due to the impact of local-national elements, some business 
organisations within transnational networks act like NGOs with civilian or non-
capitalist impulses. In other words, business organisations enter a process of 
civilianisation where the lines of differentiation between for-profit and non-profit, i.e. 
associational activity, are blurred. The civilianisation of business associations is most 
vivid in contexts where state corporatism traditionally disenfranchises voluntary 
organisations of businesspeople, pushing them to the margins of civil society, where the 
mass of NGOs is clustered. While some of these organisations still pursue access to the 
state through traditional policy bargaining mechanisms, others begin lobbying for the 
interests of their members outside of state corporatist mechanisms.  
Compared to both state-sanctioned business organisations operating across 
transnational networks and networks of transnational/global capitalists, these voluntary 
organisations and their networks bore a ‘civilian’ character, enabling their members to 
prioritize issues of political identity, representation and pluralism over competition, 
profit maximization and market dominance and/or explore political, spiritual and moral 
connections simultaneously with business ventures. Eventually, networks of new 
voluntary associations became alternative spaces for the communication and reinvention 
of identities, beliefs, convictions, values, and practices. In order to understand these 
networks and what they transmit, it is essential to look at the actors within them, i.e. the 
business associations.  
Business associations around the world: What the empirical evidence tells us 
Interest group theories have effectively underlined the importance of 
associations for a representative process of policy-making in any system. According to 
some theorists, freedom of association is a crucial civil right that ought to be 
safeguarded. Others claim that the mere existence of associations legitimizes a regime, 
while all agree that states need associations to implement, delegate and test their 
authority in national policy-making. Interest group theories single out business and 
employers’ associations and labour interest organizations (trade unions where 
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applicable) as two associations to study empirically to understand state-market-society 
relationships. This research does not presuppose that business associations are the only 
channels of state-market-society interaction. However, business associations are 
particularly important because, in the evolution of interest group theories, it was 
commonly held that the relationship between government and business determined the 
character of the regime and that power struggles primarily involved government and 
business.
58
 While this may be an overstatement, especially in the global era when 
multiple non-profit actors are at the forefront of international policy-making, business 
associations are nevertheless the most common and effective type of associations in 
market societies.  
Business associations bring together individuals and companies that generate 
and manage a large share of national revenue; employ vast numbers of people; create 
know-how and carry out innovative research; and provide services such as recreation, 
child-care, environmental protection, etc. They are crucial, therefore, to the welfare of 
countries. Consequently, businesspeople and organizations representing their interests 
are concerned with and seek involvement in formulating policies that affect not only 
their business operations but also the lives and welfare of their stakeholders. Unlike 
public sector interest organizations, such as chambers of commerce and trade, voluntary 
business associations are more likely to preserve a critical distance from state 
institutions’ or governments’ view of economic and social policies. In advanced 
capitalist states with diverse and pluralist associational environments, business 
associations are able to represent companies of all sizes from different sectors and 
articulate the interests, inclinations and demands in markets, where the pace of change 
and innovation is fast. They are generally more vulnerable to market pressures and so 
are able to portray the real impact of economic change on market actors more 
accurately. Finally, they are legally recognized, accountable bodies of institutionalized 
representation that have a working knowledge of interacting with state institutions and 
governments, so they are a viable option for any firm or businessman intending to 
influence policy-making.  
From a very functionalist viewpoint, businesses converge around associations to 
obtain public goods. There is a dependency relationship between state institutions that 
provide public goods and market actors. Some organizations in neo-corporatist systems 
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are supported directly by the state and are therefore providers of public goods as well as 
of training, services, trade promotion and support. In Austria, for instance, the structure 
that exists within business organizations, which have mandatory, fee-based 
membership, facilitates a democratic and representative process of interest mediation 
between government and business. There is a high rate of membership in business 
associations and members are actively involved in the affairs of the association.
59
 
France, on the other hand, has a neo-corporatist structure where business associations 
cannot recruit hard-working, enthusiastic members and are ineffectual lobbyists 
compared to the lobbyists recruited by large French corporations.
60
 Regardless of 
whether membership is voluntary or compulsory, businesses join business associations 
because associations are gateways into the realm of the state – and, if successful, 
business associations are very effective mechanisms for exerting influence over policy, 
influencing public opinion and securing access to public funds, goods, etc. 
The discourse on national business associations identifies the following 
determinants
61
 of associational performance: ‘state-centred institutional factors, regime 
characteristics, national policy style, business or industrial culture, [and] economy-
centred factors.’62 Collective action, rational choice and class-based theories have 
addressed the issue of associational performance using variables other than the five 
listed above, but these theories do not consider the influence of national/ regional 
factors.  
Differences in institutions, regimes, and industrial bargaining cultures across 
countries and regions also affect country-specific and regional business associations’ 
performance in interest mediation.
63
 Broadly, Anglo-Saxon state-market-society 
relations are characterized by pluralism while state-corporatism is more common in 
South America and societal-corporatism in East Asia. Central and Eastern European 
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states, on the other hand, are home to hybrid structures that combine pluralist and 
corporatist models.
64
 At the same time, however, national/regional variables help to 
explain empirical differences between business associations’ performance and challenge 
theoretical generalizations.  
North American interest group politics are generally considered pluralistic, 
although both Canada and the United States underwent episodes of corporatisation. 
Political and economic liberalism in both countries partially explain the emergence of 
pluralist structures. In Canada, the values of the business elite, such as competitiveness, 
voluntarism, individualism, laissez faire competition, correspond to pluralism and the 
associations founded by liberal market enthusiasts eschew corporatism. Yet, in both the 
United States and Canada, the aggressive pursuit of free market competition among 
businesses created equally competitive peak associations instead of unitary, all-
encompassing, sector-wide associations.
65
 In North American pluralism, equal access of 
associations to the government, i.e. the Congress and the Senate, is guaranteed through 
the legal enforcement of a precondition of equality of parties to the contracts deemed 
legitimate by the state. In the specialized system of agreements that exist between 
governments and interest groups, ‘inequality of individual actors is compensated for by 
equal collective procedural status rights of partners to the collective contract’.66 The 
federal state ensures equal representation in collective bargaining through regulation. 
Since North American interest representation processes emerged not only to liberate but 
also to rein in interest groups, the engagement of interest groups in policy-making 
through lobbying and advisory councils, such as the Business Advisory Council of the 
Department of Commerce, is governed by a carefully constructed legal framework. 
Moreover, federal and state agencies finance associations with the expectation that they 
act as ‘informal channels for administrative coordination’.67 Consequently, the United 
States and Canada employ elements of corporatism in their manifestly plural models of 
interest representation.  
Interest mediation in South America during the privatization and market 
liberalisation era of the 1980s has been studied for signs of pluralism and associational 
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autonomy because South American corporatism was infamous for bolstering 
authoritarian regimes. Before the 1980s, most countries in South America used 
corporatist arrangements, which were associated with cronyism, clientelism and 
corruption. South American corporatism, therefore, was considered to be a major 
impediment to participatory democracy. Interest group representation in Mexico 
exemplified South American corporatism. Mexico’s ruling party, PNR, (National 
Revolutionary Party- later to be termed PRI) founded intermediary associations to 
represent business and labour interests. Through these intermediary associations, which 
were largely under the influence of the party, PNR increased its political control, 
demobilized mass movements of workers and peasants and vacated the Mexican public 
sphere. In the 1980s, the PRI finally faced a crisis of legitimacy when the party’s main 
support base, the proletariat, moved in vast numbers towards the political left. However, 
PRI’s power remained unchallenged well into the following decade because decades of 
state corporatism hindered the development of alternative routes for influencing policy 
and communicating with the state. Mexico’s state corporatism, which was adopted by 
Argentina and Venezuela as well, was not purely corporatist but combined clientelism 
and corporatism in an idiosyncratic ‘corporatist patronage system - an alliance of 
profits’.68 Strong corporatism started to show signs of weakening under the Zedillo 
administration (1994-2000) and was largely eradicated prior to Fox’s election in 2000.69 
It should be noted, however, that the powerful actors in Mexico’s business-labour-state 
bargaining process were not business lobbies but labour unions. Big unions suffered 
throughout the 1990s due to political reforms and democratization; while the larger 
unions disintegrated, smaller ones gained independence. Similarly, opposition parties 
flourished under the relaxation of ruling party and labour solidarity. However, because 
federal and local tripartite negotiations are still the constitutionally defined ways to 
intermediate policy,
70
 reform has been slow. As of 2012, Mexico is deemed to have 
stronger voluntary business associations but they seldom exercise policy impact because 
the government cannot effectively involve these associations in policy making.
71
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East Asian corporatism, pioneered by Japanese state corporatism during Japan’s 
so-called ‘catch-up development’ in the 1960s, used interest mediation processes that 
were tailored to East Asian societies and markets. The Japanese developmental state, an 
invention of the East Asian ‘catch-up’ economic development program, endorsed heavy 
subsidization of industry and protection for financial markets from external pressures.
72
 
Japanese-style state corporatism mandated the taming of domestic corporations, the 
keiretsu, by monopolizing subsidy allocation. Businesses were kept on a tight leash by 
the export-oriented production quotas enforced by the state. State-controlled banking 
tightened the leash further by monitoring profitability and managing credit allocation. A 
landmark of East Asian state corporatism was the establishment in 1949 of MITI 
(Japan’s Ministry of International Trade and Industry) to monitor the market, reward 
and punish business performance, and regulate development across industries. MITI 
was a state corporatist institution that enabled high-level, centralized bargaining with 
industry and other economic actors within the parameters established by the state. 
Japanese and other East Asian countries’ apolitical and highly educated workforce were 
incorporated into a labour market based on high job security – often interpreted as 
lifetime employment – and loyalty to the enterprise. Labour unionization was 
discouraged by the state, and instead, apolitical enterprise unions promoted ‘peaceful’ 
interest mediation guaranteed by labourers’ filial duty towards their enterprises.73 
Korea’s export-oriented development was carried out by chaebols, like the Japanese 
zaibatsu in 1950s, and government bureaus controlled chaebols through delicate state 
corporatist arrangements. The Korean state intervened in union negotiations from 1963 
until 1987 in order to suppress labour union activity and enforce state corporatist policy 
bargaining through apolitical associations. East Asian state corporatism evolved into 
societal corporatism after a series of anti-systemic movements, such as the 1987 
national union strikes in Korea. Societal corporatism helped Korea and Japan ease 
tensions in the labour market by offering more representation and room for 
manoeuvring in economic policy negotiations. Despite growing demands for 
unionization, especially with respect to wage bargaining; clashing cultural values; and 
the indirect influence of states to prevent politicization of the labour market, societal 
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The evolution of interest group politics in Europe since the beginning of the 
twentieth century reflects the significant economic, political and social changes that 
have occurred at both nation-state and regional levels. Post-war economic and political 
integration have contributed remarkably to the development and transformation of 
interest group politics in European nation states, perhaps influencing the interest 
mediation process in individual EU member states more decidedly than factors 
indigenous to those states. Moreover, as political and economic integration under the 
aegis of the EU widened and deepened, the realm of interest group politics in Europe 
also expanded from a national to transnational level. Finally, developments in interest 
group politics in the EU have invariably affected policy-making processes in pre-
accession and candidate countries; as well as in other developing countries in the 
Mediterranean region. The following section will trace the development of interest 
group politics in Europe since the early twentieth century so as to discern the influence 
of regional economic and political integration on the hybridization of pluralist and 
corporatist arrangements.  
Neo-corporatism appears to be the dominant model of interest mediation in 
continental Europe and elements of neo-corporatism are also found in otherwise 
pluralist interest representation processes in Britain, Denmark and Switzerland. 
Continental European countries are ostensibly endowed with a socio-political tradition 
that fosters corporatist structures. Kocka professed that Germany’s experience with a 
feudal-bureaucratic structure and with industrial and economic backwardness prior to 
World War I created the basis for its modern corporatism.
75
 The transition from a 
parliamentary to presidential system in France encouraged policy formulation through 
state-orchestrated interest mediation, according to Berger.
76
 Conservative Catholicism 
of Western Europe mandates subsidiarity, a principle wherein the state does not 
interfere with activities that communities can perform; subsidiarity was contradicted by 
radical corporatist political leaders, Mussolini, Salazar and Franco, who enforced 
hierarchical structures to replace primordial forms of bargaining among industrial and 
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 Yet, it is difficult to claim that culture and tradition alone 
explain the reasons why most countries in Europe prefer to build modern corporatist 
structures.  
Neo-corporatist structures are found in varying forms in France, Germany, 
Austria and Scandinavian countries. Membership in associations is compulsory and all 
industries in a typical European neo-corporatist economy have corresponding chambers. 
Sector-wide taxation revenues are transferred to the corresponding industrial association 
by the state. Associations that are bound by public law and have compulsory 
membership are often guaranteed funds and have stronger lobbying power and robust 
representation in governmental policymaking.
78
 In the French case, interest group 
representation has been limited to organizations with compulsory membership and 
which ‘act as quasi-state agents in many matters of regulation and policy 
implementation’.79 French dirigisme, a persistent and aggressive type of state 
corporatism that reigned until the end of 1970s, was based on state-generated limitations 
of political party and interest group involvement in policy-making. Even this rooted 
system was transformed, however, to societal corporatism during the 1980s and 1990s 
when ambitious privatisation packages were passed after institutionalized (i.e. 
Privatisation Commission) negotiations with big businesses and labour on national 
economic policy-making. However, it is difficult to claim that corporatist arrangements 
are the norm on the continent when countries like Belgium or Denmark show elements 
of pluralism in their decentralized associations and trade unions and corporatist 
arrangements in étatiste regimes display signs of pluralism.  
Belgium and Denmark have interest representation processes that are pluralistic 
– in theory. In the Belgian case, the political commitment to pluralist arrangements was 
strained by an episode of economic deterioration in the 1980s. During this period, 
conflicts between public and private sector interests over policy influence hampered 
peaceful interest mediation, despite the highly representative nature of national unions 
and business interest organizations, which represented white and blue collar labourers 
from both the Flemish and Walloon regions. As interest politics spiralled out of control, 
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the Belgian government adopted a partisan, right wing rhetoric that placed much of the 
blame for the economic downturn on trade unions and business organizations. 
Interestingly, Belgium’s shift to the right bolstered its theoretical commitment to 
pluralism even while prompting the government to install neo-corporatist arrangements 
to control and moderate interest group bargaining in economic policy-making. For 
instance,  
‘even when the government did facilitate the devolution of bargaining to sectoral and 
company level [a pluralist practice], it insisted that agreements reached should be in 
accord with its national guidelines. In the absence of an appropriate agreement, the 
government was prepared to impose sanctions on both workers and employers [a 
corporatist measure]’.80  
Denmark responded to an economic crisis in the 1980s with a neo-liberal 
economic program, theoretically dedicated to pluralism but with neo-corporatist 
measures to govern disorderly industry-business-state relations. A remarkable example 
of this move was the amendment to Denmark’s freedom of negotiation principle in 
bargaining: a new law was introduced which deemed labour and business organizations 
responsible for acknowledging and administering government decisions.
81
 This was a 
direct intervention in the process of interest intermediation. The Danish and Belgian 
cases suggest that some European countries are committed to pluralism in principle but 
experiment with corporatist arrangements to secure peaceful and smooth relationships 
between different interest groups in their societies.  
In Central and Eastern European countries (CEEC), small business associations 
proliferated following the collapse of the USSR, due to the erosion of central controls 
on associational development. Business organizations promptly became venues to 
exchange information and exploit newfound entrepreneurial opportunities in the market 
transition process. The proliferation of business associations in the post-Soviet period 
mirrored a scramble to engage in private ventures. However, CEEC transitional 
economies were unable to immediately establish Anglo Saxon pluralism, which was 
prescribed by European and international financial organizations alongside liberal 
market institutions and arrangements. Chambers of commerce and other business 
associations were unable to decide whether new private enterprises should be obliged to 
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join peak associations, trade unions or chambers. Experiments with associational 
models in post-communist transition countries, like the Slovak Republic and Hungary, 
yielded nation-wide business interest organizations based on compulsory membership, 
while similar processes in the Czech Republic generated pluralist business associations 
based on voluntary membership.
82
 Variation in post-transition business associations in 
the CEEC confirms the malleability of pluralism and corporatism and the progression of 
interest group politics towards hybrid models. 
Concurrently with the transition in CEEC economies, Western European states 
were working towards economic and monetary integration under the aegis of the 
European Economic Community. The evolution of the economic community into the 
European Union, an aspirational economic, political, social – and according to some, 
cultural – project had important consequences for interest group politics in Europe. 
When integration and European enlargement attained significant momentum, the 
European Union was interminably changed into a polity  
composed of traditional domestic relations within countries, traditional international 
relations between countries, less traditional transnational relations between both 
individuals and organizations across national boundaries, and entirely non-traditional 
supranational relations between European level public institutions, on the one hand, and 
on the other, a European civil society consisting of domestic, international, and 
transnational forces and relations and including both nation states and, in manifold 
national and cross national combinations, their constituents.
83
  
The confusing web of relationships between different actors in the European 
Union is arguably detrimental to national neo-corporatist structures in Europe. In 
practice, a supranational form of pluralism has replaced corporatist arrangements in 
member states. Europeanization impedes national labour market regimes, undermines 
nation states’ ability to employ protective barriers to entry, hampers associational 
autonomy and hierarchy in nation-states, and alters governments’ tools to formulate 
social policy. Furthermore, the process of centralized, collective bargaining between 
governments and trade unions is weakened by strong business interest organizations, 
which are better able to adapt to the Europeanization of markets than labour 
organizations.
84
 As the European Union ossifies into a transnational body, where an 
evolving transnational agenda attracts not only interest groups but also think tanks and 
NGOs across Europe to the policy making process, business associations find 
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themselves in an unusually diverse and challenging policy environment. Business 
associations are inevitably first comers to a transnational and plural form of interest 
mediation in the EU – which is still in the making – and they will not only reap the 
advantages of their early arrival but also continue to invest in their adaptation to an 
ever-changing environment.  
In the 1990s, business associations in Europe developed effective working 
relationships with the European Commission and adopted the practice of participating in 
technical committees, hearings, etc. However, according to John Russell and Paul 
Adamson, since the turn of the millennium, business associations are no longer able to 
rely on their working relationship with the Commission to guarantee successful policy 
outcomes because European enlargement has created a more populated and populist 
European Parliament and more diverse European market.
85
 Now, business organizations 
operating at the national and regional level in Europe need to exercise influence over a 
Parliament comprised of 27 nationalities and seven political groups. They also need to 
manage the influence that civil society organizations have on the Parliament, a decision-
making body that responds primarily to populist demands. Before the fifth enlargement 
in 2004, the European Commission released a ‘White Paper on Governance’ to examine 
the challenges to policy-making that new member states might introduce. The White 
Paper proposed a system of EU-wide corporatist intermediation in which business 
organizations selected for the policy bargaining process were informed well in advance 
of the Union’s policy agenda. It also urged EU business associations to seek more 
representation and better regulation.
86
 While business organizations are engaged in a 
relatively smoother policy dialogue with the Commission, the plurality of other policy-
making bodies and interest groups in the EU continue to present many new challenges 
for national and EU-wide business associations.  
Another way that European integration changed traditional business interest 
representation in member states was through the creation of European horizontal 
business associations (HBAs), whose main purpose was to ensure a continuous and 
formalized dialogue with EU institutions. This process of formalized policy dialogue is 
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embedded in the EU legal framework.
87
 Article 138 and 139 of the European 
Commission (EC) Treaty introduced a social policy dialogue between employers’ 
organizations and trade unions across EU member states and associate members. The 
European Social Dialogue scheme enables social partners to give their opinion, in the 
form of consultation, to the Commission and to partake in the Council’s decision-
making process.  To this end, the EC selects a set of employers’ organizations and trade 
unions as ‘Social Partners’ according to certain criteria. Partner organizations should be 
‘cross-industry or relate to specific sectors or categories and be organised at the 
European level; consist of organisations, which are themselves an integral and 
recognised part of member-state social partner structures and with the capacity to 
negotiate agreements, and which are representative of all Member states, as far as 
possible; and have adequate structures to ensure their effective participation in the 
consultation process’.88 Formalized policy dialogue is only one of the mechanisms 
through which the European Union is urging national and transnational plural interest 
groups to engage in an organized, pre-meditated European form of representation. 
Embedded in the legal framework of the EU and managed by Brussels, this mechanism 
exemplifies the corporatist undercurrents of European transnational pluralism. 
Transnational pluralism is offered as a promising alternative to modern 
corporatist and pluralist arrangements; however, in practice, transnational business 
interest organizations are neither completely apt nor effective in policy bargaining at the 
EU level. One of the problems that plague multi-level governance in the EU is the sheer 
variety of EU-level institutions, which include task forces, working groups, committees, 
sub-committees, Council of Ministers, Directorate Generals, and so on. Often, 
policymaking becomes too complicated, too cumbersome and too time-consuming 
amidst a flurry of institutions, meetings, paperwork and multilateral concertation. Most 
European level business organizations are under-funded and rely on volunteers to carry 
out administrative tasks in Brussels. Another downside to the institutionalized form of 
negotiations between EU bodies and horizontal business associations is that the sheer 
size of HBAs prevents them from effectively representing their members. Moreover, 
according to Teufelsbeuer, their effectiveness is dependent on the ability of national 
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business organizations, their members, to exercise influence over EU-level policy 
making.  In fact, national business organizations are more dominant than HBAs in 
Brussels: 58% of European business associations are national associations that have 
their own offices in Brussels to lobby Congress, the Commission and Parliament.
89
 
Considering that HBAs are not autonomous and are controlled by member 
organizations, one would be hard-pressed to claim that transnational pluralism is fully 
effective. Moreover, the low effectiveness of HBAs induces privatization (i.e. use of 
professional lobbying companies) and nationalisation of business interest representation 
makes prospects for transnationalisation bleak – at least for the time being. That said, 
the establishment and engagement of horizontal associations in the EU policy making 
mechanism is promising, especially to deliver legitimacy to decisions taken above 
nation states. 
Islam and associationalism in the Middle East  
Compared to Europe, North and South America, and East Asia, references to the 
Middle East in interest group studies are brief and sporadic. Limited access to 
information and field research may have been the immediate reasons for the lack of 
scholarly output.
90
 It is also likely that students of Middle Eastern politics, economy and 
society have collectively resorted to the dominant (Orientalist) thinking that Arab and 
Middle Eastern states are corporatist, by default. Nazih Ayubi detects the inherent 
tendency in Western scholarship on the Middle East to analyse Islamic society as a 
community where individualism and pluralism are unthinkable; Islamic politics is 
allegedly characterized by authoritarianism supplemented by a celebration of the 
community of believers, umma, over individuals. Hence, most contemporary literature 
on interest group bargaining and policy-making in the post-independence Middle 
Eastern states puts religion at the heart of social, political and economic 
transformations. While some theological interpretations and social and political 
practices affirm certain conclusions reached by mainstream theories, these theories lack 
the insight of Ayubi, who concludes that ubiquitous corporatist structures in Arab and 
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non-Arab Middle Eastern states are the products of a battle between an egalitarian, 
almost utopic vision of Islamic society and ‘governments’ increased need for more 
defined and fairly stable social bases to organize production, control diversity and 
secure support for the state’91. Islamic corporatism, assuming that a specific type of 
corporatism is attributable to the Muslim world, is therefore designed to organize, 
manage and co-opt the interests of different groups in Middle Eastern society. In that 
sense, interest group representation in the Middle East, similar to European, North and 
South American contexts, varies according to the country and historical period and 
tends to operate through hybrid arrangements. The following discussion on the role, 
presence and functions of business associations in Egypt, Iran and Jordan, allude to the 
broader debate on interest group politics in the Middle East.   
The literature on organized business’s influence on state policy in the Middle 
East and North Africa is characterized by references to the positive/negative impact of 
business-state relations on economic development. A striking feature of all business 
organisations in the Middle East is their commitment and contribution to economic 
development. Following an argument made earlier on clientelism, it may be suggested 
that the business community assumes a development role on a moral-traditional 
impulse. On the other hand, organized business groups in the Middle East and North 
Africa operate according to rules set out by their states and within corporatist structures 
erected by their governments to attain the development goals of the political elite. Thus, 
what seems to emerge is a combination of clientelism and corporatism where the state 
determines the breadth and functions of patronage ties and tries to balance political and 
economic imperatives. For instance, in Egypt ‘informal modes of politics persist 
because the state successfully neutralizes formal political associations and channels of 
interest articulation,’92 so the state is clearly involved in balancing different forms of 
policy interaction between diverse groups of businesspeople and its own institutions. 
Egypt’s postcolonial industrial development witnessed power struggles between 
members of a prominent business oligarchy composed of rival families of investors, 
bankers and manufacturers who dominated the economy through their communal 
networks. Their co-optation was of paramount importance to the political and economic 
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welfare of Egypt, so the state had to reconcile traditional forms of policy bargaining 
with newer and more centralized-hierarchical ones.  
Simultaneously, interest groups and associations responded to the state’s 
reconciliation of traditional forms of policy interaction and corporatist structures by 
inventing new mechanisms for exerting political and social influence and extracting 
distributional benefits. Clement Henry Moore and Amal Rassam demonstrated that in 
Egypt, Tunisia and Iraq, clientelism in the conventional sense did not exist after the 
1970s and 1980s. Their observations support the argument made by Shambayati that 
movements propagating a new sense of religious morality are challenging the 
traditionally clientelistic behaviour of Middle Eastern states.
93
 Reminiscent of early 
twentieth century Anglo-American politics, where clientelist structures tying the 
political and business elite together were unwound by the pluralisation of interest 
groups, revolutionary movements in the Middle East and North Africa during and after 
the 1960s witnessed the surfacing of anti-clientelist sentiments among members of the 
traditional middle and working class. For example, in articulating their support for 
Nasser’s socialist developmentalism, Egypt’s associations of craftsmen, small to 
medium sized enterprise owners, farmers and workers unions reflected on their moral 
and religious objections to previous clientelist forms of state-market-society interaction. 
While traditional patronage networks resisted transformation in smaller states like 
Lebanon, the larger and centralized states of Egypt, Tunisia and Iraq undermined former 
patron-client structures. In fact, these structures were supplanted with emergent forms 
of solidarity networks or groups, which allowed its members to operate without 
submitting to the traditional patterns of exchange that clientelism enforced. In Egypt, 
the shillal, small, impermanent solidarity networks employed by their members to 
derive political and economic concessions from the state and delve into its bureaucracy 
to exert policy influence, emerged during the Nasser period and proliferated under 
Sadat. Shillal allow its members to shift sides, as Moore demonstrated several times in 
the recent history of Egypt. By strategically shifting between different cliques or 
‘jumping shillal’, high-level bureaucrats were able to retain their influence and steer a 
successful and safe political career despite changes in leadership.
94
 In Iraq, the tabaiyya, 
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or traditional patronage networks, which generally exploited the rural populace in Iraq, 
were deconstructed by former clients of these networks, who utilized the machinery of 
the Baath Party to take over mechanisms of political influence and economic gain
95
. 
There, the state was not directly involved in the reinvention of methods of interaction 
between business interest groups and the political elite, instead, social, economic and 
political transformations engendered new, diverse and plural networks to influence 
policies and to accrue power. 
In Egypt, the state erected corporatist structures; the Sadat and Mubarak regimes 
installed hierarchical and centralized institutions to bind economic actors to the state, 
fortify the state’s monopoly of governance, and enhance the regime’s hold over the 
politicization of public space in Egyptian society. However, business and religious 
interest groups gradually multiplied and diversified into factions that developed their 
own links with members of the Egyptian cabinet, party cadres, foreign investors, and 
state bureaucrats to exert influence on policy. The Mubarak administration decided to 
address increasing pluralism by cooperating with and co-opting new groups, but the 
uncontrolled and anarchic nature of associations in Egyptian society created obstacles to 
successful and peaceful co-optation. The Mubarak government realized that new 
associations selected by the government to participate in policy-making were criticized 
heavily by other new associations, which were left out of policy negotiations. Moreover, 
Mubarak government’s proximity to newly formed voluntary associations, particularly 
those of emerging Egyptian businessmen, angered members of corporatist associations 
and bodies that previously enjoyed a monopoly over political communication with the 
Egyptian state. Mubarak’s attempts to handpick the few interest groups, who would 
participate in the decision-making processes, were unsuccessful mainly because 
dominant traditional corporatist arrangements were not amended in time to fully 
recognize and accommodate associational pluralism.
96
 In this case, state invasion of the 
pluralisation and diversification processes of economic actors compromised inter-
associational cooperation.  
‘Corporatism in Islamic Iran’s context is a populist strategy to reconcile social class and 
other differences and incorporate the nation into an organic whole…The vision of 
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Islamic corporatism is an authentic righteous Islamic umma on the march towards social 
justice on earth and toward unity with God’.97  
Here, Islamic corporatist thought approaches classical pluralism, which pledged to 
preserve justice, tradition, family and civic values and to uphold the will of the people 
(and the creator) next to and above the state. However, in practice, corporatism in Iran 
resembles state corporatist arrangements in other countries in the region and around the 
world. Iranian corporatism developed from a resistance movement to traditional 
corporatist arrangements predating the reign of Reza Shah Pahlavi. The Shah was 
opposed to both corporatism and pluralism. His aversion to pluralism stemmed from the 
threat it could pose to monarchic rule. Similarly, he rejected modern corporatist 
arrangements because he did not want values associated with them, such as anti-
imperialism, revolution and socialism, to permeate Iran. Instead, he wished to preserve 
the more traditional corporatist relationships between the state, the ulama and 
businessmen. In the mid-1970s, however, the Resurgence Party founded by the Shah 
began collecting donations from businessmen and forcing compliance with newfound 
state corporatist organizations responsible for import-export regulations. This sudden 
assault on businessmen prompted them to align secretly with radical ulama leaders for 
political influence and safety, this way establishing a corporatist coalition that was one 
of the main precursors of the Islamic Revolution.
98
 After Khomeini, state corporatism in 
Iran was reinvented to integrate populist associations in the consensus building process 
and control them through bureaucratization.
99
 Overall, the Iranian state was only 
partially successful in monopolizing representational mechanisms for business. It may 
have chosen to build public bodies to establish cooperation among various associations 
and across institutions, such as ad-hoc commissions, policymaking councils, and 
independent commission. Yet, in the absence of public bodies to intermediate and 
negotiate policies with interest groups, Iran’s bazaris and other non-organized economic 
communities fostered alternative channels for political influence and safety.  
Jordan presents a curious case of how the state maintained control through 
bureaucratization and the co-option of groups in society. ‘All forms of group work and 
collective action in Jordan must be registered at an appropriate ministry, which is 
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charged with reporting, investing, observing, and counting collective activities within its 
administrative purview’.100 Before the political liberalization of the early 1990s, Jordan 
was decidedly monist and its security establishment clamped down on any group with 
political aspirations. Associations and charitable organizations registered by the state 
were the only gateways to interest representation. In fact, Palestinian and Syrian 
merchant capitalists used these channels to attain preferential access to decision making, 
through institutionalized representation in such bodies as the Amman Chamber of 
Commerce.101 After liberalization, Jordan adopted corporatist measures to grant a degree 
of representation to professional and civil organizations, although the process of policy-
making was never sufficiently representative. Rather, institutions such as the Ministry 
of Interior – dubbed the ‘Ministry of Associations’102 – acted to contain group politics 
by creating the illusion of representative policy bargaining. Furthermore, as Islamic 
social institutions such as charitable hospitals, clinics, and community centres in 
mosques proliferated in Jordan, they began to admit private enterprises into their 
association and thereby began to effectively represent middle class interests and provide 
services that the state failed to offer to middle and lower classes. This development, to 
affirm the predictions of the Jordanian state, encouraged a spirit of activism and 
embarked some of these networks on a path towards more political representation.
103
 
Arguably, despite the strong elements of corporatism in Jordan since late 1980s, the 
Hashemite monarchy and interest groups in Jordan are now engaged in a cooperative 
relationship. Some pluralistic and voluntary interest groups in contemporary Jordanian 
society, especially the health care, women’s and academic organizations in the network 
of Muslim Brotherhood, are effectively usurping the organizational opportunities that 
the regime provides and entering directly into state’s policy realm to occupy legislative 
and executive posts.
104
 An idiosyncratic set of arrangements, resembling pluralistic 
corporatism, flourished in contemporary Jordan and these arrangements are being re-
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invented and transformed, as the relationship between religiously motivated interest 
groups and the state develops.   
Middle Eastern interest group politics do not seem to be en route towards 
integrating into transnational pluralism, as European and advanced capitalist business-
state relations do. Business associations and market actors in the Middle East do 
however effectively employ traditional clientelist forms of interacting with the state and 
political elites, engage in assisting the state’s development agendas and 
institutionalization – especially in contexts where market liberalisation policies are 
adopted – by becoming a part of corporatist structures, and finally diversify and 
pluralize their representative mechanisms and bodies. Members of organized business in 
the Middle East establish networks of interest groups to catalyse social, political and 
moral transformation, to deliver welfare where the state fails to, and to transmit religio-
political as well as economic messages. The prevalence of religion, i.e. Islam, as a 
source of group solidarity, morality and identity, is particularly noteworthy as this 
phenomenon indicates a departure from the Anglo-American, continental European or 
East Asian trajectory in the evolution of interest group politics. Moreover, in the 
absence of regional or international bodies, which meticulously govern the transactions 
between business interest groups and sectoral associations like the European Union does 
for example, the transactions occur outside of the direct control of the Middle Eastern 
and North African states concerned. The fluidity and flexibility of these transactions 
suggest that interest mediation and representation will continue to occur through hybrid, 
convergent structures.   
Conclusion 
This chapter attempted to revive and revitalize the literature on contemporary 
business associations or interest groups as fundamental components of policymaking 
both in and above nation states. Interest group theories evolved since the beginning of 
the twentieth century to explain the structure, roles and functions, composition, 
geographical, material and ideological reach, effectiveness and identity of business and 
other associations. The main tenets of interest groups theories are that they accept 
associations as the most basic representative unit in any society and that associations are 
formed voluntarily or imperatively to articulate interests of their membership and that 
associations become part of public policy-making either through competitive, cooptive 
or cooperative structures. Major theories of interest group politics, pluralism, 
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corporatism, clientelism and monism are treated in the literature as separate and distinct 
models of interest representation and mediation, however, empirical data demonstrates 
that in practice, states and associations borrow from and combine elements of all the 
major models to create and recreate new mechanisms and methods of policy based 
interaction. While the common trend around the world is of convergence and 
hybridisation of pluralism and corporatism, there are also striking differences in the 
application of these various models, especially in developing country cases; these 
differences demonstrate that new actors and networks emerged during the course of 
globalisation to display distinct religious, moral and political features.  
Similar patterns are observed in European, North and South American, and even 
Middle Eastern countries’ interest group politics: Established structures of interest 
representation, when tested by time, significant social and economic changes, 
internationalisation and globalisation, transform into hybrid structures, which 
amalgamate elements of pluralism, corporatism and occasionally of monism or 
clientelism. Policy bargaining processes between national and international business 
associations, European Union institutions, nation state institutions and national and 
international labour organisations in the EU bear important indicators for predicting the 
future of interest group politics. Pluralism is reinvented at the transnational level to 
allow for greater participation and representation of new, voluntary and unorganised 
national and transnational associations. European pluralism creates a more competitive, 
democratic, and egalitarian environment for interest group intermediation, not simply 
for interest groups within the Union but for associations from accession or neighbouring 
countries.  The next stage in evolution of interest group theory is professed as 
transnational pluralism, not transnational corporatism. Corporatist structures are in tact 
but they proved to be less flexible and adaptable to conditions of tripartite or policy-
based negotiations above the level of a nation state. Perhaps without a transnational or 
world government, corporatism will continue to remain confined within the boundaries 
of nation states.   
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Chapter 3: Turkish state corporatism and 
representation of business interests 
Modern Turkey had a corporatist system of interest mediation for most of the 
20
th
 century, based on state-led institutionalization and bureaucratisation to control and 
organize interest groups. This chapter will narrate the development of state-capital 
relations in modern Turkey and locate the corporatist institutions that were established 
to facilitate, manage and control industrial relations. Each of the several key turning 
points in the history of modern Turkey – the early Republican period; the multi-party 
politics of 1950s; the 1960 and 1980 coup regimes; and the 1980-1990s, which were 
marked by privatization and financial liberalization – testify to the emergence and 
persistence of state corporatism. The monopoly of corporatism ended with two major 
developments: the toppling of a democratically elected pro-Islamic government in 1997 
by a ‘soft coup’, and the signing in 1999 of an accession agreement with the European 
Union that committed Turkey to a closely monitored and pro-active path of 
democratization, economic liberalization and pluralisation, by way of facilitating new 
institutions and interest groups to emerge and enter into structured and informal 
mechanisms of policymaking. 
Business-state relations have changed dramatically since then, but this chapter 
will address Turkish state corporatism in the earlier period, using the framework 
provided by Taha Parla and Andrew Davison. In one of the very few, critical studies on 
the ideological foundations of corporatism in Turkey, they identify three levels of 
corporatism:  
[F]irst, a theory-ideology about a model of society and economy; second a set of economic 
and class policies about actual procedures for conducting the representation of interests, 




Corporatism, as was laid out in Chapter 2, offers a systemic view of how 
various, and where applicable, select and exclusive groups within a society represent 
their interests. It is this potential of corporatism to systemically and centrally control 
policy bargaining and interest mediation between capitalists and the state that appealed 
to the Republican elite, who crafted the nation state in Turkey. The Ottoman ruling elite 
was economically and politically weak and dependent on the latter two groups of 
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foreign/non-Muslim capitalists. The reality of a befallen Empire deeply maimed a 
younger generation of Ottomans, who assembled the Committee of Union and Progress 
(CUP). CUP leadership devised an economic recovery plan to nationalize the imperial 
economy and to introduce austerity measures to overturn the Empire’s failure to adapt 
to 19
th
 century international capitalism. Furthermore, the CUP set out to nationalize the 
economy by relying on the productive capacity of the Turkish heartland, Anatolia, and 
by eliminating the Christian merchants and capitalists in the Ottoman Empire, who 
allegedly constituted an existential threat to economic and political recovery according 
to the architects of Young Turk restoration and a new Muslim middle class.
106
 The 
Kemalist cadres who succeeded the CUP leadership followed in the footsteps of their 
ancestors to conduct post-war economic development via strategies to encourage capital 
accumulation of a state-bourgeoisie and to therefore redesign class structure.  
At the core of Turkey’s organic state building process was the theory/ideology that 
Parla and Davison identified as Kemalism, an ideology influenced by continental European 
corporatist models and ideas. Essentially, corporatism provided the structure – or rather, as 
Parla and Davison call ‘a model of society and economy’ – through which the emerging 
nation state would assert a national identity and secular values. The main objective of the 
Republican state-building project was to establish state’s dominion over the civil society.107  
The new republic tried to constitute and develop new values against the old values, the core 
of which was identified as Islam. This implies that the formation of the state was not only 
about sustaining order by force, but rather, was also about establishing hegemony within 
the domain of civil society.
108
 
Corporatism in Turkey deserves special reference, perhaps even its own category 
because it offers a unique mixture of state corporatism and clientelism. State corporatism 
in Turkey corresponds, much like other forms of state corporatism elsewhere, to a centrally 
organized, hierarchical system of managing and controlling the political and economic 
ambitions of traditional and emerging groups in Turkey. In managing and attempting to 
control negotiations of power and policy, however, the Turkish state recognized and 
absorbed its unique and traditional patron-client relationships. While institutionalizing its 
‘model of economy and society’, Turkey’s Republican elite engaged repeatedly in a 
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process of negotiating the non-Western, archaic and backward practices that epitomized 
clientelism, especially in the periphery, with the Western, novel and progressive model of 
corporatism. Modern Turkey’s founders were exceedingly familiar with and belonged to 
the traditions and institutions that defined the Ottoman Empire. It was this familiarity that 
urged them to challenge the ancien regime and this sense of belonging to an invented 
heartland, Anatolia, which compelled them to envisage a new nation. The Republican elite 
was armed with two core tasks: to replace the defunct political, economic and social 
institutions of the Ottoman Empire and to rid the young Republic of the economic and 
political presence of ‘foreigners’ and ‘enemies’, including devout Muslims, deterred by the 
aggressive secularism of the early Republican era. Eventually, however, the Republican 
regime failed to manufacture a purely European (Germanic or Italian) model of 
corporatism and ended up with a system in which traditional patron-client relationships 
thrived inside corporatist institutions. The corporatist structure in Turkey operated in 
formal and informal institutions and across the state-society spectrum.  
Party politics, social class and corporatism  
In Turkey, political parties have conventionally had hierarchical structures and 
failed to adopt democratic governance mechanisms. Political parties have traditionally 
not held direct primaries and the decisions have almost always been taken at the level of 
top leadership.
109
 The elitist and overtly hierarchical culture of decision-making in 
Ankara trickled down the party infrastructure and the political thinking of the central 
party leadership were directly transferred to local party politics.
110
 At the same time 
however, party cadres at the local and national levels financed their party out of their 
own pockets. Therefore, political parties were inevitably accountable to their local and 
national patrons. Because political party financing was neither accountable nor 
transparent, those partisans who invested in patronage unreservedly continued to 
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dominate decision-making. Ultimately, party politics has been characterized by 
monopolies or oligopolies of leadership and cronyism. 
The tale of party politics began in modern Turkey with a long chapter of single-
party rule. In order to facilitate an effective method of capital generation and 
accumulation, Kemalist elite established and filled the ranks of state organizations and 
the cadres of Turkey’s first political party, the Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet 
Halk Partisi, CHP). CHP enjoyed the privilege of single party rule, forced upon 
Turkey’s party politics, until 1950. It is difficult to understand corporatism in Turkey, 
and more precisely the unique blend of corporatism and clientelism, without referring to 
the first and arguably the most resilient institution of Turkish politics, CHP. Ayşe Güneş 
Ayata reminds us that those students of Turkey’s party politics who emphasized the 
influence of patron-client relationships on politics argued either that modernism would 
push clientelism to the point of extinction or that clientelism would remain attractive to 
right wing, conservative parties only. She proves however that social democratic 
parties, specifically the CHP, are not immune to the impact that clientelism has on 
political relationships in modern Turkey.
111
  
In 1923, when the Republic was founded, the party was inseparable from the state. The 
notables in different parts of Turkey became both representatives of the party and agents of 
the state in periphery (Frey 1965; Mardin 1967; Timur 1971; Tunçay 1983). Depending on 
the conditions in the village and the structure of the agrarian society, party notables in 
towns picked out agents in villages to represent their personal interests and those of the 
party. They would usually search for an ‘honest’ and well-to-do peasant respected by and 
having influence over his fellow villagers.
112
  
Evidently, the first converts of the party state and its corporatist infrastructure 
were rural notables or the landowning class in the periphery and the Republican 
bourgeoisie. In her anthropological work in the Datça province of the city of Muğla, 
Sibel Özbudun detected a pattern of particularistic relationships that existed between 
rural economic actors and local party cadres and that depicted the application of 
clientelism in Turkey.
 113
 She found that the village notables in the region have been in a 
close crony relationship with the CHP in the region. Traditionally, local landowners or 
aghas supported the CHP and urged or coerced their fellow townsfolk to rally in 
support of CHP. Since the locals were dependent on the landowners to sell their produce 
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and to access short-term loans to support their families and farms, securing their loyalty 
was easy. CHP, by implication, utilized the traditional patronage network that existed in 
the periphery without needing to invent and establish an alternative network of political 
and economic relationships. Besides, most landowners and capitalists at the local level 
were also party members or leaders. Özbudun showed that after the 1950s, with the 
launch of the Agricultural Bank in Datça and the influx of aid through the North 
American “Marshall Program”, CHP lost its monopoly over political and economic 
relationships in the periphery. This implies, then, that the key to CHP’s hold over the 
political patronage network that it nurtured in Turkey was its ability to monopolize 
distribution and access to economic resources. When the party state’s monopoly over 
distribution was challenged, its capacity to accrue political capital through 
clientelist/corporatist structures began to erode. 
Though CHP was as a corporatist institution, it was limited in its ability and 
ambitions to assist interest mediation and bargaining. Arguably, due to a lack of a 
democratic tradition in the CHP party leadership at the local and national levels failed to 
include party members and supporters into a meaningful dialogue and negotiation over 
policies. However, due to a combination of internal and external pressures, the legacy 
that CHP left in the realm of political and economic power relationships was borrowed 
and reproduced by its rivals and successors, namely, Democrat Party (Demokrat Parti, 
DP) and later Justice Party (Adalet Partisi, AP). Ayata narrates on the transformation of 
patron-client relationships in the CHP in the 1970s by the advent of professional middle 
classes who acquired degrees in city universities and returned to their town/village to 
claim the privileged access to state resources from the hands of wealthy local merchants 
and notables: ‘As state penetration into the periphery increased, agricultural production 
became increasingly interlocked with national and international markets and 
information and access to state resources were decisive for economic success’.114 In the 
cities, there were professional workers who were politically savvy and increasingly 
aware of current Turkish and international affairs. Thus, it was not only CHP’s loss of 
monopoly over mechanisms of redistribution that facilitated its weakening but also the 
subsequent change in the class structure in Turkey and as well in the CHP party cadres 
that gradually eroded the early Republican forms of corporatism conditioned by the 
party state.  
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Laws and institutions of industrial relations in the Turkish Republic 
Political parties and organized labour in Turkey were engaged in a complex 
relationship, which was characterized either by labour’s political adversity to the 
establishment or system parties (namely, CHP and later DP, AP, ANAP, etc.) or by the 
former’s partnership with the latter on the basis of safeguarding ‘national’ interests. 
Unions are key institutions on the state-society spectrum and the Turkish state’s 
relationship with the organized labour movement is testament to the evolution of state 
corporatism and indeed of industrial relations in modern Turkey.  
Turkey’s developmentalist state opted for authoritarian industrial relations 
because the economic interests of the growing public sector were not to be 
compromised for the sake of better, more democratic state-labour relations. In an 
attempt to create authoritarian industrial relations, a Labour Law was passed in 1936. 
‘The law accorded a one-sided regulatory power to the state in collective industrial 
relations, was totally mute on trade unions, and explicitly outlawed strike and lock-out 
action.’115 Meanwhile, to respond to fast paced industrialization and the expansion of 
the public sector, industrial and agricultural labourers were organizing around voluntary 
associations to facilitate unionization or to carry out union activities. Marguiles and 
Yıldızoğlu note further that the Turkish state managed to prevent the politicization of 
professional associations and trade unions by passing in 1947 the Law on Employers’ 
and Labour Unions and Law on Labour Union Associations, which removed some of 
the most basic rights of workers, such as the right to strike and to enter into collective 
bargaining, and attempted to keep at bay all ideological and political influences other 
than those deemed officially permissible by the state.
 116
 Apparently, the Turkish state 
incorporated an emerging class of industrial workers in 1950s into a hierarchical system 
of interest mediation where the state, as an employer held the upper hand.  
The model conceived is one in which predominate a multitude of small labour unions at 
the local level, deprived of instruments to carry out their essential activities, of the 
power necessary to defend the interest of their members or of financial means.
117
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Criticized widely by the literature on Turkey’s unions and left movements, the ‘divide 
and rule’ approach of Turkish state corporatism enfeebled the organization and 
representation of working classes in the first few decades of modern Turkey.  
Turkey’s ‘national’ business community emerged in early 1900s shortly after the 
second constitutional period granted Muslim merchants and businessmen access to the 
Ottoman imperial markets and to its emergent institutions. By 1908, the Ottoman peak 
chamber, Dersaadet Chamber of Trade, Industry and Agriculture, had already 
assembled an all-Muslim chamber leadership and declared its commitment to the 
development of a ‘national finance’. By the same vein, the political parties that formed 
in the period between 1908 and 1918, chiefly the Committee of Union and Progress, 
included in their party programmes policies geared towards supporting Turkey’s 
indigenous trade and industry chambers. While the structure and organization of local 
and national chambers during the late Ottoman era resembled the state corporatist 
structure of modern Turkey, one major difference was the lack of compulsory chamber 
membership. Both the ‘national’ business community and the politicians who wished 
upon a stronger class of capitalists concurred that chambers needed to collect 
membership fees but since they were not able to attract as many members as needed 
(and because the number of national companies or capitalists were fairly low in early 
twentieth century), chambers were never strong enough to steer the course of policy 
bargaining.118  
Several entrepreneurs coalesced during the years of occupation and war of 
independence to estimate the presence of purely Turkish/Muslim businesspeople in the 
besieged Ottoman market and to wage a ‘financial battle’ against the existence of non-
Muslim business actors. Policies of financial and economic nationalization went hand in 
hand with the wider armed struggle against the armies of imperial powers.119 To avoid 
economic surrender despite a political victory, the Kemalist cadres established 
institutions that would realize and sustain economic and financial nationalization. The 
first of these institutions was the National Turkish Trade Association and other 
institutions modelled to match this peak association followed
120
. Since economic 
nationalization was seen as an imperative by the founding ideolouges, the Turkish state 
                                               
118 Murat Koraltürk (2002) Türkiye’de Ticaret ve Sanayi Odaları (1880-1952) [Chambers of Trade and 
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119 Ayhan Aktar (1996) ‘Cumhuriyet’in İlk Yıllarında Uygulanan Türkleştirme Politikaları (Policies of 
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 Ibid. Koraltürk, p. 69.  
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became defined by this imperative. Thus, Turkish state cultivated a centralized and 
hierarchical structure to incorporate its blossoming national businesses and to represent 
private sector interests.  
For all private business entities in Turkey, membership in a corresponding 
chamber of commerce, industry or craftsmen and artisans was (and continues to be) 
compulsory. Chambers of commerce, chambers of industry, vocational chambers and 
chambers of craftsmen and artisans were established in townships, cities and districts 
through the course of Turkey’s industrial and market development. Each registered 
member was required to pay membership fees; attend regular general council meetings; 
and comply with the corresponding chamber rules and regulations at minimum. Annual 
membership fees were distributed to the corresponding chamber of commerce or 
industry in the city where the fee-paying company is located. Local chambers were tied 
to a hierarchical structure of representation, which consisted of intermediary/regional 
organizations and peak associations, also known as federations. Federations of 
chambers were organized on a regional and more often on a sectoral level. Federations 
acceded to the corporatist structure of organized interest representation through their 
participation in confederations.  
Confederations are the highest representative organizations for private sector 
entities. Two peak associations or confederations stand out as harbingers of corporatist 
interest mediation in Turkey’s private sector: the Union of Chambers and Commodity 
Exchanges (TOBB) and the Confederation of Craftsmen and Artisans of Turkey 
(TESK). TOBB and TESK were established in 1950 and 1949 respectively. TOBB is 
the highest state-funded, legally recognized entity in Turkey that represents the interests 
of private sector organizations. TOBB’s mandate was set in the middle of the twentieth 
century as facilitating the activities of members of chambers of trade, industry and 
maritime trade, and to assure honesty and security in the transactions between members. 
Therefore, TOBB was designed to act both as a supervisory body and as a broker 
between member organizations. It was equipped with the task of ensuring that trading 
and commercial companies adhered to generally accepted standards of discipline, ethics 
and friendly competition. Similarly, the Confederation of Craftsmen and Artisans of 
Turkey (TESK) was established to represent the interests of craftsman workshops, 
artisans workshops and small (peripheral) service providers (i.e. transporters, local 
grocers, hairdressers, etc.). TESK was also tasked to ensure work discipline and ethics 
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were adhered to by all member companies and to provide vocational training and other 
services to its member federations. 
The laws that established both confederations were corporatist in tone and spirit. 
Both confederations were authorized to act as public institutions and were mandated to 
‘discipline’ and ‘educate’ its member organizations and to ‘command trust and security 
in’ the private sector. Evidently, the 1950s centralized, state-planning economy sought 
to reign in private sector interests by incorporating them into semi-public peak 
associations. Although decisions were taken democratically during regular and irregular 
general council and board meetings in TOBB and TESK, government policies had a 
legally defined precedence over the outcome of negotiations held at these peak 
associations. Chambers, federations and confederations were equally responsible to 
follow the ‘orders’ of the executive and in several key areas, including board elections, 
geographical/sectoral/industrial sphere of activity, confederations – which were 
recognized as the highest bodies of interest representation – were ultimately unable to 
act independently. In contrast to their dependency on the state for their administration, 
chambers acquired the majority of their funding from registration fees and annual 
contributions from members. So, it would be more pragmatic for chambers to prioritize 
the interests of their members.  
Law 5590, which established TOBB in 1950 and was not amended until early 
1980s, offered a clear distinction between ‘industrialist’ and ‘artisan or craftsman’: 
Industrialists worked to ‘add value’ to the products they offered through 
manufacturing/processing raw or semi raw materials.121 Industrialists, who employed 
depending on the labour intensity of their line of activity at least five to ten people, 
qualified for membership to chambers. Law 507 establishing Turkey’s craftsmen and 
artisans association stated, on the other hand, that craftsmen and artisan were workers 
and owners of small businesses and they relied on ‘manual labour’ to perform their art 
or to run their business.
 122 This type of classification implied that the corporatist state 
aspired to foster higher ranking capitalists, who were to fuel Turkey’s industrial 
                                               
121 ‘ Ticaret ve Sanayi Odalari’, ‘Ticaret Odalari’, ‘Sanayi Odalari’, ‘Deniz Ticaret Odalari’, ‘Ticaret 
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122 ‘507 Sayılı Esnaf ve Sanatkarlar Kanunu’, Confederation of Craftsmen and Artisans of Turkey, 
http://www.tesk.org.tr/tr/5362/507.html  
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development in the 1950s, and a lower class of craftsmen and artisans who were to 
sustain traditional, lower-scale, provincial businesses.  
In the 1960s, a self-aware working class expanded in size as industrial towns 
and regions in especially Turkey’s northeast emerged. Industrial workers demonstrated 
a strong presence in the Turkish political and civil society in the 1960s and 1970s. The 
state facilitated the establishment of the Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions 
(Türkiye İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu, Türk-İş), which was designed to monopolize 
representation of industrial workers by drawing together local and sectoral trade unions 
and by taking part on their behalf in interest mediation exercises with the Turkish state. 
Industrial relations institutionalized to mimic state corporatist structures by peak 
unions
123
 (confederations), regional federations, and local unions divided across sectors 
and industries. These structures provided gateways into the policy arena in Turkey and 
reproduced the crony/corporatist patterns of bargaining that the party state has sworn 
by. Türk-Iş utilized its position in the corporatist framework to accrue more political 
power, groups of industrial workers splintered from this peak trade union to organize 
around the Confederation of Progressive Trade Unions (Türkiye Devrimci İşçi 
Sendikaları Konfederasyonu, DİSK). DİSK gradually emerged as the leader of the anti-
state workers movement and a key actor in the 1970s when the political struggle 
between ‘leftists’ and ‘fascists’ often escalated into violent clashes between members of 
these fractions. While structured industrial relations in Turkey nurtured the leading 
political figures in Turkey’s political left, who – broadly speaking – adopted anti-
capitalist, anti-militaristic and anti-establishment positions, most trade unions hosted 
cronyism and their survival hinged on their success in maintaining a healthy 
relationship with the state and the business community.  
Union leaders used their knowledge in the job market to assist friends and relatives find 
employment. Those thus assigned were expected in return to support them both in union 
elections and as delegates in the [CHP] party organization. Unions thus became an 




The bulwark of Turkish state corporatism, CHP, enjoyed a close working 
relationship with organized labour. This was an assertion made and owned by some of 
the fractions in the political left to label those trade unions that have entered into 
                                               
123 Peak-level unions and associations refer to labor confederations that have federations as their 
members, not individuals or businesses. The peak level association or union is the highest-level 
representative of its members in industrial relations.   
124
 Ibid. Ayata, pp. 177-178. 
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partnership with the establishment, i.e. CHP, and those that have kept a firm distance 
from the establishment.125 Some of the most fervent leftist/Marxist critiques of the 
Turkish state corporatism and its imprint on industrial relations came from Behice 
Boran of Turkish Labour Party (Türk İşçi Partisi, TLP) who claimed that the left-of-
center politics and social democratic agenda of CHP was neither genuine nor 
convincing.
126
 TLP accused the voluntary or independent union, DİSK, of increasingly 
resembling CHP and thus of betraying the spirit of the leftist movement in the late 
1970s.
127
 Apparently, the fault lines in the political left emerged in response to state 
corporatism and to the alleged or real crony ties between the party state and organized 
labour.  
Securitization and the corporatist tradition in Turkey 
Turkey’s military is unequivocally and indisputably a political actor whose 
functions far exceed those related to foreign security provision. The 1961 constitution, 
introduced by the junta leadership that overthrew a popular civilian government in 
1960, institutionalized the military’s political status by establishing a National Security 
Council (Milli Güvenlik Kurulu, MGK) whose mandate was to directly partake in the 
executive by advising the Council of Ministers. The political supremacy of the military 
elite was reflected even in the design of the state protocol where the Chief of Staff 




The legislation on associations bears the imprint of securitization, brought about 
by the 1980 military coup and sustained for many years to come by civilian 
administrations.  Each association was subjected to a highly securitized registration, 
monitoring and auditing process. The ‘Law on Associations’129, numbered 2908 and 
ratified on 6 October 1983, was exceedingly restrictive and manifested the mistrust of 
the Turkish state towards the citizenry at large, and particularly towards organized 
representation of citizens’ interests. Non-profit, civil society organizations in Turkey are 
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legally defined either as associations (dernek in Turkish) or foundations (vakıf in 
Turkish). Almost all of Turkey’s voluntary business associations are registered as 
dernek. Law no. 2908 stated that for an association to be established, a minimum of 
seven founding members were required. Bureaucrats, minors and persons who have 
been convicted of crimes (of any nature) were not permitted to establish associations.  
Since no other state in Europe applied these preconditions to start up 
associations,
130
 their existence in the Turkish law meant that freedom of association was 
granted selectively in Turkey. One of the most fundamental rights of citizens in 
democracies, freedom of association was effectively withheld from those who served 
the state (bureaucrats) or wronged it (convicts). Furthermore, by imposing a quota on 
the number of members needed to start up associations, the Turkish state hampered the 
entry of smaller interest groups into civil society. The Law on Associations also 
required those who wanted to set up associations to submit their birth certificates and 
criminal records – another restriction that European states did not place. Once set up, 
associations were obliged to announce their establishment in a print newspaper and to 
notify the nearest administrative office (usually district or regional governors) of any 
activity they planned to hold. These requirements not only hiked up the costs of 
establishing and running associations, they also pushed voluntary associations into a 
state corporatist framework where bureaucrats serving at all levels in the administrative 
hierarchy of the Ministry of Interior assumed the responsibilities of a watchdog over 
associational activity.  
Crucially, Law no.2089 deemed illegal those associations whose activities 
‘created artificial minorities based on race, religion, sect and region and damaged the 
unitary nation of the Republic of Turkey; defamed or diminished the persona, principles 
and works of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk; and curtailed freedoms of others’. This definition 
of legality resonated with many other similar clauses woven into the fabric of Turkey’s 
post-coup legislation
131
. Additionally, Article 33 of the 1982 Constitution stated that 
                                               
130 TÜSEV (2004), http://www.tusev.org.tr/userfiles/image/dernek%20raporu.pdf  
131 Most striking and controversial example is the Article 301 of Turkish Criminal Code, which states 
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expression’ (2006) Amnesty International, 
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associations were obliged to register with the state and could face prohibition and 
closure
132
 if they violated the terms of Article 13.
133
 In short, the boundaries of 
legitimate associational activity were both constitutionally and legally defined by 
references to enemies of the state; preservation of national security; and the removal of 
potential enemies from the associational landscape. Finally, Turkey’s Security General 
Directorate (Emniyet Genel Müdürlügü, EGM) maintained the registry database for 
associations until 2003 when a civilian institution, the Department of Associations was 
established within the Ministry of Interior to oversee the administration of associations. 
The judiciary, the security establishment, and the executive for the longer part of the 
history of modern Turkey policed associations.  
More significantly, the military is one of the largest economic players in Turkey’s 
economy and its might and presence in Turkey’s political and social landscape are 
matched by the breadth and scope of its economic activities. İsmet Akça explains,  
[The] military is an economic actor in all fields of the economy (production, trade, 
finance). This implies, in the Turkish context, the conversion of the Turkish Armed 
Forces (Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri, TSK) into a capitalist collective: The military officer 
becomes an industrialist, a merchant, a financial investor, and a rentier.
134
  
In other words, members of Turkey’s military elite do not only fill the ranks of Turkey’s 
political elite but also belong to Turkey’s business community. Secular and Republican 
business community and the corporatist structure that domicile its members were (and 
are) inevitably engaged in a close-knit relationship with the military elite. The terms of 
this relationship are determined by Republican values and principles, such as the 
indivisibility of the nation, the territorial integrity of the state and the supremacy of 
Atatürkist principles, expressed and protected by those members of Turkey’s security 
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establishment who held (and continue to hold) seats in business associations, trade 
unions, joint commissions on trade, industry, innovation, etc. 
A privileged class of military elite and secular business elite consolidated its 
power through the course of the history of modern Turkey. Recurrent military 
interventions kept the system and its components in check. These interventions proved 
hazardous to the Turkish economy and detrimental to Turkish private sector’s 
profitability and appeal as a stable, functioning economy. However, curiously, Turkey’s 
business community cherished, venerated and protected its close relations with the 
military entrepreneurs and leadership. Part of the explanation for this curious 
predicament comes from an analysis of the structuring of interest representation in 
Turkey, especially from 1970s onwards.  
Turkey's economic liberalization began with the 1980 coup when the military 
leadership appointed the economic advisor of Demirel, Özal, as deputy prime minister 
for economic affairs to carry out an economic recovery plan. Sabri Sayarı admits that 
the hegemonic character of the post-coup regime in the 1980s assisted the application of 
economic recovery and liberalization because there was literally no dissent.  
Under democratic conditions, groups who interests were adversely affected by the 
neoliberal stabilization policies, such as organized labour, would have expressed their 
opposition through political channels. But Turkey's military regime rules out this 
possibility by imposing strict control over potential sources of opposition, namely the 
political parties, trade unions, universities and the press.
135
 
During the period following the introduction of the 24 January 1980 economic 
program, Turkey’s junta leadership enacted a coup on 12 September 1980 and thereby 
disabled all forms of opposition to the economic measures – as well as other policy 
measures – to be implemented. Thus, the IMF standby agreement of 1980-1983 and 
World Bank loan agreements between 1980 and 1984 were put in place without any 
significant resistance.
136
 Evidently, large corporations or holdings in Turkey stood at the 
core of the transformation of Turkey’s economy through its internationalization. These 
actors did reap the benefits of privatization: ‘for instance, AEG, BASF, Koç Holding, 
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Rumeli Holding have taken a share over 10% from privatization’137. Therefore, it is 
assumed that military interventions impaired representation of interests only selectively 
and that the interests of private actors that were engaged in a particularistic relationship 
with the military elite were safeguarded by what were essentially anti-democratic 
measures. 
The developments in Turkey’s security and defence sector during the decade 
following the 1980 military coup manifest how Turkish military’s presence as an 
economic actor affects the ideology and practice of Turkey’s business associations. 
Gülay Günlük Şeneşen professes that in the 1980s, Turkish military and high-level 
bureaucrats welcomed Turkey’s transition out of ISI into neoliberal marketization and 
globalization. In fact, as Turkey engaged more deeply with the global markets, the 
Turkish Armed Forces revealed its plans to modernize Turkey’s army.138 Modernization 
did not imply a complete surrender to foreign procurement, though. On the contrary, at 
the peak of Turkey’s defence spending in the year 1998, a decree published in the 
Official Gazette declared Turkish Armed Forces’ plans to support Turkish industrialists 
in the defence industry by procuring domestically and by establishing a department 
within Turkish Scientific and Technological Research Institution (Türkiye Bilimsel ve 
Teknolojik Araştırma Kurumu, TÜBİTAK) to develop defence technologies in Turkey.  
The price advantages offered to domestic companies or domestic and foreign 
mergers by the TSK clearly violated Turkey’s commitments to the terms of its 
stabilization programs and competitive and free market principles set out by the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) and International Monetary Fund (IMF).  IMF’s Turkey 
Report from 1998 reads, ‘defence and security related expenditures recorded in the 
consolidated budget rose by 0.3 percentage point of GNP in 1997. Additional defence 
spending is carried through off budget items, such as the Defence Industry Support 
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Fund, but its magnitude is not reported’.139 While IMF acknowledged the rise in defence 
spending and the questionable practice of spending unrecorded amounts of funds 
through off budget items, it refrained from extending an outright criticism of Turkey’s 
defence spending. The military’s modernization plans championed nationalism and 
protectionism rhetorically and this non-negotiable policy inevitably strengthened 
Turkey’s domestic defence manufacturers.  
A blossoming domestic defence industry represented its key players under the 
aegis of two voluntary business associations: Defence and Aerospace Industry 
Manufacturers’ Association (Savunma ve Havacılık Sanayi İmalatçılar Derneği, 
SASAD) and Defence Industrialists’ Association (Savunma Sanayicileri Derneği, 
SADER) were founded in 1990 and 1999 respectively with the support of the Ministry 
of Defence and the Undersecretariat of Defence Industry (Savunma Sanayi 
Müsteşarlığı, SSM). The older association, SASAD, started off with twelve member 
companies and according to figures it released online for 2013, it now has 162 
members.140 Both SASAD and SADER declare their main objectives as assisting the 
SSM in responding to the security and defence needs of Turkey. Retired military 
officers, who assumed executive positions in domestic defence companies following the 
end of their terms in office, filled the boards of both associations.  
Almost all of Turkey’s defence companies are members of either one or the 
other association. SASAD and TUSIAD share key members, such as Koç Holding 
companies, Hisar Steel Company, Havelsan, Nurol, and OYAK.
141
 Crucially, security 
and defence companies and key players in the area of defence procurement engaged in 
policy-based dialogue with other private and public actors under the umbrella of either 
voluntary associations, namely TÜSIAD, SASAD and SADER or as part of chambers 
of commerce, trade and industry, particularly the Istanbul Chamber of Industry 
(Istanbul Sanayi Odası, ISO). In other words, SASAD and SADER were not simply 
two voluntary associations representing private interests of their members. They, 
together with the private/public institutions, Armed Forces Pensions Fund (Ordu 
Yardımlaşma Kurumu, OYAK) and Turkish Armed Forces Foundation (Türk Silahlı 
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Kuvvetlerini Güçlendirme Vakfı, TSKGV) which were established with specially 
defined legal statuses, enabled military elite to transition from their positions of 
leadership in public service to equally selective positions in the state corporatist and 
voluntary associations.  
Clearly, Turkey’s military-entrepreneurs and secular business community 
cooperated to erect Turkey’s ‘national’ and ‘modern’ defence and security industry 
while at the same time they welcomed openness and market reforms. This form of 
cooperation to safeguard and uphold national business interests is reminiscent of the 
first years of modern Turkey when Mustafa Kemal and his top military aides, facilitated 
the establishment of an associational landscape that nurtured an indigenous 
Turkish/Muslim business community. One major difference, however, is that over the 
course of some seventy years, the military elite’s priorities have shifted from an outright 
condemnation of international markets and of ‘alien’ or ‘foreign’ actors operating into 
the Turkish market. SASAD is known to include those companies that are both 
domestic and international while SADER is home to companies that are wholly 
domestically owned. Günlük-Senesen writes, ‘SADER and SASAD are interestingly 
partly competitive and partly complementary. Thus, it is perhaps possible to speculate a 
conflict between the interests of national and international capital’. Indeed, SASAD’s 
international character is reflected in its membership in the European umbrella 
association European Defence Industries Group (EDIG).142  
Moreover, despite a rhetorical commitment to nationalizing Turkish defence 
industry, all security sector organizations contracted out to either wholly foreign owned 
companies or domestic/international mergers, mostly SASAD members. Lale 
Sarıibrahimoğlu notes that both the state and the private actors in Turkey’s defence 
sector are aware that domestic companies fall short of responding to the needs of 
Turkey’s security sector.143  Besides, though Turkish military aspired to self-sufficiency 
in its defence and security sector, ‘the literature does not indicate… that indigenous 
arms production per se has brought economic benefits. [Moreover], earnings from arms 
exports appear to be very small.’144 Evidently, Turkey’s military entrepreneurs 
fraternized during the course of 1980s and 1990s with Turkey’s secular business 
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community within the space provided to both parties by voluntary and state corporatist 
associations and ultimately both parties tacitly consented that privatization, 
marketization and liberalization were beneficial – to the extent that their private 
interests were catered to – and economically more rational.  
Military entrepreneurs sustained their privileged position in the associational 
landscape at the expense of other players, particularly those who are, or may be, 
considered adversaries to the military elite. In fact, during what became known as the 28 
February process that marked the peak of an economic and political confrontation 
between the secular, ‘Republican’ elite, i.e. high-ranking military officers, members of 
judicial elite, politicians in opposition, establishment academia, and bureaucrats, and the 
conservative and devout ‘Islamic’ political and economic elite, the economic ventures 
of the latter group were targeted, and ultimately significantly damaged.145 Interestingly, 
according to Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) data from 1989 
to 1999, military expenditure in Turkey reached its highest level in 1997-1998 and 
continued to rise in the 2000s.
146
 It may then be assumed that the Turkish security 
establishment combated Islamic capitalism and Islamic politics simultaneously so as to 
protect the secular regime against a possible takeover of ‘Islamists’ and to guard its 
economic privileges and ventures. Hence, the rise in defence spending during the height 
of Turkish military’s fight against ‘internal enemies’.  
Bourgeois capitalism and business-state relations after the 1980 coup 
A heavy-handed intervention by the military on 12 September 1980 suppressed 
all political and civil organizations operating on the right and left of the political 
spectrum and without sparing those organizations allegedly siding with the state. The 
junta leadership revamped the existing legal system; passed a new constitution in 1982 
and gradually decorated the system with corresponding binary laws and decrees that 
severely restricted the operations of all organizations representing industrial workers. 
The military leadership once again handed the monopoly of collective bargaining to the 
corporatist peak associations, such as Türk-İş (for labourers) and TISK (for employers):    
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Once the constitution was approved in a well-managed plebiscite, the Confederation of 
Turkish Employers Unions (TISK) argued that the rights and wage levels gained by 
workers in previous rounds of collective bargaining exceeded those warranted by the new 
constitution. To redress this alleged miscarriage of economic justice, Law 2821 on Trade 
Unions, Collective Bargaining, Strikes and Lock-outs was passed on May 5, 1983. The law 
restricts the establishment of new trade unions, places constraints on the right to strike. 
Clause 13 of the law stipulates that a trade union, in order to gain collective bargaining 
rights in a workplace, must have 10 percent of all workers in most industries... Joining a 
union is thus bureaucratically cumbersome and also risky. The employer is immediately 
informed and there is no stipulation in the law against dismissal for trade union 
membership. Trade union membership is further discouraged by the provision (Clause 9) 




With Clause 9, the military regime ensured that there was not any benefit to be 
drawn from union membership since the gains to be recorded via collective bargaining 
were theirs whether they were union members or not. Furthermore, the junta regime 
introduced measures to create a pristine platform of collective bargaining by barring the 
memberships of civil servants, teachers, police, security personnel in trade unions and 
by prohibiting strikes and lock-outs in ‘water, electricity, gas and petroleum supply 
networks; petrochemical works; banking; public plants; fire-fighting departments; and 
establishments run by the Ministry of Defence.
148
 ‘Finally, the centralization fetish that 
Turkish state corporatism has had since its inception reached its zenith in the hands of 
the military leadership and culminated in a new form of centralized industrial 
bargaining that required only single, nationwide unions to represent workers’ interests. 
These national, hierarchically aligned unions were to be organized per industry and 
workers or local unions were to join only one union at a time. Bargaining was 
administered by the Supreme Arbitration Board, where union leaders claimed to be 
underrepresented vis a vis their counterparts from the public sector and government. 
The decisions taken by the Supreme Arbitration Board were so arbitrary that even the 
representatives of state owned enterprises, who believed that union-level wage 




The impact of the September 1980 coup on business-state relations in Turkey 
was so profound that its after effects were felt deeply in the following decades. The tale 
of the post-1980 Turkey is one that is mired with failed attempts of consolidation on the 
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political left and conversely of economic and political empowerment and social 
mobility on the centre right.  This shift in the centre of Turkish politics – which 
ultimately affected state corporatism – was attributable partly to the domestic dynamics 
ranging from political instability, persistent cronyism, heightened social anxieties 
caused by the Kemalist notions of citizenship, internal migration, fast-paced 
urbanization and the failure of state-led developmentalism.
150
 Also, Turkey in the 1980s 
was increasingly influenced by the developments in its immediate neighbourhood, 
particularly by the macro-level changes in the post-Cold War world and the post-
communist democratic transitions in Eastern Europe. Therefore, Turkey’s political and 
business elite felt compelled then more than ever before to respond to external calls for 
openness, liberalization and democratization.  
Those actors that were more ready and eager to acknowledge and consider the 
changing dynamics of Turkey’s relationship with the West, especially, came from the 
centre right and from among the ranks of Turkey’s capitalists and bourgeoisie. John 
Waterbury observes that in the 1980s, following the military intervention, Turkey 
followed the footsteps of many other countries towards an increase in the popularity of 
centre right political parties.
151
 This move was strengthened by the global push for 
neoliberalism and for greater integration of markets in the developed and the developing 
world. Leo Panitch confirms that in the 1980s, the political right fulfilled its objectives 
through balancing and containing, usually on behalf of host states, class based 
movements.
152
 The outcome was what Paul Cammack described as the facilitation of 
bourgeois capitalism.
153
 Hence, the bourgeois capitalists stepped up to reinvent the 
clientelist/corporatist structures of policy-making in the decades leading up to the 
millennium. 
Turkey’s business community diversified during the course of the 1980s to 
respond to the policies of liberalization and globalization introduced right before the 
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military coup. A select group of businesspeople acquired significant power by venturing 
into financial markets. Ercan posits that the liberalization of the interest rates, which 
were held fixed during decades of ISI, allowed bankers and financiers to capitalize on 
internationalization of the economy. Turkey’s financial services sector expanded 
considerably. This expansion did not only occur westward and towards the direction of 
global financial hubs such as New York, London and Tokyo. Oddly and despite the 
highly restrictive political and social landscape drawn up by the Turkish military, an 
indigenous class of devout, conservative Muslims prospered chiefly by utilizing 
international financial markets.  
The Özal administration permitted Islamic banks and financial institutions to 
operate in the Turkish financial markets in 1983. The permit was granted in the form of 
a decree, released on 16 December 1983 and enforced from 19 February 1984, which 
allowed special finance houses to establish their operations in Turkey. This decree was 
later amended by the Turkish Banking Law, introduced in 1999 as part of an IMF-
regulated plan to survive the banking and liquidity crisis at the time. In fact, Turgut 
Özal was not only an initiator but also a beneficiary of the emergent Islamic financial 
sector in Turkey. One of the first Islamic banks to establish in Turkey, the Al-Baraka 
Turkish Finance House (Al Baraka Türk) was owned by the Saudi Sheikh Saleh Kamel, 
whose partners in Turkey were Eymen Topbaş and Korkut Özal. Both Topbas and Özal 
were directly linked to Turgut Özal; the former was the head of Özal’s Motherland 
Party’s Istanbul headquarters and the latter was Özal’s younger brother, a former 
Minister of Agriculture in 1970s and a deputy of the conservative National Salvation 
Party (Milli Selamet Partisi, MSP). 
Connections between Turkey’s pre-1980 political elite and the capitalist 
investors of the Islamic financial institutions, which bloomed after 1983, extend beyond 
the Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi, ANAP) and its leader, Özal. Faisal Finance, 
established in Turkey by the Saudi Prince Mohammad al- Faisal, was launched in 
Turkey in 1980s and among its shareholders were former and active politicians of the 
era, including Salih Özcan, then a member of parliament for the MSP, and Ahmet 
Tevfik Paksu, the Labour Minister for the coalition government of Justice Party, NSP, 
and Nationalist Action Party between 1975-1977. After the sale of Faisal Finance to 
Sabri Ülker in 2001, the bank’s majority shares transferred from the hands of the 
political elite to Islamic business elite. The investment into Turkey’s flourishing Islamic 
 81 
financial sector did not always pour from the Gulf.
154
 Turkey’s own Ihlas Finance 
House and Asya Finance House were founded by Turkish businessmen but without 
hosting Turkey’s ruling elite in their boards or the higher echelons of their 
administration. These connections indicate that the establishment and proliferation of 
Islamic business and financial institutions has long been anticipated before the Özal 
administration and that the politically conservative and economically liberal elite almost 
single-handedly promoted the development of Islamic business in Turkey.  
Another way in which Turkey’s business elite and bourgeoisie diversified was 
through the expansion of small to medium sized enterprises (SMEs) and the entry into 
the previously-heterogeneous community of secular, urban industrialists new 
businesspeople with provincial backgrounds. Haldun Gülalp observed that already by 
1950s, 60s, and 70s, a transformative process was underway:
155
 Turkey’s merchants 
became industrial producers in the 1950s and these producers gradually engaged with 
their counterparts abroad through franchising, mergers and acquisitions. Boratav, 
Yeldan and Köse found that between 1980 and 1995, SMEs developed at a moderate 
pace:  
As of 1995, 95% of enterprises in manufacturing employ less than 9 workers, and produce 
7% of aggregate manufacturing value added. They employ, on the average, 24% of the 
formal industrial labor force, with an average wage of about one-fourth of the wages paid 
in large enterprises (i.e. those employing more than 10 workers). Average productivity in 
small manufacturing, likewise, reach only about a fourth of that of large enterprises.
 156
  
Evidently, though the impact of SMEs ought not to be overestimated, their 
proliferation reduced the concentration of large-scale enterprises across different sectors 
in Turkey. So, after 30 years of economic redistribution in Turkey’s periphery, it was 
not surprising to find a middle class in Anatolia that was interested to invest in business 
ventures in Turkey’s major cities and abroad. Waterbury concurred that Turkey in the 
post 1980s period witnessed the emergence of 
[A] large middle class, covering a range of incomes, many of whose members are self-
employed or otherwise engaged in private markets at last part of the time. They may deal 
with the state and extract resources from the state, but they are not of the state.
 157
  
                                               
154 Filiz Baskan, The Political Economy of Islamic Finance in Turkey: The Role of Fethullah Gülen and 
Asya Finans, In Clement M. Henry and Rodney Wilson (eds) The Politics of Islamic Finance, Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 2004, pp.216-240.  
155 Gülalp, Haldun (1983) Gelişme Stratejileri ve Gelişme İdeolojileri (Strategies and Ideologies of 
Progress), Ankara: Yurt Publications. 
156 Boratav, K.; Yeldan, A.E.; and Köse, A.H. (2000) ‘Globalization, Distribution and Social Policy: 
Turkey, 1980-1998’, Working Paper No. 20, CEPA Working Paper Series I: Globalization, Labor 
Markets and Social Policy, February 2000, New York: New School University, 1- 53. (p.10) 
157
 Ibid Waterbur, 1992, p.46.  
 82 
While some of the members of the new middle class were pious Muslims and most 
members were conservative, their political and social ambitions were kept in check by the 
state corporatist measures intact in the period between 1980-1995 and their access to 
economic policy-making and resources were largely determined by a combination of 
international (IMF, World Bank) and domestic (shaky coalition governments, state 
corporatist institutions, the Central Bank, etc.) factors. The 1990s was the decade when the 
combined impact of all these international and domestic developments was most strongly 
felt. The tension between the new middle class and their often-unmet ambitions and the 
secular, Republican elite escalated so high that the military stepped in via a ‘soft coup’ on 
28 February 1997. The next chapter will deal exclusively with the relationship between 
Muslim entrepreneurs/capitalists and state corporatism, especially during and after the 
collapse of the centre right coalition government of True Path Party (Doğru Yol Partisi, 
DYP) and Welfare Party (Refah Partisi, RP) in 1997.  
How did the interventionist, centralized and authoritarian application of state 
corporatism for over half a century affect politics, economy and society in Turkey? 
According to John Waterbury, ‘[t]he result has been the expansion of the informal, 
nonregulated, and unmeasured economy; the atrophy of formal corporatist political 
organizations; and the formation of parties that reflect new economic interests’158. In 
order to gauge the social ramifications of decades of authoritarianism and 
corporatism/clientelism and of a patchy transition to liberalization and privatization, we 
need to examine the business community and the evolution of organized representation 
of business interests in Turkey’s private sector.  
Previous sections demonstrated that it is difficult to speak of democratic 
policymaking or pluralist interest mediation during the years of martial law or military 
coup. Another important dimension of the influence of the military-civilian elite over 
the whole of civil society, and by extension, over the sphere of business interest groups 
is manifested in the legislation on NGOs and civilian organizations. Ferhat Ünlü claims 
that post-coup governments in Turkey attempted to rouse civic consciousness against 
domestic threats to security. The fiercest threats to or enemies of the state were – very 
generally – Kurdish armed and political opposition, and Islamists.159 During the 1990s 
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marked by armed conflict in Turkey’s Southeast between Turkish security forces and 
Kurdish militants, a major pillar of the Turkish response to Kurdish Worker’s Party 
(PKK) was systematic curtailment of freedom of association: ‘[The] 1995 
Constitutional Amendment (Law No. 4121)… made it unlawful for [non-profit] 
organizations to ‘have a political mission, to carry out political activities, be supported 
by political parties, act together or share the same purposes as other NGOs’.160  
Again, as will be explored further in the next chapter, the activities of Islamic 
associations or associations founded on conservative and religious values were either 
curtailed or discouraged by legal mechanisms towards the end of 1990s. A democratic 
public sphere was not desired and by extension, pluralist forms of business interest 
representation, especially in the parts of the country and society that were parties to the 
on-going domestic conflict, did not easily thrive.  
Elite status and pragmatism: Turkey in the 1990s 
The previous section established that Turkey’s voluntary business associations 
were established within an authoritarian, statist, and corporatist tradition of industrial 
and business-state relations, by businessmen who either willingly or reluctantly 
subscribed to that tradition. It was also argued that (a) an indigenous class of 
Turkish/Muslim capitalists were groomed as part of the Kemalist nation state project; 
(b) Turkey’s business community did diversify over decades but although various layers 
or sections emerged within it, the first rank remained reserved for those members of the 
business elite that held formidable partnerships with the establishment, i.e. the party 
state, the military, high ranking bureaucrats, international actors and so on; (c) Turkey’s 
capitalists were complacent in their submission to state corporatist forms of bargaining 
but they were also inventive in their pursuit of shortcuts to economic and political 
power; and (d) just as the business community diversified and new ranks, divisions and 
classes emerged within Turkey’s business elite, the members of those divisions, 
fractions and ranks also changed to the extent that the dividing lines became 
increasingly blurred.  
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Turkish businessmen were admittedly engaged in a love-hate relationship with 
the state. Their success as businessmen was conditioned by their careful management of 
this relationship. Turkish businessmen regarded the state as the primary source of their 
difficulties since state institutions were able to exercise relatively unchecked authority 
over and exert arbitrary measures on businesses in Turkey. Additionally, businessmen 
acknowledged that they owed the state their wealth, status and political influence. In her 
detailed analysis on autobiographies of members of secular Turkish business elite, Ayşe 
Buğra161 observed that secular business elite have made no reference to the neoliberal 
orthodoxy, in which the emphasis would be on individual gains or profit as opposed to a 
state’s provision of livelihoods of the individual. Buğra argued that members of the 
traditional Turkish business elite were accustomed to the arbitrary distribution and 
removal of benefits and punishments by a parochial state and thus conformed to state 
corporatism without needing to resolve to revolutionary pluralism. TUSIAD, for 
instance, has traditionally seen the Turkish state as its main arbitrator. Consequently, 
businesses and corporations that form TUSIAD’s membership use this peak association 
not only to bargain with the state for wage changes, measures to increase Turkish 
economy’s creditworthiness, etc. but also to ‘prove the social existence of the private 
sector’.162 In short, Buğra depicted Turkey’s secular, establishment businesspeople as 
obedient children of the state, cautiously claiming concessions from their father while 
submitting to his power.  
Emrah Göker asserted that Turkey’s capitalists were neither as disempowered 
nor as cautious as Buğra described them to be. 163 In fact, he demonstrated by referring 
to the policy opinions released by the Istanbul Chamber of Trade (İstanbul Ticaret 
Odası, ITO) during the years leading up to the 1960 coup that Turkey’s traders were 
interested to push for a pro-liberalisation and free trade agenda and to severely criticize 
the Adnan Menderes government for not increasingly Turkey’s overall trade volume by 
encouraging foreign trade and investment. Another ITO report published after the 1960 
coup reiterated trade policy suggestions ITO developed and announced prior to the 
military takeover. Evidently, traders who organized around ITO were not able to 
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influence trade policies before and after the coup. I argue that Turkey’s capitalists 
exerted their influence over collective bargaining through corporatist and voluntary 
associations when they could and often they also utilized their personal (crony) 
relationships with military high officials, judges, senior bureaucrats in relevant 
ministries, local governors, heads of municipalities and members of the executive to 
accrue private gains. Therefore, Turkey’s capitalists were neither too cautious nor too 
adventurous in their dealings with the state.  
Policy based bargaining between the state, labour and business in Turkey did not 
only occur via state corporatist channels. Turkey’s associational landscape was 
characterized by hybridity from the very beginning. The influence of organized business 
in Turkey began to increase in late 1970s when the policy of import substituting 
industrialization began to generate structural problems in the Turkish economy. 
Voluntary associations formed just at the beginning of the decade and their main 
concern was to urge Turkey’s integration with international markets. One major drive 
for Turkey’s capitalists to exercise more stern policy influence was to trigger reforms to 
open up Turkey’s market to foreign capital investors. Voluntary associations and liberal 
intelligentsia allegedly pushed the CHP out of power in 1978. CHP’s plans to further 
ISI strategy by investing in capital intensive sectors and thereby reducing Turkey’s 
external dependence were not favoured by Turkey’s capitalists and international 
capital.
164
 In the 1979 elections, a beleaguered CHP lost to the center right Justice Party, 
which enlivened the hopes among provincial and urban merchants, businesspeople, and 
capitalists that Turkey would enter into a more solid path of economic prosperity. 
Justice Party’s plan for economic recovery, January 24 decisions, was announced 
shortly after the administration took office. However, as mentioned before, the civilian 
government was toppled months later by the Turkish military and Turkey’s capitalists 
were left to their own devices to influence the process of economic recovery and 
marketization. 
At this juncture, capitalists responded by alternating the state corporatist 
structure of interest representation by presenting a strong and unified business lobby. 
The lobbying was done primarily through Turkey’s first and still most influential civil 
society actor, TUSIAD. Öniş and Türem posit that these two factors were the key 
sources of motivation for voluntary business associations that spearheaded 
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democratization in Turkey: better governance and more competitiveness. The expansion 
or improvement of civil and human rights and liberties was a secondary source of 
motivation for Turkey’s organized business and those associations that represented 
businesses would rally in support of democratization and globalization to push Turkey 
towards the EU accession target, which would inevitably deliver economic benefits.  
Thus, in short, organized business was pragmatic. This pragmatic approach 
urged TUSIAD to push ahead with the transition from the interventionist, import 
substitution industrialization regime of the 1960-1970s to the marketization and 
neoliberal globalization. Members of TUSIAD were not presenting an outright 
opposition to the state or to the politics of ANAP nor were they eager to abandon state 
corporatist structures such as TOBB, ITO, and others that granted them access to ad hoc 
and permanent committees set up by the ministries of trade, economy, finance, and 
labour. They were simply inventing a faster and sometimes more effective alternative to 
the increasingly dysfunctional or overtly state-like business interest associations that 
they settled for until early 1970s.  
The winners of Turkey’s privatization and market liberalization fortified their 
privileged status by confining the space of political and economic policymaking to 
those actors that enjoyed secular cultural practices. In an ethnographic study on the 
lifestyles of Turkey’s elite in the 1990s and early 2000s, Rifat Bali documents how 
elites featured in the popular imagination of the time. A ‘blue blood’ Turkish gentleman 
or woman was expected to enthusiastically consume Western arts and cultural products, 
to be well travelled in Western Europe and the United States, and to frown upon the 
advent of rogue and unrefined businesspeople in high society. Most importantly, 
signifiers of genuine elite status almost always involved lifestyle choices that were 
secular or non-Muslim. Wine drinking was imperative and an interest in vineyards and 
winemaking was encouraged among Turkey’s secular business elite and intelligentsia. 
Bali quotes several newspapers and magazines that featured the wines of Kutman 
family. Ahmet Kutman, a graduate of Robert College,
165
 founded Sarafin winery, 
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together with Güven Nil. Sarafin’s Winery catered exclusively to Turkey’s secular elite. 
Following Kutman’s success in business and winemaking, other businesspeople such as 
Güler Sabancı, now leading a Fortune 500 corporation, ventured into winemaking. 
Columnists Şahin Alpay and Serdar Turgut commended in their respective newspaper 
columns Kutman’s breeding and chivalry, which were only complemented by Kutman’s 
winemaking and drinking.  
Similarly, Turkey’s secular business and political elites followed the trend of 
shaving their moustaches and beards, which were clearly symbols of Islamic lifestyle. 
Bali, again cites news articles from 1993 that report on how CEOs of secular companies 
such as Ege Seramik expected their personnel to shave their moustaches off. Though 
known for his democratic and liberal views, İshak Alaton of Alarko Holding confessed 
his aversion to the moustache in an interview in 1996. Imaginations of Western and 
non-Islamic politics and business materialized in the person of the country’s first 
woman Prime Minister Tansu Çiller, also a Robert College alumnus and educated in the 
USA. As Çiller stepped up Turkey’s political ladder, Turkey’s distinguished public 
intellectuals did not conceal their delight in her advance: Ertuğrul Özkök, long time 
Editor-in-Chief of trendsetting daily newspaper Hürriyet, commented that Çiller was 
easily spotted from among a fog of moustached, bearded and provincial MPs
166. Özkök 
connected the recent trend of wealthy, handsomely dressed politicians and 




Secular elite status also demanded a sense of dedication to civil society. During 
the 1990s, businesspeople strengthened their privileged class status by founding and/or 
expanding social, cultural and political institutions in Turkey’s civil society. These 
institutions included sports clubs, such as the Fenerbahçe Sports Club of Istanbul and its 
respective gentlemen’s club, 1907 Fenerbahçe Association- notoriously frequented by 
high ranking military leadership – or the Kemer Country Golf and Country Club, and 
the Riders Clubs; rotary or lions clubs; cultural and arts foundations; and 
neighbourhood associations. Two neighbourhood associations set up in Istanbul’s 
Beyoglu and Cihangir districts exemplify the embedded secular motive behind business 
community’s institutionalization of the public sphere: Cihangir Beautification 
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Association was formed in 1995 to protect the up-scale and hip community of Cihangir 
from any intrusion by the Welfare Party, which had just been elected into municipal 
office in Istanbul.  
Meanwhile the Beyoglu Beautification Association was established to maintain 
and further commercialize the shopping district of Istiklal and was dubbed “little 
TUSIAD” for the overlaps in the membership of both organizations. Both organizations 
worked to privatize and render exclusive Istanbul neighbourhoods that were long 
inhabited by non-Muslims (Rum, Jews, Armenians) and secular intellectuals.
168
 Another 
example is the Istanbul Cultural and Arts Centre (Istanbul Kultur Sanat Vakfı, IKSV), 
which was founded by a group of businesspeople led by Nejat F. Eczacıbaşı in 1973.169 
Eczacıbaşı initiated the establishment of several other civil society organizations, 
chiefly the top ranking policy think tank, TESEV, and he clearly stated his intention in 
building these organization as galvanizing progress: He intended to hasten Turkey’s 
advance into global pre-eminence and competitiveness. He wished Turkey’s society 
Westernized, civilized and well off/affluent.
170
 Turkey’s secular, established elite 
attended IKSV’s signature Istanbul Jazz Festival. The future of the Festival seemed 
bleak to those who feared Istanbul’s decline into Islamic lifestyles, in 1995 when the 
Islamist Welfare Party won the local elections. Cengiz Çandar, celebrated in 2010s for 
his liberal views and support of AKP, commented that the festival of 1996 was probably 
the last festival to be had in Istanbul, which had fallen to the Islamists.
171
In short, 
throughout the 1990s Turkey’s secular elite was openly anti-Islamist and acted to secure 
not only private or group gains but also to protect secular and Western lifestyles against 
the dawn of Islam.    
Meanwhile, repetitive economic crises took their toll on lower and middle 
classes, which turned to the political left and the labor movement for a panacea to their 
financial vulnerability. The 1990s economic turmoil and crises hung over a society that 
was torn between the world of Washington Consensus neoliberalism and its anti. 
Fringe/smaller political parties, labor unions, associations and intelligentsia on the left 
identified their position as anti-neoliberalism. As such, anti-neoliberalism opposed 
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Turkey’s foreign trade, economic and diplomatic relations with particularly Western 
European and North American countries and markets, membership in and creditor-
debtor relationship with the IMF and the World Bank, accession into the European 
Union, and any other larger associations with globalization and imperialism. Ercan and 
Oğuz claim that these maxims define the national-developmentalist vein in the majority 
of Turkey’s organized labor and socialist politics. National-developmentalism, assumed 
by political parties such as Turkish Communist Party (Türkiye Komünist Partisi, TKP), 
Party of Labor (Emek Partisi, EMEP), Worker’s Party (İşçi Partisi, IP), conceives of 
the Turkish state as ‘an ally of labor against neoliberal globalization and imperialism’172. 
Left-leaning and nationalist labor union confederations that were revived in early to mid 
1990s, following a decade of prohibitions after 12 September 1980, namely the 
confederations of public servants, KESK (left-leaning) and TÜRKİYE KAMU-SEN 
(right-leaning/nationalist), and the confederations of workers, DİSK (left-leaning) and 
TÜRK-İŞ  (centre-left), followed the national-developmentalist trend and positioned 
themselves against the invasion of Turkey’s markets, resources and territorial, national 
and cultural integrity by global forces. Thus, a coalition of opposing corporatist 
institutions ossified around the ideal of a ‘developmental state173, which defied 
mainstream economic theory in favour of the interests of civil servants and public sector 
workers. 
Meanwhile, and not unlike just before 1980 coup, which was explored in 
Chapter 3, the military hierarchy also objected to domestic and international pressures 
Turkey faced in the wake of the banking crisis. Pragmatists among Turkey’s business 
community and politicians who trusted Turkey’s economic recovery with Kemal 
Derviş, a seasoned international bureaucrat, tolerated the Washington Consensus rescue 
model and the Copenhagen and Maastricht criteria. The carrots offered to Turkey’s 
business elite by IMF, World Bank and the EU were better financial and economic 
management, loans to support rotting markets, smaller state and larger private 
enterprise, and gradual commercial, political and social engagement with Europe. 
Conversely, Turkish security sector elite, who sought to maintain semi-authoritarianism, 
was threatened by accountability, austerity, and foreign involvement in Turkey’s public 
administration. Their objection to deeper engagement with Europe emanated from 
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economic, industrial, agricultural and financial considerations, however, the source of 
almost an instant aversion to Europe was ideological: Europe respected human rights 
and democracy and (yet) it harboured Turkey’s archenemies, namely Kurdish diaspora, 
Kurdish politicians in exile, PKK leadership, and Muslim conservative politicians, 
émigrés, and extremists.174 
More significantly, Turkey’s left-leaning political parties and interest groups 
adopt the discourse of isolationism and patriotism, which is usually associated with 
Turkey’s right-wing nationalism. In other words, these confederations occasionally 
downplayed class-based considerations and in their stead, emphasized the integrity and 
sanctity of Turkey’s human and natural resources. Unions’ messages of anti-
Europeanism, anti-globalization and anti-privatization resonated with disgruntled 
sections of society and business community that lost to globalization and intense 
liberalization/marketization. Several episodes of direct confrontation between various 
business interest groups, governments and left-leaning confederations occurred during 
the 1990s and early 2000s. These two decades also witnessed strikes, marches, sit-ins 
and other instances when organized workers movements publicly challenged 
authorities, including members of international financial community. Some of the 
strongest messages against neoliberalism and Europeanization, perceived by leftists as a 
euphemism for global imperialism, were voiced against international financial 
organizations and foreign companies looking to invest into Turkey.  
While Turkey’s large, established and leftist workers union confederations were 
once members of a strong anti-privatization coalition, Turkey’s policymakers, economic 
and financial administrators, public sector managers, and business associations and 
unions representing private sector employers were not entirely convinced that 
radical/aggressive privatization was the only way forward for public sector 
corporations. In a private conversation, a top executive, who later became the president 
of a think tank, declared how he was offered the chief executive officer position in one 
of Turkey’s formerly public petroleum and gas corporations, indicating that better 
management of public corporations was entertained as one of the many options to 
salvage the public sector. 175 Entertaining alternative paths to public sector reform did 
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not, however, prevent the gradual application of large-scale privatization in late 1990s 
and throughout the 2000s.  
Coming to terms with the persistence of corporatism/clientelism in Turkey 
Turkish state corporatism was hoisted upon a tradition of clientelism that 
defined business-state relations and the unique combination of state corporatism and 
clientelism persisted until the end of twentieth century in Turkey. Timothy Power and 
Makrukh Doctor find three reasons why corporatism persists. First is that traditional 
corporatist state bureaucrats and associations and their leaders do not want to give up 
the benefits of corporatism, such as compulsory membership fees that provide a steady 
source of funds for the chamber or industrial association concerned, or the seats in 
policymaking structures, such as specialized commissions, councils, and independent or 
parliamentary regulatory commissions, set up by the governments. Secondly, corporatist 
development impedes the emergence of a strong peak association and a unified labour 
movement both of which are very representative. In the absence of both bodies, interest 
group fragmentation intensifies competition among sectors and classes of capitalists and 
labourers and encourages them to adopt particularistic interests, which are best served in 
corporatism. Third, corporatism is both formally and informally institutionalized. The 
actors that need to change the rules of corporatist institutions are the same actors that 
will need to bear the costs of change.176  
These three factors apply to the Turkish case. An additional one, not cited by 
Power and Doctor, is the manner in which Turkey’s business community was able to 
utilize and move between informal and formal institutions to balance their need to serve 
the interests of their members or businesses with their obligation to serve the ‘nation’ or 
the secular Republican tradition. This pragmatic approach worked because Turkish state 
corporatism was largely anti-democratic and authoritarian:   
The nature of business collective action, interest representation, and policymaking in 
Turkey is amorphous and arbitrary. Central political organs, which exclude private 
institutions from the formal policy process, make most public policy decisions. Yet it is 
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In the absence of democratic interest mediation, Turkey’s capitalists devised practical 
solutions that would sustain and prolonged their privileged position vis a vis those 
economic, social and political actors that they perceived as competition. 
The preceding section explains why Turkey’s state corporatism began to face 
significant changes after Turkey signed an accession agreement with the European 
Union in 1999 and embarked on a carefully monitored program of economic, structural 
and legal reforms. As Turkey advanced on the EU accession path, more representative, 
pluralist and democratic business-state and industrial relations became a matter of 
urgency and an issue of compliance. Significantly, new interest groups had emerged and 
gained sufficient influence to make Turkey more ready to respond to, and engage with, 
these new imperatives constructively. The following chapter will discuss the emergence 
of Islamic actors and clarify why and how they differ from Turkey’s secular, 
establishment elites, including Turkey’s secular capitalists. Then, the chapter will 
analyse the novel and traditional elements of policymaking in the AKP era Turkey to 
gauge whether the influx of new and powerful Islamic actors made a difference. 
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Chapter 4: Who are Turkey’s Muslim conservative 
business elite and how do they bargain through 
associations? 
The previous chapter established how for decades after its establishment, the 
modern Turkish nation-state confronted its citizens, particularly pious, conservative, 
provincial individuals. The state’s policies of confrontation resulted in the two-decades-
long period of political, social and economic transformation on three levels: of devout 
Muslim individuals and communities; of interest groups, that is, associations of Muslim, 
conservative businesses; and of the political system between 1990 and 2010. This 
chapter features a broad discussion of the policy agenda that Turkey’s Muslim 
conservative businesses, as represented by their associations, adopted and pursued. In 
other words, this chapter discusses what Muslim conservative businessmen sought to 
achieve through business interest groups and how. 
The aim of the first section is to briefly demonstrate the conditions within which 
a distinct class or community of conservative Muslim patrons or power holders emerged 
as Turkey advanced towards European integration and globalization. Focusing on the 
military intervention of 28 February 1997, this section analyses the episodes of 
confrontation between Turkey’s Muslims and the agents of the coup in the military, the 
Judiciary, the media, the academia, and the business community. Directly confronted 
and attacked by the military elite and secularist judges, prosecutors, journalists, 
intellectuals and business organizations, Turkey’s pious, conservative and socially- and 
economically-mobile families turned to their own community for solidarity. 
Specifically, I show how a ‘soft’ military intervention was perceived by its targets as a 
collaborative effort by secularists to crush an Islamic society and way of life in Turkey. 
A shared sense of victimhood among members of Turkey’s pious, conservative 
Muslims brought them closer, thereby enhancing their ownership of their faith and 
conservative values as the most prominent features of their community.
178 
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The first section introduces the term ‘Islamic counter-elite’179 to argue whether 
the nascent Muslim conservative businessmen belong to a new elite that accumulates 
more power than and operates against the established, secular elite in Turkey. Here, 
Islamic business elites’ accounts of piety, morality, state and the Republic, nationalism 
and Turkishness, and on Europe and the rest of the globe are examined to determine 
whether Islamic business community communicates its (seemingly) distinctive identity, 
position and policy choices with Islamic references. And after almost thirty years since 
Turkey’s Muslim conservative business community began to publicly own its social and 
cultural identity, are present-day Turkey’s state-business relations distinctively 
conservative and Islamic?  
The second part of this chapter asks whether the patterns of policy bargaining by 
interest groups have changed, and if so, how and in relation to what policy areas? Here, 
I use the analytical framework I have derived from theories of interest representation, 
particularly corporatism and clientelism, to understand how and why traditional 
structures of policymaking in Turkey are resistant to change. Also, the theoretical 
framework, which at the beginning of this thesis was used to establish that 
democratizing countries including Turkey adopt hybrid policymaking structures that 
carry elements of corporatism and pluralism, works to explain the impact that 
aggressive marketization and European integration have had on policymaking structures 
in Turkey. In other words, the final section of this chapter shows that pluralizing 
elements of the now-hybrid policymaking landscape in Turkey are formed largely as a 
result of the IMF/World Bank and EU-led reforms. At the same time, the corporatist-
clientelist elements of the hybrid policymaking structures in Turkey are influenced and 
dominated by actors from the ‘Islamic counter-elite’, including Islamic business 
associations.  
Overall, the chapter concludes that the patterns of policy bargaining transformed 
between the pre-market years of authoritarian secularism in the 1970s-80s and the 
politically and economically turbulent 1990s. By 2000s and following the dawn of a 
politically stable and financially reliable Turkey under the leadership of the AKP, 
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Turkey’s interest groups inhabited a different policy bargaining landscape. The most 
prominent features of the hybrid policymaking landscape of Turkey in the 2000s were 
the larger range and variety of interest groups involved in policy negotiations and the 
diversity of public bodies established to host policy negotiations. Beneath the surface, 
older and established institutions continued to rely on patronage relationships to exert 
pressure over policymakers, however, an impression of more pluralism in policymaking 
was nevertheless maintained.  As far as traditional structures of policymaking in the 
Executive and the Judiciary were concerned, pluralism meant the emergence of new 
actors, representing Muslim conservative Turks and other interest groups in society. 
Outside of the realm of the state and parallel to traditional structures of policymaking 
stood new and non-institutional policymaking channels. Their emergence, which 
represents another face of pluralism in Turkey, was supported by some Islamic business 
associations, which utilized their organizational and financial capacities to nourish such 
informal channels (domestic and foreign media, global popular culture, a blossoming 
international education/academic community) to influence policy.   
Turkey’s new Muslim conservative patrons 
An ‘Islamic counter-elite’ formed in Turkey as a result of economic 
marginalization, political disenfranchisement and securitization of the state, three core 
strategies that were pursued against the Muslim conservative community as well as 
other social, national, ethnic or religious groups in Turkey. Nilüfer Göle identified what 
she termed an ‘Islamist counter-elite’ in Turkey as an elite composed of ‘actors in 
Islamist movements and professionals and intellectuals aspiring for political power.’180  
Turkey’s Islamic counter-elite emerged as an economically powerful, well 
connected, culturally and socially advanced and exclusive community in a class 
structure dominated by the Republican secular elite. Turkey’s Islamic counter-elite 
therefore possesses three distinct qualities. It exists alongside an older, secular elite. 
While it occupies the same territory with Turkey’s Republican ex-military officials, 
CHP top leadership and cadres, members of the Judiciary, and established industrialists 
and businesspeople, the members of the Islamic counter-elite hold fundamentally 
different notions of elite status and morality. Secondly and crucially, the Islamic 
counter-elite did not take over the resources that were once exclusively at the disposal 
of the old Republican elite. The resources available at the top of the wealth distribution 
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in Turkey expanded simultaneously with the emergence of new elites so for many years, 
incoming and outgoing members of a privileged community could effortlessly coexist, 
as it were. Ultimately, however, the Islamic counter-elite moved in on the space that 
was previously occupied by Turkey’s secularists, pushing them out. This suggests that 
the Islamic counter-elite’s move to dominate Turkey’s institutions, bureaucracy and 
market may not have been driven by economic pragmatism only. Third, Muslim 
conservative families harboured aspirations for elite status and lifestyles and therefore 
larger groups of middle class Muslims in Turkey prioritized political and social mobility 
over other forms of resistance to the establishment. Other groups in society, most 
prominently Turkey’s Kurds, organized against the establishment and the Turkish 
Republic’s problematic policies of citizenship, too. However the Kurdish (PKK) 
resistance movement did not consider forging a ‘Kurdish counter-elite’ as a resistance 
strategy, perhaps since it is fundamentally a Marxist movement with strong anti-elite 
messages.   
Securitization 
Securitization was an important function of Turkey’s authoritarian secularism181 
and has a dual significance to the formation of a counter-elite within Turkey’s Muslim 
conservative community. On the one hand, a deeply securitized state-society 
relationship encourages communities, which hold strong national sentiments, to adapt to 
and believe in the state-sanctioned notions of national identity, security and homeland. 
Republican ideals of protecting the homeland and conserving the nation have a strong 
appeal to Muslim, conservative families and communities that have similar ideological 
references. While a deeply securitized regime attracted Turkey’s Muslim conservatives 
to the idea of a Nation, defence and security policies and militarism repelled them.   
Turkey’s national security paradigm recognizes a very tightly defined notion of 
citizenship and thus serves to legitimize a disproportionate and constant combat against 
individuals and communities that are not recognized as ‘citizens’. The ideal citizen is a 
secular, Sunni, Hanefi and male Turk. Practicing and pious Muslims do not conform to 
this narrow definition, offered by historian and political scientist Baskın Oran182. This 
line of reasoning, held by the authors of Turkey’s Republican national security doctrine, 
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leads to the defamation of practicing and pious Muslims as potential threats to domestic 
security. Ironically, Turkey’s Muslims have consented to the nationalization project of 
the Republic and have embraced Turkishness in the anticipation that Turkey’s varied 
ethnicities and faiths would effortlessly fold into the form of a unified Nation. 
Furthermore, as will be explained later in the chapter, Turkey’s Muslim conservative 
families recognize the official discourse on ‘the enemies of state’ and support the 
mainstream national security line of preserving and protecting the glorious Turkish 
nation against non-Muslim, non-Turkish and ‘foreign’ enemies.   
As far as the 1990s in Turkey – an era that this section of the Chapter focuses on 
– is concerned, the archenemies of the Republic were Turkey’s Kurds, and specifically 
the Kurdistan Workers Party (Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan, PKK). A brutal war between 
Turkish security forces and Kurdish militants in Turkey’s East and Southeast, 
accelerated by regular attacks on civilians in major cities in Western Turkey and 
complicated by Turkey’s difficult relationship with its Eastern neighbours, Iraq, Syria 
and Iran, marred the 1980s and 1990s. However, the 1990s also staged simultaneous hot 
and cold (propaganda) wars against other imagined enemies of the state, including 
Turkish journalists, political leaders, former or acting security sector officers, 
businesspeople, artists and leading figures on the political left and Islamic conservative 
right.  
The Kurdish conflict, especially, empowered the privileged community of 
security and defence capitalists and fostered a network of military and gendarmerie 
intelligence officers, paramilitary forces and perpetrators of organized crime, judges, 
prosecutors and investigators, journalists, businesspeople, public intellectuals, and 
seasoned politicians and cabinet members – in short, Turkey’s deep state – because the 
conflict’s persistence bred legitimacy for an ever-expanding national security network 
and infrastructure. Crucially, state corporatism and cronyism enabled members of an 
obscure and illegal band of security operatives
183
, who had gone as far as founding and 
institutionalizing armed paramilitary groups within Turkey’s security sector 
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The Republican (Kemalist) military elite established a highly centralized, 
corporatist bureaucratic structure to support its national security doctrine. This corporate 
hierarchy also helped the military elite to bypass elected representatives of Turkey’s 
democratic institutions, to act beyond their mandate, and to operate without needing 
consent.
185
 Over the course of the twentieth century, the military and Republican state 
elite were not able to recruit absolute public approval at all times and the Jacobinist 
conceptualization of a benevolent, superior elite acting in the best interests of rogue 
masses failed on a number of occasions, most ferociously during the successive coups. 
Centre right populist parties, such as the Democrat Party (Demokrat Parti, DP), the 
Justice Party (Adalet Partisi, AP) and the Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi, ANAP), 
that have acquired substantial public support over decades merited the attention and the 
reluctant cooperation of the state elite. However, the state elite’s relationship with 
populist political parties was difficult, competitive and often led to the hostility of the 
former to the latter. The pendulum swung between brutal competition and pragmatic 
cooperation and the very kinetic nature of this relationship resulted in the building and 
crumbling of coalitions between actors of all backgrounds and convictions. 
Turkey’s blend of corporatism and clientelism engendered politically and 
economically lucrative coalitions between bureaucrats and businessmen with political 
ambitions. Banking and media tycoons, chairs or chambers of commerce and trade in 
Turkey’s major cities, recruited as their cronies members of Turkey’s mafia 
organizations.
186
 Mob bosses and underground criminal organizations were linked to 
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Turkey’s formal state security organizations, particularly the Police Force, the National 
Intelligence Service (Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı, MIT) and Gendarmerie Intelligence 
Service (Jandarma İstihbarat ve Terörle Mücadele, JİTEM).187 Several factors 
contributed to the marriage of state corporatist mechanisms with patron-client 
relationships during especially the long lost decade of the nineties: (1) State corporatism 
accommodated only select (Republican, secular, militaristic, loyal, obedient, etc.) actors 
so non-compliant or disqualified and power-hungry actors opted for informal means to 
accrue rank, status and wealth; (2) corruption was allowed and rampant in agencies of 
social control; and (3) transparency, accountability and democratic oversight of state 
agencies were concepts yet to be introduced to Turkey as democratic precedents by 
external actors, namely the European Commission and international financial 
institutions. Lawrence W. Sherman defines this form of organizational corruption as 
‘the illegal misuse of public authority by social control agents, resulting in private gain 
for the agents or others participating in the agency’s dominant coalition’.188This 
definition applies to the Turkish case well because it identifies as corruption acts that 
are committed to yield both private gains and gains for a larger group, or a coalition. 
The reach of the gains expected and collected in the Turkish case extends beyond the 
public body or social agent to cut across several public and private organizations.  
A case in point is Hiram Abas, deputy chief of MIT between 1986 and 1988. 
MIT was led by the military until 1992 when its first civilian Chief, Sönmez Köksal, 
was appointed. Civilianization of the military intelligence occurred largely due to Özal’s 
efforts. Allegedly, Özal attempted to rein MIT in by attracting Hiram Abas, a lieutenant-
turned-intelligence officer, who was assassinated in 1990.
189
 At the time of his 
assassination, Abas was representing the business interests of a large US arms producer 
in Turkey and he had already established amicable relations with business tycoons like 
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Halit Narin and Emin Cankurtaran.
190
 For lack of a better source, Wikipedia features a 
quote from the memoir of CIA agent Duane Clarridge, who praises Abas as Turkey’s 
‘finest intelligence officer’191, testifying to the existence of a strong US connection, the 
nature of which remains uncertain.  
The case of Alaettin Çakıcı best demonstrates the ideological alignment between 
Turkey’s security sector personnel, members of organized crime, and politicians and 
businesspeople. Criminal organizations had incremental links to ultranationalist 
community organizations, particularly the Nationalist Action Party’s youth wings and 
the Idealists Hearth Associations (Ülkü Ocakları), which suggests that members of 
organized crime held strong Turkish nationalist beliefs. A prominent figure of Turkey’s 
mafia was Alaettin Çakıcı, who was arrested in Italy in 1998, carrying a Turkish 
diplomatic passport issued by a high-ranking officer, Faik Meral of MIT. Çakıcı was 
tried and convicted in 2000 on the grounds that he founded and ran an underground 
criminal organization. Allegations of Çakıcı’s involvement in several other crimes, not 
addressed in court in 2000, have yet to be proven. Besides, his self-assurance and 
silence during the court proceedings and the relatively lax environment within which he 
serves his prison sentence led journalists, observers and the public suspect that Çakıcı 
was being protected by those members of deep state who are still part of the criminal 
justice system. Allegedly, Çakıcı corresponded with former State Minister and MP from 
Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi, ANAP) Eyüp Aşık and former Prime Minister, 
Mesut Yılmaz to negotiate the terms of his involvement in the public tender to privatize 
Turkbank. Çakıcı confessed and provided details of his close ties to Yılmaz, Aşık and 
other leading politicians in his statement to a Special Parliamentary Commission 
investigating the Turkbank tender in May 2000. Moreover, Çakıcı was suspected of 
having launched armed attacks on prominent businessmen before his capture and among 
his targets were Burhan Karaçam, CEO of Pamukbank and Cavit Çağlar, former State 
Minister under Süleyman Demirel, banker and business owner. Though allegations 
against Çakıcı were quite significant and concerned very powerful political and business 
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actors in Turkey and though Çakıcı’s case involved several European countries and 
therefore Turkey’s international reputation was on the line, the accused was not 
thoroughly questioned and sections of the case remain unresolved.  
A third case is about another dark face of securitization and rampant corruption: 
The so-called Susurluk incident. Abdullah Çatlı was one of the four passengers who 
died in a car crash in Susurluk, a town in northwestern Turkey. The crash on 3 
November 1996 also killed Çatlı’s girlfriend, Gonca Us, and Hüseyin Kocadağ, former 
Istanbul deputy chief of police. The fourth passenger, True Path Party MP and 
businessman Sedat Bucak, was pulled out of the car wreck injured and survived the 
crash, along with weaponry that belonged to the TNP. The Susurluk accident was a 
public scandal on an unprecedented scale because the crash unravelled a web of crony 
and corrupt relations between businessmen, mob bosses and the Minister of Interior, 
Mehmet Ağar; several high-ranking officers from MIT, such as Korkut Eken; TNP 
leadership, particularly Hanefi Avcı; Constitutional Public Prosecutors; and key 
political figures including President and seasoned politician Süleyman Demirel.192 
Susurluk unleashed ‘evidence of the state’s collusion with MHP activists’, according to 
Tim Jacoby; it was indeed a manifestation of ideologically aligned business, criminal 
and state actors.
193 
Most of the leading state and political elite, investigated by the State 
Security Court (Devlet Güvenlik Mahkemesi, DGM) after Susurluk accident, survived 
the crash unscathed. Mehmet Ağar, whose signature was found on passports and 
weapons permits found on the bodies that were pulled from the car crash, became the 
leader of the centre right True Path Party.
194 
The Susurluk accident did have a profound 
impact on the public psyche, however, and triggered a mass protest against the deep 
state and corruption in Turkey. In 1996, scores of Turkey’s concerned citizens engaged 
in ‘one minute of darkness for perpetual light’ campaign by turning their lights out in 
the evenings for several consecutive weeks. Though largely urban and secular, this mass 
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protest represented the level of awareness among Turkey’s bourgeoisie of the ills of 
securitization.  
One final contributor to the disassociation of the Nur and Nakshibendi 
communities, the larger Muslim business community and some politicians in political 
Islamist parties from the old Republican state elite and members of the deep state is that 
Islamic counter-elite held different views on Turkey’s national security, particularly in 
relation to the Kurdish Question. During Turkey’s ‘longest decade’195 of the 1990s, the 
Welfare Party engaged – inevitably – in the Turkish state’s response to PKK armed 
struggle across Turkey. Erbakan framed the Kurdish Question as one of the pillars of 
the imperialist project that the Milli Görüş movement has termed, the Great Middle East 
Project (Büyük Ortadoğu Projesi). His party’s position was that American, Israeli and 
Western European conspirators fuelled separatist tendencies among Turkey’s Kurds, 
who were otherwise peacefully cohabiting with their Turkish Muslim neighbours, and 
supported Kurds’ self-determination.196Consequently, Erbakan and his party defended 
the recognition of the Kurdish Muslim identity, by way of constructing brotherhood 
through Islam. More specifically, the 1991 Welfare Party Kurdish Report, on which 
Erbakan’s prodigy Recep Tayyip Erdoğan worked, recommended putting an end to the 
state of emergency rule in the Southeast and to the practice of village guards to revoke 
feelings of brotherhood among Turks and Kurds.
197
 Erbakan personally confronted his 
coalition partner, Tansu Çiller and the state elite in an effort to end the heavy-handed 
military operation in Eastern Turkey.
198
 His noncompliance with anti-terrorism politics 
perturbed his secular political opponents and the state elite. The terms of the ‘Kurdish 
opening’, a peace-building initiative launched in AKP’s second term by then-Minister 
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of Interior Beşir Atalay, testifies to how the moderate brand of political Islamists in 
Turkey pursue a different path to ending ethnic conflict in Turkey, a path that is more 
nuanced than the militaristic and developmentalist policies held by previous 
governments and thus recruits the support of the business community.
199
  
An additional factor, which nuances the Islamic movements’ approach to the 
Kurdish issue, was the underground network of Islamic radicals, whose leader Hüseyin 
Velioğlu frequented student organizations of Milli Görüş movement in his prime and 
later founded an armed organization, the Turkish Hezbollah, in Batman. Turkish 
Hezbollah was allegedly commissioned by TAF and JITEM to eliminate PKK militants 
and sympathizers throughout the 1990s. Though Velioğlu and his comrades were 
devout Muslims, who frequented the same confessional network as politicians in the 
Welfare Party (and its successors Fazilet Party and later Saadet Party and the AKP), 
Hezbollah’s radical acts and messages are not sympathized by the members of these 




The above section established that Turkey’s business community was deeply 
engaged with various power holders in the political elite and security sector 
bureaucracy. The crony relationship between businesspeople, statesmen, military, police 
and gendarmerie officers and criminal gangs, shielded by a culture of impunity, 
concerned and disturbed Turkey’s citizens.  
 Concerned citizens included devout, conservative Muslim Turks who had 
strong moral objections to rampant corruption and clientelism. Turkey’s mainstream 
political Islamic and business community responded to this mass-scale outing of the 
deep state in two ways. On the one hand, they shared with the general public feelings of 
contempt and lamentation towards corrupt state officials and the tradition of corruption. 
On the other, Islamic politicians, businesspeople and public figures that have by the end 
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of 1990s accumulated some wealth and power were also systematically discriminated 
against and by corrupt members of the establishment, whose lifestyles and values were 
as objectionable as their deeds. There was, therefore, a sense of being cheated or fooled 
by a corrupt system and its cronies.  
In fact, the conditions of economic, political and moral crisis were crucial to 
providing opportunities for new actors and to shifting the balance between Islamic and 
secular bourgeoisies. The 1990s witnessed the crumbling of several political parties and 
coalitions that voluntarily or consequentially bolstered Turkey’s deep state. Meanwhile, 
the fruits of Özal’s hard labor to expand Islamic capitalism in Turkey were being picked 
by members of several brands of political Islam in Turkey. Chapter 3 demonstrated how 
the Motherland Party under Özal enabled Islamic financial institutions to enter into the 
Turkish market. Islamic business and finance continued to prosper and expand after 
Özal’s demise in late 1990s. An ‘Islamic counter-elite’ had already formed in 1990s and 
the forerunners of conservative Muslim business families were the nascent industrial 
corporations, such as the Ihlas Group, Yıldız Holding (Ülker) and the Sanko Group, 
notable families in the conservative Muslim business community, and religious 
congregation (tariqat) leaders.  
Centre right Muslim politicians, businesspeople and acting and retired security 
sector officials assisted the strengthening of an Islamic counter-elite throughout the 
1990s and 2000s. Acclaimed lawyer and journalist, allegedly assassinated by the deep 
state, Uğur Mumcu published in 1987 and 1988 leaks on the commercial ties that are 
believed to exist between MPs of the ruling Motherland Party and political Islamist 
National Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi, MSP) and retired military officers. On 3 
April 1988, for instance, Mumcu wrote about the post-retirement job of Ragıp Uluğbay, 
one of the 1980 junta leaders, at the board of Raks, one of leading holding companies of 
the time. Ekrem Pakdemirli, then a businessman and also a former AKP MP, owned 
Raks.
201 
The junta-leader-turned-businessman, Uluğbay, was apparently engaged in a 
crony relationship with the Özal political elite.202 Transitioning into the business world 
after years of service in the security sector is not unusual for retired high ranking 
officers; however, the corporations that employ their services and utilize their contacts 
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often conscribe to a Republican secular community. Uluğbay chose to coalesce with the 
emerging Muslim business community. Again, Mumcu picked up on the 1980 junta 
leadership’s dealings with Muslim politicians and businessmen on his article on 30 
November 1987 where he declared that Kenan Evren, the junta leader, pushed for a 
Cabinet approval to lay to rest the deceased leader of Cerrahi tariqat Muzaffer Özak in a 
place chosen by the congregation.
203
 Though unproven, Mumcu’s assertions were 
inflammatory and allegedly cost him his life. Perhaps, then, the junta leadership 
favoured certain religious congregations or engaged in business ventures with 
businesses of practicing Muslim and centre right political figures to sustain their control 
over the sphere of religion and politics. Reciprocally, perhaps those business actors and 
politicians that collaborated with ‘agents of social control’ sought to rein the state in by 
entering into coalitions with willing members of the state elite.    
In any case, the emerging coalitions or links between Turkey’s Muslim 
conservative businesspeople, politicians and Turkey’s old Republican elites did not 
prevent an outright and radical episode of confrontation in 28 February 1997 when a 
NSC declaration was released to condemn the actions of a democratically elected 
Welfare Party-led coalition government. The national security strategy memo declared 
to combat religious extremism in Turkey. To do so, it rallied support from judges, 
prosecutors, journalists, opinion leaders, and secular political figures to label the 
Welfare Party as an Islamist organization with intentions to introduce sharia rule. 
Common discursive devices such as ‘the threat of Islamisation’, ‘Islamic reactionism 
(irtica)’, and ‘the imminence of sharia’ were utilized by observers and opponents of 
political Islam in Turkey to diminish Islam and its political and social manifestations as 
‘enemies of the state’. At the forefront of a combined effort to nominate Islam as a 
security problem stood Turkey’s military elite. 
In the spring and summer of 1997, the military held a series of briefings 
regarding the threat of political Islam in Turkey to which the press, the judiciary, public 
administrators, civil society associations, and academicians were invited. On 29 April 
1997, General Çetin Doğan, during his briefing to the press, declared the new National 
Military Strategic Concept (Milli Askeri Strateji Konsepti, MASK). The military now 
declared Islamic reactionism (irtica), rather than Kurdish separatism or external threats 
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of interstate war, as the number one threat in Turkey.
204
 This was neither the first nor 
the last offensive on a political space that was increasingly dominated by political Islam 
in Turkey. Islamic messages in party politics in Turkey were frowned upon and parties 
with consistent Islamic messages and agendas were banned from partaking in political 
life.
205
 Since ‘a category of political activity crime’ was invented by the post 1980 coup 
regime, it was expected and almost natural for the space vacated by legitimate party 
politics of the Muslim conservative community to be filled with alternative 
organizations, including but not limited to business interest groups and business 
associations, and for those organizations to be politicized.
206
 
Most of the respondents on my fieldwork with Turkey’s Muslim conservative 
business community demonstrated a clear and united response to what they termed as a 
hostile “28 February regime”, which in their opinion systematically targeted Muslims in 
Turkey. A respondent in Ankara described 28 February coup as ‘a slap in the face of 
Muslims’. However, the respondents refer to a particular group or category of Muslims 
who have been victimized by an oppressive military regime: the practicing, pious and 
good Muslims. It is important to note that though Turkey is predominantly Muslim, the 
number of citizens registered as Muslims has little significance for pious, conservative 
business elites and their families apart from affirming the religious identity of the 
country they are citizens of. They do not feel that they are a part of the umma in Turkey 
and that they are surrounded by equally pious, practicing and good Muslims. Prime 
Minister Erdoğan claimed that AKP intends to ‘nurture a pious generation,’207 which 
testifies to Turkish political Islamic movements’ shared suspicion about the prevalence 
of Islamic practice in Turkey.  
However securitized the discourse on political Islam may have become and 
however heavy handed the military elite may have been to combat Islamist movements 
in the late 1990s, Turkey’s security sector bureaucrats discourse and strategies were not 
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completely baseless. By the time political Islam entered into official strategy documents 
at home, Turkey has already been classified as harbouring Islamic fundamentalists in 
the US. American journalistic and diplomatic accounts of Erbakan’s win at the 1996 
elections and his term in office spelled a deepening concern for the future of Turkey’s 
secular regime and for a smooth strategic alliance between the two countries.
208
Islamic 
movements have for long been brewing genuine and varied ideological, moral and 
theological messages and recruiting support and legitimacy from Turkey’s Muslims. 
Therefore, political Islam and its myriad faces in Turkey were not simply products of a 
military-led Islamisation process, which started in the 1980s by Kenan Evren’s junta 
leadership. Nor were Islamic movements, orders and interest groups in existence only 
because the military permitted them to flourish in Turkey. Furthermore, before and 
during the military’s offensive against political Islam in 1997, those other, less 
prioritized ‘enemies’ of the TAF, such as the Kurdish separatist movement and 
Turkey’s neighbours, and other international actors continued their engagement with the 
Turkish state and with actors in the Islamic movement. After all and according to the 
military and mainstream media and academic publications, by mid 1990s, Islamists 
have already infiltrated into public service.
209
 By extension, any and all policy areas 
were inevitably affected and influenced by subscribers of Turkey’s Islamic movement.  
Consequently, military generals were not suddenly taken by surprise in 1997 to 
realize the real and potential impact that Islamic politics, economics and culture had on 
Turkey’s secular, Republican regime. In fact, their thinking was aligned with the 
American position that strengthening political Islam against a communist threat was a 
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 They were perhaps dismayed by the failure of their ancestors’ strategy to 
foster a secular brand of Turkish-Islamic synthesis. Convinced that they had developed 
a deeper understanding of who the next generation of Turkey’s Islamists were and how 
they were going to act as potential voters, public servants, businesspeople and the 
clergy, Turkey’s military elite and secular intellectuals sought an effective means to 
contain the Islamist threat that had simply gone too far. More disconcerting perhaps was 
the possibility that the military elite would be voted out of power and favour by the 
incoming generations of imam hatip-trained, conservative, practicing Muslims. Eligür 
cites a Piar-Gallup poll published in the Cumhuriyet, a Republican and Atatürkist daily 
newspaper, which announced the perceptions of imam hatip graduates towards the state, 
the regime and their function as graduates of imam hatip schools. The poll results 
portrayed imam hatip graduates as exceedingly conservative, both socially and also in 
terms of their approach to the state. Most of the graduates polled said they would opt for 
the civil service track and assume jobs that did not involve preaching or leading prayers. 
They declared their faith in the existence and survival of the Turkish state through 
which they claimed to nurture new generations of pious Muslims. Generals serving in 
the National Security Council at the time and the authors of the Concept of West 
Operation estimated that general elections due to take place in the 2000s would spell 
victory for Islamist parties/movements since most of the electorate would have either 
been graduates of IHLs or recruits of religious organizations, schools and orders.  
Over six months before the infamous 28 February soft coup in May 1997, 
Operation Hammer – then the latest and largest in a series of Turkish security forces’ 
offensives on PKK bases in northern Iraq/Iraqi Kurdistan since 1992 – was launched. 
Operation Hammer recruited ground troops and air force units of about 200,000 soldiers 
and the ground operations were administered by Yaşar Büyükanıt, then the Commander 
of the Seventh Corps in Diyarbakır. Büyükanıt became later renowned for launching 
another offensive; the target then was the ruling AKP and their nominee for President, 
Abdullah Gül. Under his term in office as Chief of Staff, Büyükanıt oversaw the posting 
of a memorandum on 27 April 2007 on the official website of the Turkish Armed 
Forces that declared the TAF’s condemnation of Gül’s nomination. This peculiar 
connection between two events is one of many parallels between Turkey’s 
conceptualization and implementation of national security in the 1990s and shows the 
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persistence of a confrontational relationship between Turkey’s new Islamic elite and the 
Republican secular establishment in the 2000s.  
Economic marginalization 
A third key trend that led to the formation of an Islamic counter-elite was the 
uneven distribution of economic and financial resources by the state and a state-
sponsored elite. As wealth concentrated in the hands of a privileged minority and 
geographically (in metropolises like Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir and Bursa), Turkey’s 
provincial communities became economically marginalized. Economic marginalization 
hampered the development of a middle class and weakened the chances of Turkey’s 
Muslim conservative families, small business owners, farmers and landowners to 
survive domestic and global financial crises. Economically marginalized communities 
were also unable to build social capital, which would have admitted their members into 
established corporatist or patronage networks that delivered economic and social 
benefits to their members.  
The 1990s witnessed the largest capital accumulation process ever experienced 
in the history of modern Turkey. Within ten to fifteen years, the established secular, 
Republican capitalists increased their economic and political power exponentially; their 
wealth rose to epic proportions due to an internationally machinated process of 
economic liberalization and market reforms. The then-Deputy Chairman of TOBB, Ali 
Osman Ulusoy, commented that between 1983 and 1998, a select few generated 
colossal profits, unmatched by previous episodes of wealth creation or capital 
accumulation in the history of modern Turkey.
211
  Not surprisingly, TUSIAD, which 
represented those interests of conventionally capitalist businesses, became a staunch 
advocate of internationalization and IMF-led reforms. MUSIAD and Ankara Chamber 
of Industry (ASO) and Istanbul Chamber of Commerce (ITO) on the other hand 
denounced the 2001 economic and financial recovery program for its neglect of real 
economies and its reluctance to penalize those actors whose corrupt business and 
banking practices brought the crisis upon Turkey.
212
 
One very disturbing feature of Turkey’s uneven wealth distribution is the culture 
of financial corruption, which facilitates capital accumulation. Financial corruption, 
political cronyism and elite status became very closely associated with especially the 
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centre right political parties of the 1990s. The allegations of cronyism in Turkey’s 
foreign trade ventures peaked during the terms of ANAP and DYP coalition 
governments.
213Turkey’s lax and loosely regulated banking system also housed 
countless corrupt bankers, businesspeople and investors that were entangled in crony 
relations with centre right politicians of ANAP and DYP. For instance, Engin Civan and 
Selim Edes, two business tycoons who were accused for their involvement in an illegal 
sale of a bank, remained at the forefront of media and public discussions in 1995. 
Dubbed ‘Civangate’, the series of events that were triggered by Abdullah Çatlı’s 
shooting of Engin Civan revealed the ways in which politicians as powerful as President 
Turgut Özal and First Lady Semra Özal used the services of a criminal and mob boss, 
Abdullah Çatlı, to coax Civan to pay Selim Edes the 120 million USD Edes expected to 
withdraw from Civan’s Emlakbank. Part of that money was to be transferred to Ahmet 
Özal, who would then use it to cover part of taxes he owed.214   
A decade of economic and financial liberalization culminated in the collapse of 
first the banking system and then the real economy. The end of 1990s was defined by 
economic and political instability. In about ten years, between 1989 when the move 
towards financial liberalization peaked in external financial liberalization and 1999 
when the banking crisis in Turkey urged IMF to step in and the Turkish government to 
introduce aggressive banking reforms, Turkey’s capitalists accumulated significant 
amounts of finance capital. Financial protectionism of the Turkish state enabled bankers 
to operate in a heavily-subsidized financial market, where the state exercised little 
oversight. Banking licenses were easy to acquire and most fees banks usually charge for 
consumer services, such as issuing credit cards or carrying out cash transactions, were 
assumed indirectly by state subsidies.  
Analyses on Turkey’s economic performance in the 1990s capture two essential 
problems that were believed to have brought upon the banking and financial crisis in 
1999: Fiscal imbalance caused by public debt and a lax financial market with loose 
regulations and little oversight on private banking operations in general, and on credit 
financing in particular. Some of the fault lines, which triggered the collapse of Turkey’s 
banking system, were drawn in the process of applying January 24, 1980 Program and 
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their negative effect on Turkey’s fiscal standing at the end of 1990s were easily tracked 
back to the beginning of privatization and market liberalization. Ertuğrul and Selçuk 
point towards the Public Sector Borrowing Requirement (PSBR), as an indicator of the 
shifts in public sector debt, and demonstrate how PSBR entered into a process of slow 
decline from 9% of the GNP with the introduction of the January 24, 1980 program and 
did not remain lower than 5%/GNP for the longer part of the decade. In fact, despite the 
correction in 1994-1995, public sector borrowing rose up to 15% by 1999.
215 Selçuk and 
Rantanen
216
 observe that fiscal policies were unsustainable by the middle of 1990s. The 
imbalance in Turkey’s fiscal policies extended not only to the amount of public 
borrowing that reached alarming proportions but also to the way in which public 
borrowing was financed, i.e. the imbalance between borrowing from domestic and 
foreign debtors: Whereas the rate of foreign borrowing in the total debt decreased from 
1993 onwards, domestic debts increased exponentially. ‘Total domestic debt of the 
government in 1988 was a mere USD 4 billion. As of December 2000, the stock reached 
USD 53.8 billion.’ In other words, Turkey’s fiscal standing by 2000 was far worse than 
when the first in a series of programs to contain inflation and achieve sustainable 
growth was introduced two decades earlier.   
The 2001 crisis was a mixed blessing for Turkey’s Anatolian small to medium 
sized business owners and their families. On the one hand, the 2001 crisis was deeply 
destructive for the business community because of the Turkish market’s dependence on 
foreign capital and exposed market actors to fluctuations in the neighbouring (Russia) 
and global markets. On the other hand, the 2001 crisis paved the way to achieve lower 
inflation levels and macroeconomic stability, which benefited entrepreneurship and by 
extension the development of new businesses in Turkey’s heartland217The Secretary 
General of a TUSKON affiliated federation in Southeast Turkey, GAPGIAD, describes 
the significance of the crisis to the cementing of interest groups within the Muslim 
conservative business community: ‘The economy was engulfed in flames and everyone 
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worried about saving whatever they could from getting scorched’218. A survival instinct 
charged member organizations of Muslim conservative business associations to build 
solidarity against adverse economic conditions. 
Business and opinion leaders in the community of provincial Muslim capitalists 
associated the ills of the banking crisis with the immorality of those who committed 
them. For instance, former MUSIAD President Ömer Bolat219 and Islamic scholar 
Hayrettin Karaman joined the ranks of many public figures in AKP era Turkey to 
lament corrupt politics and business practices of the 1990s.
220
 Speaking in the 
parliament in 2001, Fazilet Party MPs Ali Coşkun and Sait Açba spoke out against the 
practices of holding company banks and of government’s providing full guarantee of 
banking deposits.
221
 These statements testify to how badly the tradition of corruption 
and profiteering were received by Turkey’s conservative Muslim community and 
political Islamists. 
 
Mismanagement of the financial crisis was attributed to secular business 
associations and corporatist bodies representing business interests, too. Profits were 
generated through financially abusing Government Debt Securities (Devlet İçi 
Borçlanma Senetleri, DİBS) and interest rates. While most of Turkey’s public funds 
were channelled into domestic debt repayments, the secular business community 
claimed that budget deficits ought to be constitutionally restricted. Ümit Sönmez 
criticizes the approach that TUSIAD and TISK adopted in the late 1990s: These two 
interest groups lobbied for smaller state and to restructure public financing and 
governance by constitutionally recognizing a framework to limit public spending. They 
offered their proposal to construct a financial constitution at a time when the Turkish 
state has already been catering to these associations’ capitalist interests and therefore 
Turkey has been generating budget deficits, instead of investing more into public 
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 Leftist critiques of Turkey’s business community and its 
perceived strength in determining the course of public spending tend to depict TUSIAD, 
TOBB, TISK and other business interest groups as decisively and perhaps cruelly – 
considering Sönmez’s implication that domestic debts that big business incurred were 
being paid for by cents that may have been invested into better public education– 
corrupt.  
When government-subsidized banking and industrial development favoured – to 
a large extent – established capitalists and their holding companies for the most of 
1980s and 1990s, the provincial merchants and small to medium sized business owners 
cultivated a different system of support. One direct means to build support is to 
establish clusters of small to medium sized enterprises (SMEs), in other words, to 
engage in strategic entrepreneurship. SMEs are conceptualized in several consecutive 
Development Plans as engines of growth in Turkey’s blossoming market economy.223 
Configured they may be as harbingers of an Anatolian awakening in business; SMEs 
did not perform well until the beginning of the twenty-first century. Structural and 
cultural impediments to SME growth, deregulation, poor or no public oversight or 
private audits, and dependence on family resources, decelerated their evolution into 
larger, more sophisticated companies. Şemsa Özar’s qualitative study on SMEs from 
2001 and 2002 show how despite the high birth rate of SMEs in the beginning of the 
2000s, Turkey’s small businesses survival rates were not high. In most cases, small 
businesses depended on exploitation of their family’s human and other resources to stay 
afloat. Özar also finds that where deregulation or lax public oversight benefited large 
financial corporations or holding companies, they destroyed small enterprises: 
‘Entrepreneurs that encounter low demand and high competition do not lead to a fall in 
the entry of new enterprises to the market’224 (Özar, 2007, p. 253). Planners and 
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policymakers of 1990s and early 2000s, thus, worked to spur more competition, better 
regulation and professionalization for Turkey’s SMEs in industrial and in agricultural 
sectors, to ensure their survival and success. 
Success came much later, though, as Turkey stepped firmly into a process of 
institutionalization. The Secretary General of Gaziantep Chamber of Industry praised 
European integration process for its ‘only virtue’: the structured market-development 
and professionalization framework and services that pre-accession institutions 
provided.
225
Turkey’s economic recovery program and accession regulation were 
accompanied by a trend of institutionalization. Measures to discipline small businesses 
were designed and implemented as part of a Consensus model fiscal and monetary 
regime.
226
 A public body to monitor, train and empower small to medium sized 
businesses, KOSGEB, is the extension of the corporatist tradition of SME development. 
Established within the Ministry of Industry and Trade in 1990, KOSGEB diversified 
and expanded following the EU accession agreement. KOSGEB recognizes and 
operates within a framework drawn by Turkey’s pertinent public bodies, chiefly the 
industry and trade ministry but also the State Planning Organization, the Treasury, and 
the labor ministry, and collaborates with corporatist institutions, i.e. chambers and their 
confederation, TOBB, confederation of merchants, TESK, and the confederation of 
Turkish labourers, Türk-İş. Between 2005 and 2011, two consecutive AKP 
administrations issued executive orders, decrees and Cabinet decisions to refine and 
enhance the services KOSGEB provided, to create ancillary offices in the periphery, and 




Chapter 3 established how SMEs featured in Turkey’s market growth and 
liberalization. In mid 1990s, SMEs were going global while maintaining their ties to 
their locality. Associations sprung up, infrastructure investments and new technologies 
entered Turkey’s periphery. Turkey’s once rural families became business owners, 
expanded their companies, invested in land and property in domestic and international 
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destinations; set up associations, funds, and social networks; and sent their children and 
grandchildren to public and private universities in Turkey’s major cities and abroad.  
The end of the 1990s ushered in Turkey’s transition to twenty-first century 
neoliberalism. The IMF, World Bank and the European Commission urged Turkey to 
introduce neoliberal market reforms. Furthermore, the EU Accession Process, launched 
in Helsinki in 1999, prompted Turkey’s Legislature and Executive organs to introduce a 
more systematic and structured regulatory regime. By 1999, a restructuring of Turkey’s 
banking system was imperative however there was not a broad consensus in Turkey as 
to how the restructuring was to be designed and implemented. The left and workers’ 
unions rejected the Washington Consensus’ political and economic pragmatism, which 
demanded economic concessions from the labouring and middle classes, already 
disadvantaged by the poor performance of the real economy. The discourse of Turkey’s 
political left in end-1990s and early 2000s was predominantly nationalist, isolationist 
and militaristic, preventing the potential of a policy dialogue between unions and 
political parties on the left and national and international economic policymakers, i.e. 
World Bank and IMF bureaucrats, Minister of Economic Affairs Kemal Derviş and the 
coalition government of Ecevit. Despite the criticism from Turkey’s left and nationalists 
to globalization of Turkey’s economy and society, neoliberal globalization won support 
from both the established secular elite, which romanticized Western lifestyles and 
economies, and the emerging Muslim conservative middle class, which saw an 
economic and political opportunity in the broadening of Turkey’s market and society 
Westward.  
Kemal Derviş, who acted as the Minister of Economic Affairs between March 
2001 and August 2002, launched the ‘Program to Facilitate Turkey’s Transition into a 
Stronger Economy’ on 14 April 2001. The 2001 economic strategy document sought to 
realize structural change in the Turkish economy and to sustain economic stability. 
Derviş prioritized Turkey’s transition to good governance, monetary and fiscal 
transparency and anti-corruption measures and insured political support for the tough 
economic measures to follow. 
228
 Turkey accordingly replaced its pegged currency 
system with a floating currency regime; reformed its banking system to accommodate 
the financing needs of the private sector; established – arguably – an income policy to 
facilitate equal and just distribution of wealth. The recovery program of early 2000s 
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continues to steer economic policy making in Turkey in the 2010s – both in operational 
terms and in spirit.  
Six factors contributed to the strengthening of Turkey’s commitment to a 
privatization agenda, according to political economist Ziya Öniş:  
1) the depth of crisis experienced before large-scale privatisation; 2) the strength and 
commitment of the executive to the privatization programme; 3) the presence of 
powerful external anchors; 4) the degree of maturity of domestic private capital; 5) the 




Three of the six forces listed above are especially pertinent to the argument 
proposed in this chapter, that Turkey’s neoliberal globalization and marketization 
adventure triggered the formation and the gradual erosion of coalitions between several 
actors within the corporatist/clientelist policymaking structure: Whereas in the 1990s, 
Turkey lacked a powerful and globally-integrated class of domestic capitalists, a 
popular government fully committed to privatization and able to construct legal and 
institutional mechanisms to bolster privatization moves, the political, legal-
administrative and international contexts are dramatically different in the late 2000s.  
The values and morals of Turkey’s Muslim conservative businesspeople 
Previous chapters examined how the principle of secularism in the making of 
modern Turkey was manifested and how interest representation through associations 
was institutionalized. Thus, even before Turkey’s pious Muslim and provincial 
businessmen began to actively partake in community building and class-formation; the 
borders of the secular business space were drawn, leaving them out. Generally, 
academic, journalistic and popular depictions of ‘Islamic capitalists’ are not offered by 
those from among the ranks of an empowered and new class of businessmen. The small-
to-medium-sized enterprise owners from cities in central Turkey might have remained 
irrelevant had those enterprise owners not prospered and become socially mobile. Their 
migration to the secular space precipitated the secular Turks’ efforts to gauge their 
influence and strategize accordingly. Hence, earlier and established class-based analyses 
on Turkey’s Islamic capitalism are penned by members of a privileged community of 
Turkey’s intellectuals, journalists, artists and scholars, who are very well endowed with 
linguistic, literary, analytical, social and professional skills, and as well with strong 
connections to influential Western institutions. These analyses highlight the differences 
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between Turkey’s outgoing elite, Western-inspired, cultured, modern, and comfortably 
excused from social and economic realities in the periphery, and its incoming Anatolian 
elite, provincial, anti-modern, nouveau riche, and driven by a tasteless pursuit of wealth. 
As analysts and spectators play with categories and labels to identify sections of 
Turkey’s heterogeneous business elite, Islamic capitalists respond to these scientific and 
popular experiments by responding to and building on certain categories and labels. 
Thus begins a process of other-driven class-consciousness. 
Self-defined class-consciousness of Turkey’s Muslims also flourished in 2000s 
and transnationalization of Islamic movements that emerged from Turkey encouraged 
this trend. Outspoken admirers of Turkey’s ‘Anatolian Tigers’, such as Mustafa Akyol, 
portray Turkey’s Islamic bourgeoisie as an epic amalgamation of Kemalist modernity 
and Islamic liberalism and work ethic.
230
 Though not a businessman, Akyol is not a 
stranger to the Muslim community: He received an Islamic upbringing and belongs to 
the Muslim Democratic community of journalists and intellectuals. Fluent in English, 
Akyol is able to put his international contacts to use by advocating the case of Turkey’s 
‘Islamic Calvinists’231. Practicing Turkish Muslims based permanently or temporarily in 
American and European academic and policy advocacy institutions, such as Hakan 
Yavuz, Ibrahim Kalın, Ahmet Kuru, Ihsan Yılmaz, and Hasan Kösebalaban, helped to 
polish the image of Turkey’s emerging business community as progressive and pacifist 
and to cement the claim that the wealth created by Anatolian Tigers fuelled Turkey’s 
economy and AKP’s politics. Business leaders and politicians from within the Islamic 
middle class also speak out to identify the basic tenets and transformation of their own 
community. Former MUSIAD President, Ömer Bolat declares in an interview in 2007 
his pride in MUSIAD members’ work ethic and discipline, inspired by the deeds of 
Prophet Mohammad, and confesses how remarkable he finds the change his brothers 
and sisters at MUSIAD changed from conservative, immobile, monolingual and 
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Bolat’s reference to a Turkish Islamic morality is a starting point for most 
businessmen and professionals I interviewed on my fieldwork. Islamic morality and 
values are referenced as a key differentiator for two reasons: Muslim conservative 
businessmen are perceived as a class or community that is markedly different than 
secular business elites in Turkey and they justify their unique status by referring to a 
moral superiority. Also, by referring to Islamic morality, Turkey’s Muslim conservative 
businesspeople open their community and businesses up to a global Islamic market and 
society.  
Islamic morality and work ethic 
A brief overview of Islamic morality and business is useful here since Turkey’s 
Muslim conservative associations and their members respond to the ‘Islamic’ in Islamic 
business according to the following parameters. There are three core principles which 
help to distinguish Islamic economics from secular economics: Islamic law prohibits 
riba, often translated as interest,
233
 and gharar or speculation; dictates a wealth 
redistribution system based on zakat (alms); and states that Islamic economic decisions 
are taken and acted on after they have been sifted through a moral filter. These 
principles exist to secure the system of moral economics domiciled in Islam. Certainly, 
Islamic economic dogmas are more extensive and elaborate than simply three 
principles, however, these three principles best represent the themes of justice, equality 
and social welfare in Islamic economics. These distinct themes depart from an arguably 
exclusive notion of ownership in Islam. Essentially, life on earth is temporary and 
humans are mere vicegerents of all creation, which belong to Allah alone. At the same 
time, however, humans are free to pursue and satisfy their basic needs and are 
consequently to have equal access to all resources. Islamic moral economics maintains 
that (Muslim) individuals are expected to take into account the needs of the 
underprivileged members of society and are therefore obliged to share the fruits of their 
labour with the underprivileged.
234
 Thus, ownership is delegated from God to society 
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and then to the individual; subsequently, the individual’s economic behaviour is 
governed according to his/her obligations to the society and to God.
235
 
Islamic economics prescribes profit and risk sharing in business financing. 
Islamic rules do permit businesses to utilize credit, and do not prescribe that all 
businesses be financed entirely with equity capital. Islamic businesses can and do utilize 
financial leverage in their capital structures, thereby exposing their owners to both the 
potential enhancement of returns on equity if things go well and to value reduction if 
results are disappointing.
236
 By implication, an Islamic business enterprise should not 
engage in activities, which may generate an unfair return without risk sharing. 
Moreover, an Islamic business enterprise should not employ financial services, provided 
by banks and other intermediaries, which may yield interest on behalf of the business 
enterprise. Similarly, an Islamic business should not enter into loan agreements that 
have terms of debt repayments, which include interest. Here, it becomes evident that the 
gateway to an interest free economic system is the Islamic business enterprise and only 
through arming it with necessary investment and spending tools to compensate in 
productivity and profitability for lack of riba will Islamic economic theories be realized.  
Whereas riba and gharar seem to preoccupy students and practitioners of 
Islamic finance more, it is zakat, which purportedly represents the distinct 
understanding of moral economics in an ideal Muslim economic society. The basic 
premise of zakat is set out unequivocally in the Qur’an as one of the five obligationsof 
every practising Muslim.
 237
 Umer Chapra is one of many scholars who situate zakat at 
the core of Islamic economics’ preoccupation with social equality. He holds that 
morality guides individuals to contribute to zakat schemes, which in turn promote social 
equality. Improvement in social equality fosters economic growth, which subsequently 
enhances wellbeing of individuals within that system.
238
 As a result, zakat becomes the 
inevitable link between the morally conscious individual and social welfare. Zakat is 
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different from the sadakah (charity) paid on a voluntary and flexible basis but similar to 
sadakah, zakat payments are channeled into relief, aid and development projects to 
obtain social equality. An Islamic business is mandated to enact a just distribution of its 
resources internally and externally, through its engagement in a national system of 
welfare distribution. By implication, Islamic economic theory concludes that without 
zakat, socio-economic justice is unattainable. 
Islamic economics extends beyond studying halal and haram business conduct to 
offer a moral system to govern the behaviour of Islamic business. Islamic moral 
economics is ‘an axiomatic approach to develop conceptual foundations of Islamic 
economics by treating Islamic ethos as an ideal through which economic and social 
policies dealing with every aspect of human life, including economic life, are 
assessed’.239 This holistic notion of an axiomatic moral economy is indebted 
particularly to the work of scholars like Syed Nawab Hyder Naqvi who observed, ‘The 
workings of an Islamic economy can be seen in the behaviour of Muslim society’.240 
The truisms in moral business behaviour in Islam are products of Islamic law, 
jurisprudence, and established practices in Muslim societies of the past and present. 
Bearing in mind the influence of Islamic legal pluralism on formulating legal axioms 
and the influence of socially-, culturally-, politically-, and economically-constructed 
factors on business practices in Muslim societies, it is not possible to distil a universal 
theory of Islamic business morality/ethics. Nor is it realistic to expect Muslim 
businesspeople to synchronize their business conduct according to identical moral 
considerations and work ethic. It is fair, however, to claim that Islamic business is the 
building block of an Islamic moral economy and that at the level of Islamic business, 
the moral/ethical behaviour of an entire society is observable and governable.  
Islamic economics requires economic decisions to be evaluated through moral 
considerations. This assertion implies that Islam has a distinct set of moral codes for 
work, a distinct Islamic work ethic (IWE). Students of Islamic ethics in business pay 
tribute not only to what they claim is the origin of definitions on Islamic work ethic, the 
Islamic core texts, and also to Weber and his contemporaries, who developed the notion 
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of a Protestant work ethic (PWE).
241
 Abbas J. Ali has been particularly prolific in the 
1980s and 1990s in observing managerial behaviour and morality/values of 
businesspeople in the Arab world. His definition of Islamic work ethic emanates from 
the Prophetic tradition that regards work as form of worship. Namely, Ali groups 
Prophetic formulations on IWE as doing business legitimately; earning instead of 
hoarding or amassing wealth; producing high quality work, paying fair wages; being 
confident and self-reliant; not forming a monopoly; refraining from bribery; conducting 
business with good, just, lawful intentions; ensuring transparency; containing greed; and 
exercising generosity. This ambitious list of principles for ethical conduct is 
compounded by the reminder that the legacy of the Qur’an and the Prophet ought to be 
celebrated by every Muslim through his or her work. Ali stresses this incremental link 
between business performance and religious performance in his reference to the 
Prophet’s life and deeds: ‘His emphasis on discipline and commitment intended not 
only to highlight the essence of work, but also to draw a link between faith and work 
and to eventually steer the Muslim community towards becoming an economically and 
politically viable entity’.242  
Evidently, ethical business conduct is considered a sign of religiosity and a 
Muslim’s service to his creator and his community. Students and proponents of IWE 
caricature values that they assign to the Western-capitalist business world so as to 
differentiate IWE from secular or non-Muslim ethical systems. Whereas IWE is 
presented as a socially conscious and socially responsible value system, Western work 
contexts are associated with individualism, exercised both within organizations and 
outside.
243
 The so-called individual ethics is an amalgamation of positivist law, 
organizational factors and individual factors, which include individuals’ varying levels 
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of moral development, personality, nurture, and socio-cultural background.
244
 Certainly, 
Islamic thinkers conclude, a system of ethics guided only by individualistic impulses 
does not and cannot prevent amoral, unethical business behaviour. At the same time, 
however, Islam celebrates the role of the individual as the productive unit of an 
economic society and stipulates that individuals experience different stages of moral 
development, at the end of which they reach ethical maturity. In fact, failure to pursue 
the rightful path to personal (economic) development is frowned upon. Sayyid Ab’ul 
Ala Maududi, for example, devotes special attention to the celebration of the individual, 
within the Islamic society, and emphasizes the direct link between the individual and his 
creator. He claims that the freedom to pursue economic self-sustenance is a fundamental 
freedom for any Muslim but the economic relationships that emerged in the post-
industrial revolution world inhibit most individuals’ freedom to earn their living.245 
Islamic work ethic, then, does not rule out an economic system composed of individuals 
as the primary economic units; it proposes, instead, to contain those individualist 
impulses that are potentially destructive for the society by conditioning business 
decisions on Islamic morality rather than rational choice. 
Turkey’s Muslim business community embraces some of the parameters of 
Islamic morality, explained above. To that effect, three trends emerged out of my 
fieldwork interviews with businessmen. The first concerns the spirit of servitude to the 
ummah and the state, as configured and ruled by devout Muslim governments. The 
General Secretary of ANSIFED, a TUSKON federation, posits that their federation and 
their members serve the Turkish nation and the government because only then can these 
two entities thrive.
246
 This tendency is explored below under the subheading 
‘Turkishness’ because the terms of the service to the Nation and the State are defined by 
the Islamic business community’s interpretation of Turkish identity. 
The second trend is to find loopholes in a secular system to be able to follow an 
Islamic work ethic. This requires pious Muslim professionals in Turkey to constantly try 
to bypass institutionalized governance mechanisms in the public and private sector. 
Avoiding alcoholic beverages in work-related functions, growing a beard and wearing a 
traditional pair of loose, cotton pants (şalvar) are some of the ways in which devout 
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Muslim men can and do demonstrate their piety. Most professions and a majority of 
medium to large companies in Turkey require male professionals to operate in a 
relatively secular space and not to condition their work according to their religious 
practices. For instance, attending Friday prayer is very common, if not passionately 
encouraged, however praying five times a day during a regular work day is not as 
common and not desirable - at least according to some of the interviewees. One 
interviewee in Istanbul declared that his company was an exception because he was able 
to practice Islam almost entirely as he wished despite his full time employment.
247
 
Almost all other men and women interviewed indicated that they had to forgo some of 
their duties as Muslims to remain in employment. Men would not take their wives to 
work functions to conceal that their wives wore the headscarf. Families in public sector 
employment would avoid lodging in dormitories or on-campus housing offered by the 
company or state body for which they work.  
Some of the business people I interviewed did not object to bending the rules of 
Islamic economics to achieve business success. Ali Bulaç, a highly respected Muslim 
intellectual, journalist and AKP supporter, vindicates the liberal state and market for 
having diminished Islamic values and morals of Turkey’s businesspeople. He suggests 
that private sector companies owned and managed by Turkey’s devout Muslims engage 
in haram activities because they operate in a secular and liberal market environment. 
Bulaç highlights the discrimination against headscarved women in the recruitment to 
Islamic enterprises as a triumph of business pragmatism over piety.
248
 A MUSIAD 
Board of Executives claimed that the nature of neoliberalism coaxes individuals to 
violate the terms of their morality or religion and that is quite normal.
249
 This pragmatist 
perspective is also reflected in the oft-referenced ‘Islamic Calvinists’ report by ESI and 
yet should not be treated as a given. Some members of the Islamic community in 
Turkey criticize their fellow members for failing to comply in spirit and in practice with 
the Quranic worldview and teachings. During a roundtable in Konya, two participants 
suggested that Turkey is yet to be considered as part of dar’ul Islam because the secular 
elements of the system and the disregard that most Muslims have for the teachings of 
the book prevent Turkey from becoming a truly Muslim country.
250
 Similarly, in several 
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roundtables discussions with headscarved women, women who chose to wear more 
substantial head and body covering suggested that other roundtable participants, who 
wore their headscarves in a more contemporary fashion, were not taking the hijab very 
seriously.
251
 These reactions demonstrate the infighting between members of Turkey’s 
devout Muslim communities and may be treated as symbols of a constant pluralisation 
process within the Islamic counterelite, as will be explored in the following section. 
Turkishness and Turkish nationalism 
However global their perspective may have become, Anatolian businesspeople 
continue to emphasize their Turkishness in their business and social conduct. In other 
words, the common denominator of the members of Islamic business associations is 
being Muslim and Turkish. A distinct category that combines select elements of Islam 
and a brand of Turkish nationalism define present-day Islamic business elite in Turkey. 
One case in point is how Anatolian businessmen engage with business contacts and 
stakeholders in markets abroad. For instance, the manager of the Gaziantep branch of 
TUMSIAD, a business association occupied by rather devout members, recounts the 
tale of a Turkish businessman from Gaziantep who ‘corrected’ the faulty conduct of his 
business partner in Indonesia and thereby contributed to building a positive image of 
Turks and Turkey in Southeast Asia.
252
 TUSKON federations ANSIFED (Central 
Turkey) and GAPGIAD (Southeastern Turkey) also emphasize the Turkish identity of 
their membership. The Turkish language, customs and familiar Muslim practices are 
keys to smooth and successful business transactions, according to TUSKON.
253
 
This emphasis on Turkishness hints at the wide resonance that Turkish 
nationalism has to the members of Turkey’s Islamic business associations. Derya 
Gültekin Karakaş finds that Muslim conservative businessmen vote for Right wing and 
Turkish nationalist parties.
254
 I found through my research that Turkey’s Muslim 
businessmen place an extremely high value on their ethnicity. TUSKON federations had 
members that were particularly proud of their Turkishness. The General Secretary of 
ANSIFED boasted of the significance that the Turkish language has to expanding 
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Turkey’s trade and cultural influence abroad.255 Nationalism and the Turkish brand of 
Islamism alienated Muslim minorities, particularly the Alevis of Turkey, and at the 
same time unified Muslims of the mainstream Hanefi and other convictions against 
external pressures, such as the limitations of secular elite’s strong presence and the 
military’s authoritarianism. Tanıl Bora proclaims that in Turkey, nationalism is the 
common thread that runs through the discourse of different, and in some cases, 
opposing communities.
256
 Evidently, when the exigencies of political survival 
demanded it, Turkey’s Islamists and secular nationalists collaborated. For instance, 
immediately after the National Security Council authorized the discharging of 
thousands of public servants based on their or their spouses’ choice of attire, i.e. 
whether they were headscarved or not, then- Minister of Health Osman Durmus 




This seemingly unique combination, the so-called Turkish-Islamic synthesis, is 
not an AKP invention; the previous chapter established that Turkish Islam gained 
recognition and momentum in the 1980s under Özal’s leadership. AKP MP and former 
Minister of Industry and Trade, Ali Coşkun’s life and career present several pieces of 
evidence to support the claim that the present-day tradition of negotiating Islamic values 
and morality with business and public office was established during the Özal years and 
pervaded business-state relations during the subsequent decade of centre-right 
coalitions. When Coşkun arrived Istanbul as a freshman in electrical engineering, he 
was a total stranger to then Turkey’s only metropolis, surely a thrilling place for almost 
all provincial students who come to a large city for the first time in their lives. Coşkun 
sated his longing for Anatolian values, piety and brotherhood in his university’s Society 
of Students, a branch of the Nationalist Turkish Students Union. The student movement, 
where Coşkun polished his political skills, venerated Turkish nationalism and Islam and 
its followers were Democrat Party supporters. The military junta’s ousting of his 
political party of choice in 1960, the year when Coşkun graduated, may have cemented 
his commitment to the socially conservative, democratic and economically liberal 
politics of the centre right in Turkey.  
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Coşkun pursued his political ambitions outside of the realm of political parties 
for over three decades until 1990s; instead, he acted as a Board Member in the Turkish 
Hearth Organization (Türk Ocağı), and was the Deputy Chair and a loyal follower of the 
Hearth of the Enlightened (Aydınlar Ocağı).258 These two organizations educated and 
indoctrinated Turkey’s leading Muslim and nationalist politicians, businessmen and 
intellectuals. The Society to Disseminate Enlightenment (İlim Yayma Vakfı), which 
acquired official status as a foundation in 1974, was one of the many conduits through 
which Turkey’s nationalist and pious centre-right politicians and businessmen built a 
communion. Turgut Özal and his brother Korkut Özal were among the founding 
members of the Foundation, which offered need-based scholarships for public and 
private schools in Turkey and abroad, and free accommodation and care to children and 
young people. It also managed several afterschool and private courses and programs to 
teach the Quran and operated as a convent for Islamic learning and teaching where 
scholarship students, students of Quran, researchers, theologians and notable religious 
figures – of a particular school of Islam – convened.259 
A third and final trend that relates to how present day Muslim business 
community practices the Islamic work ethic and morality concerns charitable acts. 
Turkey’s devout Muslim businesspeople tend to and are devoted to charity, distributed 
in the form of zakat and sadakah. A Zaman newspaper columnist loyal to Gülen 
commemorates Sabri Ulker, the late founder of the now global Yildiz Group, with 
Ülker’s generous commitment and support to a relief fund set up for the ultranationalist 
(Turkish Hearth) ex-convicts and families, perpetrated by the 12 September 1980 
junta.
260
 Personal contributions are quite substantial however there are transnational 
charities that emerged out of Turkey and expanded in size and fame by promoting 
Islamic messages and by effectively redistributing welfare across the globe. In the past 
decade, several Islamic charities, namely The Foundation for Human Rights and 
Freedoms and Humanitarian Relief (İnsan Hak ve Hürriyetleri İnsani Yardım Vakfı, 
IHH), Is Anybody There? Association (Kimse Yok Mu? Derneği), and the Lighthouse 
Association (Deniz Feneri Derneği), became remarkably prominent and they 
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institutionalized the redistribution of Islamic (particularly zakat and animal sacrifices) 
and voluntary contributions into health, education and social services. While all three 
organizations are tax-exempt
261
 and can collect and distribute donations, the latter two 
are permitted by Law No.2860 to collect charitable donations without needing to apply 
for and obtain an official permit.
262
Of the three charities, IHH is the only one that 
publishes its financial status/profile annually and in 2010 IHH reportedly collected 
around 87 million Turkish lira (58 million USD) from Turkey-based donors.
263
 This 
figure amounts to approximately 10% of total revenue generated in 2010 by all 
registered foundations in Turkey.
264
 IHH pioneered the campaign to set sail the Blue 
Marmara aid boat to Gaza and while several of the charity’s personnel were injured 
during the Israeli offensive against the boat, the charity earned top marks from its 
Muslim followers for confronting the state of Israel. The names of Lighthouse 
Association and its subsidiary in Germany, Deniz Feneri e.V., were tainted by a series 
of legal proceedings, which started in 2007 in Germany, culminated in three convictions 
for fraud in Frankfurt and later migrated to Turkey. Trial proceedings conveyed that 
Lighthouse had accumulated 41 million Euros in five years and subsequently 17 million 
Euros had been transferred to Turkey.
265
 Finally, Is Anybody There? Association has its 
roots in a post-disaster relief campaign staged on Samanyolu TV in 1999. ‘Is Anybody 
There?’ Association skyrocketed to fame within a decade thanks to the expansive 
network of public, private and voluntary organizations attached to the Gülen movement, 
of which the charity is a part. Today, ‘Is Anybody There?’ Association enjoys exclusive 
public visibility and is able to attract a substantial portion of regular and emergency 
charitable donations. 
These professional and transnational charities are interlinked with the business 
community, both as recipients of donations and in-kind contributions from businesses 
and as sister organizations that belong to same confessional network. Charities’ 
performance may therefore reflect well or poorly on the business association and 
religious movements, as was the case in Deniz Feneri and the Gülen movement. Then 
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again, distributing alms is not the only means through which the capital accumulated by 
Islamic businesses is redistributed to Muslims in Turkey and around the world. Today, 
to support students and families to develop their social capital and to integrate into a 
fast-paced, urban economy and society, business associations organize seminars, 
trainings, scholarship programs and entrepreneurship programs. These organizations 
ensure that the local, familial and confessional bonds are conserved, despite the pace of 
social and physical mobility in 21
st
 century, and that business interest groups assume a 
significant role in the evolution of Turkey’s Islamic counterelite. In that sense, business 
associations are not too different from the university associations of which Coşkun and 
his likes were a part of. Present day business associations either function as or 
financially support organizations that advance a Turkish Muslim business and socio-
cultural morality, and at the same time support their members’ interests in policy 
bargaining.  
Fethullah Gülen renders an impressive service to the Turkish-Islam synthesis – 
or rather to the ideal of a morally-superior Turko-Islamic world at peace.
266
 Without a 
doubt, Gülen’s most striking achievement is the ever-expanding network of Turkish 
Colleges around the world. ‘They recite poems in Turkish whilst standing beneath 
portraits of Atatürk,’267 recounts historian Yılmaz Öztuna of students of Central Asian 
origin attending the ‘Turkish Colleges’ of Fethullah Gülen. Kemal Karpat, another 
contributor to an edited volume on Gülen schools, praises the model, reasoning and 
practices of Turkish colleges for being nationalist. Karpat claims that the Turkish 
colleges conceptualize nationalism without referring to Islam or to an ideology. This 
supposedly pure and non-ideological form of nationalism is captured by the Turkish 
teachers, principals and by the use of the Turkish language of the teaching programs and 
curricula.
268
 Karpat and Öztuna join the ranks of countless intellectuals, politicians, 
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artists, and public figures that collectively own the argument that Turkish colleges pay 
service to the Turkish nation and Turkishness.  
MÜSIAD, too, glorifies the ‘unique’ combination of nationalism and Islam in 
Turkey. Walls and desks of the expensively decorated office of the former MUSIAD 
President feature tokens of Turkey’s Islamic and secular Republican past. One photo, 
which captures Kemal Atatürk posing next to an imam in prayer, stands out. Of all the 
many photos of Atatürk, the choice of this rarely published image speaks of the concern 
that MUSIAD has to emphasize its respect for Turkey’s Republican national heritage as 
well as for the strong Muslim tradition.
269
 The discourse of ‘service to the Nation’ runs 
across other Muslim conservative business associations. The president of TÜMSİAD, 
Dr. Hasan Sert, evaluates the deeds of the AKP administration through the lens of 
national and community service. He announced in a speech in 2009 that the government 
acts in harmony with the Nation, demonstrating a positive attitude to solve economic 
problems and to develop in collaboration with the Nation’.270  
At the same, to disassociate Turkish nationalism from the Republican elite 
conceptualization of a secular Turkish Nation, Muslim conservative business 
associations refer profusely to imaginations of an Ottoman past. Arguably, the 
Ottomans perfected the concept of pluralism in the form of the millet system
271
. The 
millet system institutionalized tolerance for various faith-based communities in the 
Empire. Accordingly, pluralism was a result of religious diversity in the Ottoman lands 
and the Sultan chose to respond to religious diversity by ‘tolerating’ non-Muslims.272 
Official narratives on Ottoman history proclaim that the Ottomans were the most 
benevolent of (Muslim) imperial rulers when it came to accommodating non-Muslim 
peoples. Therefore, non-Muslims found a peaceful and hospitable environment within 
which to pursue their economic, social and cultural/religious activities, freely and 
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without interference. Surely, the idea of hospitability, tolerance and peaceful 
coexistence inspired present day Muslim business community, especially since in their 
imagination of the Ottoman Empire was an Islamic state that consistently held the moral 
high ground.  
Neo-Ottomanism is a popular label attached to Turkey’s foreign policy moves 
under the leadership of Foreign Minister Davutoğlu and is also used to refer to Turkey’s 
industrialists and traders operating in formerly Ottoman territories in the MENA region. 
Since 2002 and more markedly since 2007, Turkey’s commercial and trade relations 
with developing markets in Asia, Africa and South America have prospered. According 
to Bulent Aras, advisor to Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoğlu, Turkey’s 
deeper engagement with countries other than those on its usual westward bound trade 
links is galvanized by President Gül’s diplomatic skills and Mr. Davutoğlu’s strategic 
concept. TUSKON members are mostly Anatolian producers that eagerly to expand 
their production and services towards countries in Central Asia, North and East Africa 
and the Far East.   
In interviews held in Gaziantep, Ankara and Istanbul with business associations 
and a few of their members testify to some of the points made above. Members of the 
interviewed business associations believe they are morally-superior and well versed in 
business ethics and aim to infuse Islamic morality into societies in countries with which 
they trade. Though an implicit yet obvious division of labor exists between Gülen 
schools and academies (the schools of light), the boarding facilities, the mosque and 
spiritual foundations, and the family of ‘volunteer workers’, TUSKON member 
confederations and companies also contribute to some of the educational, cultural and 
religious work that the Gülen network undertakes in developing countries. One 
Chairperson of a TUSKON federation in Gaziantep scorned the Chinese companies’ 
business and trade conduct in Africa. After announcing his disappointment with the 
Chinese style of capitalism, which in his view is irresponsible and amoral towards host 
societies, he enthusiastically recommended how his confederation and colleagues 
exercise a benign and moral style of capitalism. The interviews revealed that the 
collective effort in entering the host country and society with an imperialist zeal is 
shared and that the businessmen and their families remain faithful and eager servants of 
a common cause to disseminate Turkish-Islamic civilization’s values and virtues.273 
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 The glorification of the family 
A global survey by PriceWaterhouseCoopers (PwC) found that 95% of private 
companies in Turkey are family-owned and that family businesses share 75% of 
Turkey’s national income.274 Family businesses are arguably more inclined to operate 
with and reproduce clientelism and nepotism. In the Turkish context, it may be deduced 
then that most of private enterprises are nepotistic. PwC’s report states that in close to 
70% of those businesses surveyed that survived and/or expanded their operations 
despite the recent financial crisis (credit crunch), business owner-managers have not 
appointed their successors. Evidently, today’s family businesses in Turkey are 
patriarchal and the father or the oldest male founder of the company makes key 
financial and managerial decisions. Most of Turkey’s family businesses are 
geographically concentrated and are small businesses (ASO, 2005). Accordingly, family 
businesses represent a majority of Turkey’s private enterprise and understanding their 
identity and business behavior will yield significant findings for the purpose of this 
chapter: identifying and analyzing Turkey’s new Islamic capitalists and their 
political/policy choices. 
Academic and non-academic sources attribute the following qualities to family 
business: A family business creates wealth to support the members of the family and to 
reinforce a good reputation and a high social standing. Both the human capital and the 
revenues generated by the family enterprise are invested to secure the survival and 
proliferation of the family’s dependents and its reputation; thus, family businesses are 
believed to lack a purely capitalist reasoning that dictates investment decisions based on 
competition, productivity, etc.
275 
Most family businesses are believed to be short-lived 
(they last for 50 to 75 years) because of their reluctance or failure to recognize the 
demands of business capitalism. In other words, since the social and economic needs of 
the family precede the demands of a competitive market, family businesses are doomed! 
However, the reverse is also true; when competitive market pressures stifle family 
businesses, they turn to their internal resources, i.e. the labor power of family members, 
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the savings and assets of the family, for survival. Typically the family business 
domiciles and showcases patron-client relationships and nepotism is arguably both the 
blessing and the curse of family enterprises. Very broadly, nepotism enables family 
businesses to establish and maintain non-market support mechanisms and at the same 
time, establishing and maintaining clientelistic relationships demand time and capital 
and human resources. More importantly, nepotism operates in a parallel universe where 
the formulas of market capitalism may or may not apply. Therefore, in a business 
environment where implicit rules override contractual and legal commercial 
relationships, those actors who are well versed in those implicit cultural/ethical codes 
are more likely to prosper. 
MUSIAD boasts of representing the majority of family businesses and of 
venerating family values. A MUSIAD representative recommends responding to 
economic or social problems, such as the underrepresentation of women in employment, 
by finding solutions inside the family.
276
 Most men I interviewed were of the opinion 
that family was the unit where Muslim values and lifestyles were transmitted and 
reproduced. The reality of the everyday Turkish business is somewhere between the 
image/fantasy of the idyllic family business and that of a cutthroat competitive business 
landscape filled with professional, upwardly-mobile and purely capitalist 
businesspeople. Business associations compete fiercely for effective representation of 
the interests of the Islamic counterelite and at the same time propagate Islamic morals, 
values and lifestyles in their communication to the secular space and the global business 
environment.  
Business associations are not the only free market actors that compete for SME 
clients. Right at the peak of the global financial crisis in 2009-2010, sharia compliant 
and conventional banks in Turkey were enthusiastically financing Turkey’s SMEs. 
Albaraka Turk announced that SMEs constitute an 80% majority of all of the bank’s 
customers and credit lending to SMEs make up 50% of the bank’s total financial risks. 
Operational in Gaziantep, Adana, Bursa, Konya, Kayseri, Denizli and Istanbul, cities 
known for fast business growth among SMEs, Al Baraka Turk bankers engage and 
cooperate with trade and commerce chambers at the local level to broaden their client 
base. Bank Asya had 120,000 SME customers in end 2009 and despite the looming 
financial crisis, this allegedly-Gulenist shariah compliant bank offered new borrowing 
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tools for its SME clients. Türkiye Finans, catering to over 50,000 SMEs in end-2009 
had planned to invest 4 billion TL into SME loans in 2010. 
Türkiye İş Bankası, one of Turkey’s largest and oldest conventional banks, 
served over 1 million SMEs across Turkey and had signed cooperation agreements with 
about 2000 chambers to reach its SME clients. Akbank, chaired by members of the 
Fortune 500-listed Sabancı Group, reached 450,000 SMEs, which constituted around 
30% of the bank’s total lending.  Akbank, too, facilitated close ties with chambers and 
business associations in various cities in Turkey to attract new SME clients and manage 
good working relationships with existing ones.
277
 A public-turned-private bank, 
Halkbank, operated a unique model with chambers, whereby a pool of credit funded 
both by the chambers and the bank was serviced to SME members of chambers at 
advantageous terms and rates of debt-repayment. 12,000 SMEs had used funds through 
this combined scheme by end-2009.
278
  
Judging by the figures announced at end 2009, shariah-compliant banks were 
outcompeted by powerful conventional banks in catering to SMEs. However in the case 
of Albaraka Turk, for instance, SMEs held the majority (with 80%) in the shariah 
bank’s total lending. Critically, both conventional and Islamic banks entice new SME 
customers by way of trade and commerce chambers – not business associations. – and 
the corporatist KOSGEB.  
What is then the difference between Islamic and conventional SME banking in 
Turkey? Apart from the obvious distinction in the size of business done by conventional 
banks, their most discernible quality is their assumptions about their SME clients. 
Kayhan Sönmez of Türkiye İş Bankası believed that SME managers and owners were 
not up to date with global trends and their businesses needed professionalization to 
survive the impending financial crisis. Erol Sakallıoğlu of HSBC Bank Turkey 
highlighted that SMEs needed to develop professionalism in management and render 
transparent their finances.
279
 SME bankers in Islamic banks choose to point instead 
towards the impact of intrafamily relationships and the culture of doing small business 
in Turkey as potential challenges to SMEs survival in the coming years of financial 
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crisis. A senior executive from Türkiye Finans declared that second or third generation 
male siblings run SMEs according to a traditionally hierarchical management culture.
280
 
The general manager of Bank Asya, Abdullah Çelik, defended the view that 
conservative Muslim businessmen, who constituted only a quarter of the bank’s total 
customer base, pursued the best and most profitable service from private banks in 
Turkey, conventional and shariah-compliant
281
. These statements indicate that senior 
executives of shariah-compliant banks in Turkey have an indigenous understanding of 
‘conservatism’ and of the Islamic or traditional elements in the businesses they serve. 
This shared understanding does not lead to a distinct spatial and commercial divergence 
between conventional and shariah-compliant private banks nor does the 
conceptualization of the ‘conservative’ elements of SMEs necessarily render shariah 
banks more attractive to SMEs.  
The conduits for both conventional and shariah-compliant banks to reach SMEs 
are the corporatist organizations of KOSGEB, TOBB and chambers. Unlike business 
associations, state (KOSGEB) and semi-public (TOBB) organizations and chambers 
cannot be tagged with ideological and/or religious identities. 
Policy bargaining in AKP era Turkey 
The previous section introduced the dynamics that led to the rise of Turkey’s 
new Muslim conservative elite and discussed their morals, values and approaches to 
economic, social and political phenomena. Based on those morals, values and 
approaches, Turkey’s Muslim conservative businesspeople conduct their relationship 
with the state and other stakeholders. There are four key features of policy bargaining in 
AKP era in Turkey.  The policymaking landscape opened up to new actors and their 
arrival influenced the transformation of Turkey’s state to accommodate pluralism. Thus, 
the first measure of policy influence of Islamic business associations is whether their 
existence has had an impact on the changes in policies (policy alignment) and in state 
structures, i.e. policymaking bodies or mechanisms. The second feature concerns the 
‘maturity of capital hypothesis’ (Ziya Öniş and Ümit Türem, 2002) that connects the 
democratic attitudes of businesspeople with the level of their integration with global 
markets. As a business community becomes less dependent on governments to reach 
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resources, the more democratic and plural their outlook and strategies become.
282
 In 
contrast to the first feature, a measure of success for an Islamic business association in 
this second feature is how well positioned the association is to bypass the state and build 
and/or exercise policy influence outside of the state’s realm. Third, business 
associations engage in policymaking often as part of an umbrella organization, which 
supposedly reflects the sentiments of the associations it represents. Two interesting 
developments in the 2000s are the emergence of two such umbrella organizations, 
TUSKON and MUSIAD, and the expansion of two peak-level semipublic entities, 
TOBB and TIM. Together, these four bodies dominate the economic and social 
policymaking landscape in Turkey, at the expense of secular business associations and 
secular establishment unions and confederations. Finally, the Islamic and democratic 
credentials of Turkey’s now powerful business associations and the capitalists they 
represent are conditional upon an ambiguous set of criteria and contested not just by 
Turkey’s secular, Republicans but also by devout Muslims in Turkey. By implication, 
Turkey’s policymaking environment is opening up to new actors and new mechanisms 
on one hand and being pulled into corporatist/clientelist forms of decision making by 
traditionalist and conservative actors on the other. 
(1) State transformation influenced by Turkey’s Islamic business associations 
I will use three parameters to observe state transformation under this 
subheading:  The proximity between AKP politicians and Islamic business community; 
the breaking apart and/or forging of institutions to accommodate interest mediation 
between the government and Islamic business associations; and the alignment or 
divergence between policy positions of the government and major peak-level 
organizations that represent the interests of the Muslim conservative business 
community. 
How integrated are the AKP government officials and Turkey’s Islamic business 
associations? The AKP is a mainstream and popular political party that has attracted and 
continues to attract members and supporters from Turkey’s business community.  
Streamlining a business career to include a high-ranking political post is quite common 
because of the potential gains accrued in political office.  Moreover, a background in 
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business, when combined with a past service in a bureaucratic post, is thought to 
increase one’s chances of getting elected into parliament. These assumptions may 
explain the rise in the number of MPs with a business background in the Turkish Grand 
National Assembly between 2002 and 2012. In the 22
nd
 parliament, 50 out of 325 AKP 
MPs were either members or leaders of business interest associations, bar associations 
or chambers; in the 23
rd
 term of the parliament, this figure rose to 62 out of 331 and in 
the current parliament, it is 63 MPs out of 326. CHP MPs are also 27 out of 135 in 22
nd
 
term; 31 out of 101 in the 23
rd
 term; and 43 out of 135 in the 24
th
 and current term. The 
proportion of association members to the total number of MPS is slightly higher for the 
main opposition party, CHP than the ruling AKP however both parties consistently 
attract elected officials who have a background in associations and chambers.  
The distinction between the two parties lies in the type of association or chamber 
that their respective MPs were affiliated with.  CHP MPs have served in boards, upper 
management and ad-hoc commissions of chambers and associations that represent 
medical professionals, lawyers, and engineers. CHP is a party that still mobilizes 
support from a diminishing urban middle class, so their political base is still 
concentrated in district-level organizations, such as bar associations, branches of 
Turkish Medical Association, chambers of electrical, agricultural, and mechanical 
engineers, and of architects, veterinarians, and pharmacists etc. These institutions 
resisted decades of suppression of associational activity and maintained their 
connections to organized labor and unions because they were strictly Republican, 
secular and pro-establishment. Hence, CHP MPs from cities in western, northern and 
southern Turkey foster political power and credibility through their service in the lower 
rungs of the hierarchy of state corporatist institutions. Fewer CHP MPs have affiliations 
with chambers of commerce or industry and business associations.  
Business associations and chambers of industry and/or trade are organizations of 
choice for AKP MPs. MUSIAD-affiliated MPs dominate Turkey’s legislative. Since 
2002, MUSIAD- affiliated businesspeople have filled the AKP seats in the Turkish 
Grand National Assembly. Leading MUSIAD members, Ahmet Edip Uğur, 
Abdurrahman Müfit Yetkin and Vahit Kiler, are seasoned AKP parliamentarians, who 
have been elected into the TGNA for three consecutive terms. Kiler belongs to the 
family that founded and owns the Kiler Group. According to his two brothers, Ümit and 
Nahit Kiler, he abandoned the world of commerce for politics. Vahit Kiler nevertheless 
remained committed to the corporate world and he chairs the Parliamentary 
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Commission on State Owned Enterprises since June 2011.
283
  Bayram Ali Bayramoğlu 
was the President of MUSIAD between 1999 and 2004 and later he ran for parliament 
during the 2007 general elections and was elected out of Rize. Between 2002 and 2007, 
there were 11 MUSIAD-affiliated MPs in the parliament. This figure dropped to 7 in the 
second term of AKP in power, only to rise again to 10 MPs after 2011 general elections. 
MUSIAD’s minor retreat from the parliament coincided with the first entry of 
TUSKON-affiliated parliamentarians in 2007. Tahir Öztürk, Orhan Karasayar, and 
Kayham Türkmenoğlu served in the 23rd term of TGNA and each had held significant 
positions of power in TUSKON’s federations in eastern and southeastern Turkey. 
Representation of business associations in the AKP-held seats in the 24
th
 and most 
recent term of the TGNA is much more diverse. Whereas affiliations to MUSIAD were 
common in 2002, by 2011, several AKP MPs were members or leaders of various other 
business associations, such as TÜMSİAD and SİADs attached to the umbrella 
organizations, TÜRKONFED. Of the three TUSKON-affiliated MPs, only Orhan 
Karasayar was reelected and he is the only MP with a background in a TUSKON 
organization in the 24
th
 term of the TGNA.  
Institutionalization was a key ingredient of market reform and Turkey’s gradual 
adoption of the EU accession agenda.  Robust public and private institutions were 
expected not only to assist Turkey’s march towards sustainable economic growth and 
away from volatility but also to buffer Turkey against political crises. A 
multidisciplinary and exhaustive political economic analysis of least developed 
countries, by Daron Acemoglu et.al., find that a direct link between institutions and a 
country’s propensity to decline into volatility, and then into a full blown financial crisis. 
The research also shows that weak institutions cause political crises.
284
 For Turkey, at 
the micro level, institutionalization implied more and better communication between 
local government and public bodies and businesses. A better- regulated and supported 
associational landscape was expected to facilitate economic, trade and financial policy 
discussion at the micro level/ in the periphery. Better-organized chambers of commerce, 
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meanwhile, were to ease the transfer of policies from the centre to the periphery. Güven 
Sak describes the Turkish experience with institutionalization as the replacement of 
profitable (unregulated) relations with more structured and corporate relations, from the 
centre to the periphery. TOBB Chair’s senior advisor and top aide, Sak’s appreciation 
for structured and corporatist industrial/ business-state relations may be an occupational 
hazard. However, his formulation of the change that happened since early 2000s in 
institutionalization of policy dialogue implies a game change. ‘There needs to be a 
formal and engaging policy dialogue process and we need to be prepared for it. That is 
why TOBB was strengthened and complemented by TEPAV’.285 
Turkey’s post-1980 democratization process contains several episodes of 
institutionalization and the increase in the number of boards; councils or commissions 
that assist, monitor, regulate or manage public bodies demonstrate a fixation with new 
institutions. For the game change that Güven Sak described to occur, political stability 
is crucial. Hence, three terms of majority rule by the AKP were ripe for institution-
building. Furthermore, AKP strengthened Turkey’s Executive, which effectively 
negotiated the terms of institutionalization first hand with the European Commission 
and the World Bank-IMF. However, according to Esen Çaglar of TEPAV, AKP has yet 
to establish strong, transparent and functional institutions across the landscape of 
economic and trade policy.
286
 Possibly, ‘good governance’ within the context of 
Turkey’s public sector reform was interpreted to mean a quick makeover; the fastest and 
most formulaic method for implementing reform was to invent new institutions to 
perform the functions of older organizations. In certain cases, the outcome of public 
reform or restructuring was simply a name change; the institutional structure, traditions 
and weaknesses lived on. 
Products of the post-Derviş structural adjustment process in the area of industrial 
relations and economic policymaking were ad-hoc committees, commissions or 
temporary councils set up within ministries. Ad-hoc committees may take several forms 
however the most common form is the independent regulatory agency (IRA). IRAs 
were staples of the institutionalization frenzy, which defined public administration 
reforms in the 1990s and early 2000s. The reasons for reforming public administration 
were legitimate; in other words, public administration reforms were justified as a key 
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286 Interview with Esen Çağlar, TEPAV, Ankara, 26 Oct 2010. 
 139 
ingredient in Turkey’s privatization, liberalization and Europeanization processes. 
However, the invention of multiple bodies to regulate economic and trade policies, for 
instance, had unintended consequences. One critical consequence of the inflation in 
IRAs was a two-tiered bureaucracy. While ministerial bureaucrats were expected to be 
endowed with the necessary technical/professional skills and know-how and thus to 
serve those regulatory roles well within the confines of the ministry, they were rivaled 
by professionals appointed to work on similar tasks in corresponding IRAs. 
Furthermore, as IRAs became attached to the office of the Prime Ministry, this post 
expanded disproportionately. 
Councils and ad-hoc commissions demonstrated corporatist characteristics; they 
were structured to preserve the corporate hierarchy of the public body to which they 
were attached. Coordination Council for the Improvement of Investment Environment 
in Turkey (Yatırım Ortamını İyileştirme Koordinasyon Kurulu, YOIKK); the Permanent 
Special Commission to Develop Competitiveness of Turkey’s Industry (Sanayinin 
Rekabet Gücünün Geliştirilmesi Daimi Özel İhtisas Komisyonu, DÖİK), and the 
Investment Advisory Council (Yatırım Danışma Konseyi, YDK) held their regular 
meetings in the Prime Ministry, with former Minister of Economy Nazım Ekren at the 
helm. TOBB and TİM were the only two attendees that were provided access. State 
ministers or high-ranking public officials took up the rest of the council and commission 
seats. While according to Caglar, ad-hoc commissions were the places where most 
critical and short-to-medium-term decisions were taken, they were not representative of 
the non-state actors that their mandate concerned. 
Broadly, AKP treated the market liberalization, Europeanization and its power 
consolidation processes as opportunities to reform public governance and expand 
executive powers through new institutions. Ad-hoc commissions, councils and other 
public bodies are essentially corporatist and determine which organizations can 
represent interest groups, thereby defining the legitimate space of policy bargaining 
hierarchically and with a top-down approach. By implication, it is the AKP government 
that empowered new business associations and confederations by giving them seats in 
old and new institutions – not the other way around. There may or may not be a direct 
policy alignment between the government and business associations which are pro-
government or share similar cultural and religious values. However, business 
associations inevitably expect concessions and/or invitations to policy bargaining 
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processes from a powerful political Islamic government, which by its third term has 
allegedly hegemonized the state and the public domain.
287
 
Despite the overlap between the members of parliament and the members of 
Islamic business associations, the AKP government’s policies do not always align with 
the interests and demands of pro-government associations, MUSIAD, TUSKON, 
TUMSIAD, and pro-government chambers TURKONFED, TIM, TOBB, etc. The AKP 
government’s 2009 policy package to incentivize domestic investment displeased the 
heads of chambers and associations in Turkey’s southeast. These measures categorized 
Turkey’s geographical regions into four investment zones, ranging from the highest 
priority zones with the greatest set of public policies to incentivize domestic investment 
to the lowest priority zones. Accordingly, the president of Diyarbakır Chamber of 
Commerce in 2009, Galip Ensarioğlu,288 criticized AKP’s incentive package’s 
categorization, which placed his city in the same category as Trabzon – a city in 
northern Turkey considered dramatically safer to invest in than the so-called capital of 
Kurdish separatism, Diyarbakır. Other representatives of business associations and 
chambers in eastern Turkey also voiced their strong opposition to economic and trade 
policies, designed to jumpstart Turkey’s productivity and growth during the worst days 
of the 2008-2009 crisis.  
In the AKP era, three major union confederations representing workers, TÜRK-
İŞ, DİSK, and HAK-İŞ, and the three confederations representing civil servants, 
KAMU-SEN, MEMUR-SEN, KESK, became confrontational and continued to pursue 
inter-ideological (socialism, nationalism, and conservatism) and intra-ideological 
(infighting between the socialist wing and the nationalist wing) battles over major 
policies, particularly during the rounds of minimum wage negotiations. Ahmet 
Gündoğdu, the President of MEMUR-SEN, is openly supportive of AKP policies and 
believes that the values of the majority of Turkey’s civil servants align with the values 
of the AKP government.
289
 MEMUR-SEN’s membership base expanded exponentially 
over the course of 10 years of AKP rule and Gündoğdu has been a prominent actor in 
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Rarely do labor union confederations speak with a single voice, especially 
against the policies or decisions of public and private entities. During the winter of 2009 
and 2010, the workers of formerly state owned tobacco monopoly TEKEL’s Adana, 
Ballıca, Bitlis, Samsun, Malatya, and Tokat factories started a general strike on 15 
December 2009 and the strike pervaded the mass of state-employed workers. Though 
the initial group of workers, who faced losing their jobs and their pensions as TEKEL 
was being sold off to British American Tobacco (BAT), was affiliated with Türk-İş, the 
strike brought together several other labor union confederations, primarily DİSK, 
Kamu-SEN and KESK. Prompted by its anti-privatization agenda, Turkish Communist 
Party was the first to own and actively participate in the rally against BAT and the AKP. 
TEKEL workers’ strike expanded and persisted until midsummer 2010. This strike was 
by no means an indicator of the divisions within the organized labor; on the contrary, 
TEKEL workers’ struggle signified a sense of unity and solidarity across classes, 
ethnicities, and political communities in Turkey. Yet, episodes of interest mediation 
between the government and organized labour since 2002 ended with AKP’s victory, 
MEMUR-SEN and HAK-İŞ’s support for government policies and the growing dissent 
and agitation among opposing union confederations.
291
  
Regardless of their policy differences, Turkey’s Muslim conservative business 
associations appreciated the leadership of Recep Tayyip ErDoğan and his ‘AK’ Party, 
an alias for cleanliness and moral superiority. Their admiration is most evident in the 
frequency with which Erdoğan is invited to appear as a keynote speaker at major annual 
events of TOBB, TIM, MUSIAD and TUSKON. Erdoğan’s appearances on MUSIAD 
and TUSKON general assembly meetings sparked significant social and political 
debates each year because the PM chose to present some of his strongest views on 
issues, such as abortion, religious education, poverty and social welfare, and terrorism 
during those meetings. In contrast, Erdoğan appeared once on TUSIAD High Advisory 
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Board meeting in 2007
292




Several key figures in the AKP leadership, chiefly Ali Babacan, do address 
monetary and fiscal policy and economic policy issues that directly concern business 
interest groups on his appearances in annual conventions organized by Islamic business 
associations. As Deputy Prime Minister, Babacan declared the rationale for economic 
austerity measures in his speech to members and supporters of TUSKON at the 
confederation’s leadership convention for its Board members. Babacan spoke of the 
comparative advantages that the Turkish economy had over other developing countries, 
both in terms of Turkey’s declining total debt and of the rising percentages of debts paid 
on time and in full by lenders. It was on the TUSKON summit that Babacan also called 
for a medium-term strategy to boost savings.
 294
 
Kayseri Chamber of Industry (Kayseri Sanayi Odası, KAYSO) Chair Mustafa 
Boydak supports Deputy Prime Minister Ali Babacan’s economic austerity program in 
fall 2012. Boydak’s statement confesses to a proud yet conditional backing by his 
business association of Babacan’s proposed monetary policies.295 On the one hand, 
Boydak congratulates KAYSO and its members for confiding in the government’s 
response to rising current accounts deficit and persistent threats to the stability of the 
Turkish lira from the international financial markets. 7 to 8% growth recorded in the 
first half of the 2000s triggered a troubling rise in current account deficits
296
. On the 
other hand, Boydak suggests that the business community’s perseverance has a shelf life 
of three to five months, after which KAYSO members are likely to aggressively pursue 
growth and hence disregard Babacan’s savings and borrowing advice. 
In 2009, investment bankers were prescribing a similar solution to tackle the 
widening current accounts deficit. The Oxford Business Group’s ‘2009 Turkey Report’ 
cites at least five analysts from conventional banks, such as Garanti Bank and İş Bank, 
that propose to lower the deficit by slowing growth and thereby bringing down 
inflation. At the time, reducing the deficit was more critical for the private sector, which 
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had recorded 247 billion USD foreign currency debts whereas the public sector debt 
was at 76 billion USD.
297
This is one of many instances when Muslim conservative 
businesses from the Turkish heartland have prioritized growth and therefore offered 
only conditional support of the AKP economic policies. By implication, achieving 
successful economic outcomes and keeping growth levels above the 3-4% mark are 
imperative for AKP to sustain the political backing of Muslim conservative business 
associations.  
Policy alignment will be explored further in the following chapter in two 
specific policy areas: gender and media.  
(2) Muslim capitalists going global 
Turkey’s Islamic counterelite or Anatolian Tigers rose to global fame as Turkey 
advanced onto the global stage with three distinct qualities: It was a Muslim democracy, 
ruled by a young, moderate political Islamic party. A latecomer to marketization and 
liberalization, Turkey nevertheless aligned with international economic organizations to 
stabilize its economy and to attract foreign investment. It actively pursued a policy of 
regional and international integration by way of EU Accession, the Turkey-Armenian 
peace talks, the Iran anti-nuclear dialogue, the Alliance of Civilizations initiative, and 
the more recent foreign policy initiative, ‘Zero Problems with Neighbors’. A growing 
interest in Turkey engendered a mass of literature and analysis on the source of 
Turkey’s economic growth, market productivity and political substance, all of which 
pointed towards Turkey’s Islamic bourgeoisie and elites.  
The onset of Turkey’s opening up globally was the 1999 Helsinki Summit, 
which announced the beginning of accession negotiations with the EU. TUSIAD’s 
persistent emphasis on Turkey’s EU integration proved to be a positive force in 
overcoming popular and military resistance to the opening of accession talks with the 
EU in Helsinki summit, and throughout the EU integration process, TUSIAD has been 
an ardent supporter of reforms.
298
 This shows that the traditional and established 
business elite has (a) more experience in organized and representative power-sharing or 
interest mediation with the state institutions and governments (b) a tradition of 
organizing within and across sectors and industries and of collective action, and (c) a 
                                               
297 The Report: Turkey 2009. Oxford Business Group. 2009, p. 41 available from 
http://www.oxfordbusinessgroup.com/full_content/economy-92  
298 Reşat and Öniş, Ziya (2010) 'Turkish Big Business in the Age of Democratic Consolidation: The 
Nature and Limits of its Influence', South European Society and Politics, 15: 2, 181 — 201.  
 144 
greater ability to usurp the conventional channels of dialogue with the state. Again, the 
goal of eventual membership in the European Union increased the practical and 
rhetorical importance of business interest groups, especially TUSIAD, in policymaking 
in Turkey. 
EU membership catalyzed the building of a brief-but-powerful coalition between 
secular and Muslim conservative business elites. Associations of Turkey’s Muslim 
conservative businesspeople warmed up to the idea of Europeanization and of joining 
the European Union as a full member after 2003. In her study of MUSIAD’s approach 
to the prospects for Turkey’s EU accession, Dilek Yankaya identifies three attitudes 
towards Europe and Europeanization: On a political level, MUSIAD and its members 
adopt an opportunist stance, assuming that EU membership will guarantee broader 
democratic and civil rights and freedoms, particularly the freedom of religion and 
conscience. At the same time, however, Yankaya observes that MUSIAD exercises a 
degree of Euroskepticism because the Islamic character of the association impedes its 
full submission to European belief and value systems. On an economic level, Yankaya 
analyzes MUSIAD’s behavior as economic pragmatism: ‘By economic 
Europeanization, I mean the process of social learning about European business patterns 
and culture in the sense of formal and informal norms as well as macro-economic 
governance. MUSIAD businessmen’s ways and degree of integration into European 
business spaces and their evaluation of European business patterns provide a valuable 
indicator of the degree of their economic Europeanization’. 
In my fieldwork interviews, the prospect of EU membership excited secular, 
establishment organizations immensely and they were the first to bring up the EU in 
their answers about their associational activities. During the interview at TISK, the 
confederation’s representative gave a detailed description of the diverse services TISK 
carries out for its member organizations for EU accession, including trainings, legal 
counseling on accession criteria, and representing Turkey’s business community in EU-
level organizations, such as BUSINESSEUROPE.
299
The Gaziantep Chamber of 
Industry spoke highly of the EU membership goal and what that has done for the 
chamber and for business development in the region. At the same time, Islamic business 
associations support the EU accession process, even when there are moral objections to 
the idea of Europe, a Christian Club. Ali Bulaç summarizes these objections as a 
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counterfactual European identity-building exercise that excludes Islam and Muslims.
300
 
Europe’s grappling with the idea of a Muslim-majority country in the EU affects 
business associations representing devout and proud Muslims however Islamic business 
associations do not take a decisively negative stance against full EU membership.  
For Islamic business associations, going global means exploring countries and 
regions to the East and South of Turkey and pursuing a global civilizing mission in 
addition to trading and business opportunities. This vision, explored in the section 
above, led to the Islamic business community’s engagement with Islamic financial 
networks in the Gulf and Southeast Asia, the Organization of Islamic Conference, and 
to diversifying the policy agendas of international organizations, such as the Council of 
Europe and the United Nations, to include top priority issues for devout Muslims, i.e. 
the Arab-Israeli conflict, inter-communal fighting in Sudan and other African states, the 
plight of Muslims in Russia, India, and China, etc. Two representatives from two 
different TUSKON federations spoke of the importance that engagement in 
international economic and political organizations has on expanding Turkey’s business 
and cultural presence around the world. They even declared that President Gul would be 
better off assisting Turkey’s trade expansion and business development in foreign 
countries than deal with appeasing social groups and dealing with political conflict at 
home.  
Previous sections of this chapter alluded to a civilizing mission adopted by 
Turkey’s Islamic business associations and this mission certainly affirms the global 
outlook of Turkey’s emergent Muslim capitalists. Prime Minister Erdoğan has spoken 





TUSKON conventions, of this confederation’s successful representation of ‘Turkey’s 
grandeur’ in distant lands. Erdoğan congratulated TUSKON for acting beyond a 
business association’s regular mandate to develop and promote commercial links on 
behalf of its members to adopt a patriotic mission of expanding Turkey’s and Turks’ 
influence around the world.  
DEİK was a powerful actor in managing foreign commercial relations, until it 
was contested by TUSKON. Its former Chair, Rifat Hisarcıklıoğlu, was reputed to have 
oriented DEİK with the AKP leadership. Before DEIK became an organization that 
worked in collaboration with the likes of TUSIAD, TOBB and other leading 
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associations, its existence and mandate were questioned by the state. Altay Atlı 
demonstrates how state bureaucracy resisted the transfer of some of foreign policy 
implementation to DEIK in early 1980s, despite Özal’s faith in the capacity of the 
business council to assume some of the foreign policy functions assigned to state 
bodies. Instead, a corporatist institution, the Joint Economic Commission (JEC) was 
established and DEIK was granted a seat in the JEC. Hence Atlı claims that organized 
representation of business interests rarely expands to a point when the state relinquishes 
some of its authority or functions to business associations.
 301
 Atlı’s observations are 
crucial, considering how DEIK did expand its influence to the point where it is able to 
fulfill state’s functions to boost foreign commerce. However, between 2009 and 2010, 
there were rumors of a split between TUSKON and DEIK, which had supposedly 
started during DEIK’s annual convention in 2009. In 2010, Economy Minister 
ÇAğlayan gave a keynote speech at DEIK’s annual convention’10 and he forgot to 
mention TUSIAD as one of Turkey’s leading business interest groups (instead, he 
named TUSKON, MUSIAD, TOBB and TIM).
302
 These two events were interpreted as 
yet another sign of a divide between Islamic capitalists and secular capitalists. 
 DEIK Chair Rona Yırcalı gave several statements between 2010 and 2012, 
inviting TUSKON to cooperate with DEIK to attract foreign investors, to expand 
Turkish trade into foreign markets and to engage in trade policy related dialogue with 
the government together. In 2010, Yırcalı’s positive calls for cooperation were 
answered, as alleged by Sabah newspaper, with a 100 million dollar business venture 
between a buyer in Nigeria and Yırcalı’s company, BEST. The venture is said to have 
been arranged by TUSKON as part of the business confederation’s work during their 
commercial delegation to Nigeria.
303
 Meral solemnly denied the allegations that 
TUSKON was uncooperative and even hostile towards DEIK.
304
 More recently in 2012, 
Yırcalı continued to appeal to TUSKON for collaboration, justifying his call by 
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claiming that two similar organizations operating with the same agenda in foreign 
countries creates confusion for host countries about the business landscape in Turkey.
305
 
TUSKON responded by making a case for pluralism; the diversity that their work 




(3) The winners of AKP-era interest group politics: TUSKON, MUSIAD, TOBB 
and TIM 
In a speech on 31 March 2012 Rızanur Meral celebrates the fourth anniversary 
of TUSKON, which has become Turkey’s largest business confederation 170 individual 
business associations with a membership of 120.000 companies, as Turkey’s largest 
‘voluntary civil society organization’. Meral emphasized the ‘voluntary’ nature of the 
contribution made or services rendered by TUSKON members throughout his address. 
Meral explained how TUSKON pursues this voluntary spirit of service to the nation and 
to Turks’ growth and economic expansion by ‘sending a business delegation to every 
country on Earth’. ‘For instance,’ Meral noted,  ‘our member businessmen ventured 
tirelessly into the South American market and I announce with great pride that a 
delegation of Turkish businessmen have just left Argentina and are heading to 
Paraguay’ [Author’s own translation]307. Aiming to serve the grand Turkish nation by 
engaging in domestic and international commercial ventures on a civilizing mission 
carries TUSKON farther away from the realm of business interest groups. TUSKON is 
not deluded in positioning its main objective as economic and cultural imperialism. 
Prime Minister Erdoğan praised TUSKON for having ‘defined its mandate 
according to the wishes and expectations of the Nation (millet),’ a mission that the 
Prime Minister believes was shaped by the teachings of Rumi. To describe the patriotic 
and halal mission of TUSKON to expand Turkey’s commercial and cultural links at 
home and abroad, Erdoğan cited the Persian poet’s famous analogy of a man grounding 
one feet in his homeland and circling the other foot around the world, as if he were a 
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compass. According to Erdoğan, the business confederation takes its intellectual and 
spiritual nourishment from Anatolia, Turkey’s heartland, and ‘conquers hearts and 
minds’ of peoples outside of the Turkish heartland through a peaceful, economic and 
cultural dialogue. This interpretation is shared by Meral whose keynote references to 
TUSKON’s ‘peaceful, non-offending and humble efforts to attract Turkish business to 
every corner of the Earth’ demonstrate the confederation’s ownership of the compass 
analogy
308
 and of a broader mission of cultural imperialism.  
Both the government and business associations emphasize non-violence. 
TUSKON, MUSIAD and other Anatolian business organizations – perhaps with the 
exception of ASKON- have repeatedly highlighted their respective organizations’ 
choice of peaceful, patient and constructive dialogue and actions. Preaching peaceful 
mechanisms for policy negotiations and policy making mean two different things. The 
first may be a political message to Turkey’s established ruling elite, especially in the 
higher echelons of judicial bureaucracy, that unlike the Welfare Party era, the AKP era 
business interactions occur in a conflict-free space. Secondly and more importantly, the 
ultimate goal of expanding the economic and cultural influence of Turkish Islam 
requires a patient and reconciliatory approach, according to the teachings of Gülen. In a 
monthly journal distributed by TUSKON federations, Mümtaz’er Türköne writes that 
the maturity of Turkish democracy is best conveyed in the current administration’s 
attempt to replace the established (secular) elite with a new elite, without resorting to 
violence or a dramatic systemic change (sharia or totalitarianism).
309
 Türköne welcomes 
the peaceful transformation of Turkey’s political and economic elite, a process that 
Türköne believes was long overdue. That the success of the Turkish economy and 
Turkish businesses are results of a grand Nation (millet) strengthens the political 
message of the AKP and of TUSKON, which is certainly more than just a business 
association.  
TUSKON’s fast rise to success is attributable, then, to three factors: Its roots in a 
strong, transnational movement with a coherent ideology, a charismatic leader and an 
international administrative network that runs like clockwork. To top that, the business 
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association (not the movement) refrains from confronting the AKP government and PM 
Erdoğan directly, thereby securing a safe distance from the heat of political debate. In 
many ways, TUSKON became the driving force behind the massive operation that the 
Gulen movement undertakes. For instance, TUSKON member federations take active 
roles in the organization of Turkish Olympics. They tap into the talent pool created by 
the Gulen Movement in the form of a mass of graduates from Turkish Colleges in 
Turkey and abroad. The member businesses and secretariat of the association are duty 
bound to assist students, families and Gulenists from a world over. They, too, rely on 
translators, teachers, spiritual teachers (missionaries), host families and individuals, 
business middlemen, all of whom are Gulen loyalists living in countries with which 
TUSKON affiliated businesses trade. Entering and remaining in markets as far as 
Bolivia and Tajikistan become considerably easier when there are familiar faces and a 
common language, both Turkish as spoken tongue and the nomenclature of Gulen’s 
teachings, to be found there.  
MUSIAD is the first and most recognizable Islamic business association and 
stands out as perhaps the most studied Islamic association in Turkey. MUSIAD, too, 
boasts of a strong network, particularly in Europe where generations of migrants from 
Turkey have forged powerful commercial and social links via MUSIAD with their 
homeland. As the first comer from the Muslim conservative business community into 
the realm of state-business relations in Turkey, MUSIAD rose to prominence by 
institutionalizing and professionalizing as a business organization. MUSIAD has an 
expansive net of committees, each with select and active members, working on a 
number of strategic issues and sectors. Former MUSIAD President Omer Bolat names 
each MUSIAD member as a full time MUSIAD professional, implying the sworn 
commitment that each member is alleged to have made to the business association. 
Their membership criteria are strenuous and they expect recommendations, background 
checks, etc. To that effect Bolat comments, ‘we do not allow bad seeds to thrive in our 
midst [Author’s own translation]’.310 MUSIAD resembles an exclusive club, an analogy 
often used to refer to TUSIAD.  
MUSIAD and TUSIAD stand on different sides of the political/ideological 
spectrum however they weigh almost equally on policy decisions and each have seats in 
corporatist policymaking bodies. Figures like Ethem Sancak, Abdullah Konukoğlu and 
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Murat Ülker have assisted TUSIAD’s rapprochement with the Islamic conservative 
business community and deeper engagement with MUSIAD, a familiar and influential 
organization, served as an ideal conduit to build commercial and social links between 
secular and Muslim conservative businesspeople – not that there was a great divide in 
real economic terms but there certainly was a sense of estrangement that is largely 
influenced by the contrasting cultural/lifestyle choices. Ali Bulaç identified MUSIAD 
on a mission to become TUSIAD-like and highlights the hypocrisy behind this 
transformation. On the other hand, a board member at MUSIAD argues that although 
his association is Turkey’s most powerful and enjoys the widest representation of 
SMEs, his administration still avoids being targeted by sections of Turkish state, which 
are secular, Republican, authoritarian and vengeful against what MUSIAD represents.
311
 
Based on a recent fieldwork with Anatolian SMEs, political economist Ayşe Buğra 
argues that the majority of MUSIAD members are companies with headquarters based 
in or around Istanbul whereas there are an increasing number of Anatolian small to 
medium businesses and entrepreneurs that join TUSIAD. Hence, both business 
associations evolve in a business-state relations space that is also gradually expanding
312
 
TOBB and TIM certainly sharpened their respective roles and significance in 
economic, industrial and trade policymaking. TOBB is an effective confederation with a 
corporatist and hierarchical character but TOBB’s member chambers sustain this peak-
level organization voluntarily and elect TOBB leadership democratically. A senior 
policy analyst at TEPAV warns against naming TOBB as a semi-governmental 
organization because TOBB stages very intricate and competitive democratic elections. 
On a district level, chambers hold elections and these elections usually feature Gulenist 
or other tariqat affiliated candidates competing against other (secular, Republican or 
religious) candidates.
313
 Güven Sak alleges that in the recent years (since 2007), Gülen 
loyalist businesspeople earned administrative seats in many chambers around Turkey.
314
 
He also observes that the secret to TOBB’s success is the democratic elections process 
and that the entire business community across Turkey is covered by this vast network of 
chambers, established in 81 cities and 181 townships. TOBB Chairman Hisarcıklıoğlu 
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presides over more than 350 chambers of industry and/or trade and when TOBB makes 
a statement about a policy, then the government and all concerned parties recognize the 
weight of hundreds of chambers in all of Turkey’s cities behind that policy opinion. 
Considering the corporatist credentials of TOBB and particularly the fact that 
membership to chambers is compulsory in Turkey, it is no surprise that TOBB remains 
a key strategic actor in economic, financial, industrial and social policies in Turkey. An 
additional layer that complements TOBB’s influence is the presence of religious 
confessional networks in TOBB’s grassroots organization, as alluded to by TEPAV 
staff during my interviews with them in Ankara. Chambers across Turkey are lead by 
businesspeople that are considered to be devout Muslims with conservative political 
views and an appreciation of the AKP leadership. During the 2008 economic crisis, 
there were a series of newspaper articles discussing the impact of the global financial 
meltdown on Turkey’s real economy and productivity with various chamber leaders in 
major industrial cities like Bursa, Kayseri, Uşak and Gaziantep. The heads of chambers 
in these four cities identified the 2008 crisis as the most damaging blow on industrial 
development and foreign trade they can remember and expressed deep concern about 
energy prices, inflationary pressures, monetary instability and the dearth of financial 
capital in international markets. Despite these serious concerns, none of these four 
chamber leaders, who own and manage large industrial enterprises in their home cities, 
blamed or attacked the AKP government for their economic policies or their 
management of the 2008 crisis. In fact, Konukoğlu of Gaziantep Chamber of Industry 
highlighted that the business community ought to empathize with and continue to 
morally support the government as they wrestle with a difficult financial situation. Their 
level of preparedness to economic and financial crises, built over time by experiencing 
multiple crises in the volatile 1990s and early 2000s, enables these businessmen to 
tolerate a crisis environment better than more vulnerable and smaller enterprises, 
perhaps. However at the same time, these chamber leaders recognize that in order to 
secure the tax relief schemes and incentive packages that their cities and sectors have 
benefited from, they need to recognize and emphasize their moral affiliation with the 
AKP government. Hence, Boydak of Kayseri Chamber of Industry calls to preserve 
‘moral values at a difficult time of crisis’ and ‘think of the relationship between state-
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chamber-businesses as a marriage, in which partners pledge to remain loyal for better or 
for worse and in sickness and in health [Author’s own translation]’.315 
Last but not the least, another prominent player in industrial relations in Turkey 
is the Turkish Exporters’ Assembly (Türkiye İhracatçılar Meclisi, TİM). This 
organization was set up in 2009 along with a country-wide organization of exporters 
assemblies, which were under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Economy’s 
Undersecretariat of Foreign Commerce. 
316
The ‘Exports Trategy of Turkey for 2023’ 
document was released simultaneously with the establishment of city-level exporters 
assemblies and their parent institution, TİM.317 Mandated to promote Turkey’s 2023 
Export Strategy, TİM is a textbook case of corporatist organization. The chair of TİM, 
Mehmet Büyükekşi is a key figure in Turkey’s business circles and merits access to PM 
Erdoğan’s inner circle. Büyükekşi engages with Zafer Çağlayan, Minister of Economy 
on a regular basis and partakes in several high-level commercial visits of President Gül, 
PM Erdoğan and cabinet ministers. Büyükekşi, a Gaziantep born businessman, sits on 
the boards of Turkish Airlines, Istanbul Chamber of Commerce, Istanbul Development 
Agency and assumes an active executive position in Ziylan Group companies.
318
 TİM 
hosted PM Erdoğan in all its annual conventions where Erdoğan delivered important 
messages, sometimes unrelated to foreign commerce or R&D, two focus areas of TİM. 
The fact that TİM was set up as a privileged organization that is placed under the vast 
expanse of the Prime Ministry (where the Ministry of Economy is also located) and that 
its mandate relates to an exports strategy which extends to 2023, a target that AKP and 
Erdoğan are very politically committed to reach shows the incremental links between 
the government and this corporatist organization. Mehmet Büyükekşi is personally very 
committed to the political goals of the AKP and expects to be nominated as a mayoral 
candidate out of Gaziantep in the upcoming 2014 local elections.
319
 
Although these four business interest groups represent Muslim conservative 
capitalists and maintain amicable relations with Turkey’s neoliberal, democratic and 
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conservative mainstream ruling party, there are nevertheless instances where the limits 
of their friendship with the AKP, particularly with PM Erdoğan, are tested.  
(4) Intra-group rivalry among Turkey’s Muslim conservative business elites  
Pluralism and democratic consciousness go hand in hand in the case of Turkey’s 
Islamic business associations. Rızanur Meral of TUSKON bluntly states that as Turkey 
follows the rule of law and advances its liberalization and democratization processes, 
favorable conditions for production, commerce and financial development will be 
created.
 320
 Furthermore, Derya Gültekin-Karakaş identifies pluralization and 
diversification within Turkey’s capitalist class and shows that any given business 
association may contain members from groups with different ideological, moral or 
religious convictions.
321
 Diverse cultural, moral, social and political convictions coexist 
in business associations but their coexistence is not always peaceful. Managing and 
containing rivalry and contestation among Turkey’s Muslim conservative 
businesspeople and associations are a top priority, since most if not all leading business 
associations pursue a peaceful, stable and non-controversial environment to advance 
their business interests.   
Concerned with Islamic morality and Quranic interpretation, Turkey’s Muslims 
aspire to being recognized as good practicing Muslims. A secular culture, politics and 
state infrastructure has for decades interpreted which thoughts and deeds constituted 
good, according to Islam. The Directorate of Religious Affairs represents the state-
sanctioned interpretations of the Quran and the Sunna as well as guidance on more 
quotidian matters to citizens who approach the Directorate with their questions. 
Moreover, Turkey domiciles contemporary preachers, teachers of Islam and 
confessional leaders, all of whom offer their advice and guidance on Islam. There is an 
ocean of scholarship and a plethora of oral traditions that relate to how one ought to 
conduct oneself everyday to be considered a good Muslim.  
In such a varied space of religious scholarship and interpretation, their peers, 
families and colleagues for their choice of Islamic lifestyle challenge practicing 
Muslims in Turkey. Sometimes, as in the case of Alaeddin, a workshop participant from 
Ankara, these challenges escalate to acts of discrimination, mobbing and even hate 
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speech, which complicate the building of a peaceful coalition of practicing Muslims. A 
devout Muslim, Alaeddin’s secular family scorns his more conservative interpretation 
of Islam and nags him by asking whether he intends to ‘rise to the Heavens, while still 
alive and well on Earth’.322 Apparently, there are vast differences between Turkish 
Muslims’ imaginations of one another and these differences may or may not correspond 
to the theological, ideological and sociological divide between followers of different 
tarikat in Turkey. Alaeddin’s testimony also confirms that a hierarchy applies between 
believers and non-believers in Turkey. There is a clear sense of rivalry between 
businessmen and industrialist associations in Gaziantep, for instance. Those that 
represent the region’s old and established business elites admit that Southeast Anatolian 
businessmen have been downcast and marginalized by the traditional state elite. During 
the agro-industrial development in the 1950s, the ruling Democrat Party dubbed the 
business elites of Anatolia ‘hillbillies’ and scorned them for their provincialities.  
Provinciality also implied religious conservatism, another trait that the Jacobinist state 
and business elites despised.  
There are similar social pressures on the members of the Muslim community. 
Another participant at the Ankara workshop claimed that there are ‘very orthodox 
Islamic organizations’ in Turkey’s many provinces and their followers coerce other 
Muslims into complying with their terms of Islamic morality and practice.
323
Business 
associations express their rivalry along religious lines, too. Konya-based ASKON and 
TUMSIAD are deeply critical of the moderate, mainstream and popular Islam that they 
allege MUSIAD members to be following. These two associations advocate more 
dedication to Islamic morality in their dealings with their member businesses, the state 
and communities. At the same time however, during my interview with several 
members of TUMSIAD in Konya, the chairperson confessed that his member 
businesses do not always work with Islamic banks and that they inevitably work with 
conventional banks too.  
Ömer Bolat, former MUSIAD Chair, remembers the cultural and ideological 
victory that his business association and colleagues achieved to build an organization 
that propagates Islamic morality and welcomes practicing Muslims in Turkey’s secular 
and corporatist business environment. Having waged a unified battle against Muslim 
stereotypes in Turkey, Islamic capitalists inevitably feel protective of their brothers and 
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sisters. Implicitly, a Muslim businessman or politician is a better ally and serving a goal 
that is morally sound according to the teachings of the Quran is preferred. Explicitly, 
some businesspeople entertain revanchist thoughts to tame the business community in 
Turkey. Most radically, Ethem Sancak declared his intentions to take over TUSIAD and 
to extradite the old, secular and anti-Islamist elites from this influential business 
association. Sancak justifies his attacks on TUSIAD by citing TUSIAD leadership’s 
backing of the 28 February soft coup, which in his view culled Turkey’s Islamic 
businesses and their interest groups.
324
 Though unclear whether Sancak’s personal 
vendetta resonates with other equally wealthy and powerful Muslim conservative 
businessmen in Turkey yet the fact that a businessman of such a high standing (and 
alleged proximity to Erdoğan) publicly laments TUSIAD is significant. It is perhaps the 
clearest sign that the expansion of the Islamic counterelite will not stop where the space 
occupied by a secular elite begins.  
Conclusion 
So far, I treated politicization of business associations in the Islamic capitalist 
community as a given. The next chapter will observe the policy engagement of Islamic 
business associations in detail on two areas: gender and media policies. There is 
however a reservation that has been mentioned several times already in this thesis: 
Businesspeople are not politicized or engaged in politics by default. Most of the time, 
politicization is viewed as either risky or as a diversion from their main preoccupation, 
profit-making. However, conducting smooth business-state relations does require 
Turkey’s Islamic business interest groups to assume political positions and to operate in 
a society and politics that recognizes and responds to identities first and foremost.  
Overall, peak-level relations continue to be characterised by tension, particularly 
between the government and TUSIAD. To avoid direct confrontation with the 
government and to remain business-focused despite the frequency of political scandals 
and tensions in a transforming state and society in Turkey, Islamic business associations 
coopt with the AKP state. Hence the picture that emerges at peak level is that of a 
modus vivendi, where dissent on fundamental issues do not prevent functional 
cooperation in areas of common interest.
325
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Chapter 5: Media policies 
In this chapter, I am mainly concerned with the policy influence that Islamic and 
secular business communities exercise over media policies. Whether Islamic 
associations’ ideological or cultural positions aid or abet their policy influence over 
Turkey’s policymakers, who set media policies, constitutes the main focus of this 
chapter. Specifically, this case study chapter will assess legal reforms, public and 
private procurement/privatization, administrative and structural changes and discursive 
changes between 1999 and 2012 in the media landscape in Turkey.  Three cases will be 
explored in some detail, to showcase the periods of confrontation and cooptation 
between the secular and Islamic business communities and the government: the sale of 
Sabah-ATV media companies, the attempted dissolution of the Doğan Media Group, 
and the privatization of the public telecommunications giant, Turk Telekom. 
The distinction between secular and Islamic business emerges most markedly in 
policy issues or democratization debates that have to do with morals, values, lifestyle 
choices, etc. On the more deeply rooted and divisive democratization issues, i.e. the 
Kurdish Question, judicial and constitutional reform, and security sector reform, both 
secular and Islamic business associations did produce similar liberal and democratic or 
apolitical messages. Representatives of the business associations tended to downplay 
politically contentious issues by consistently stating their members’ commitment to 
Democracy, with a capital D, and to refrain from committing their association to 
specific policy angles within those difficult political debates.  However, in two specific 
policy areas of media and gender policies, which will be dealt with in the following 
chapter, the split between the values and morals of businesspeople that make the 
membership of Islamic and secular business associations was discernable. By extension, 
these two policy areas are where secular and establishment associations encounter 
considerable barriers to reach and influence the Legislature, the Executive and relevant 
public institutions.   
Turkey’s media sector: a background  
Turkey’s media sector boasts of hundreds of private channels, with 18 million 
TV viewers in 2011.
326
 Survey data from 2006, 2009 and 2012 show a marked increase 
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in the percentage of households with one or more TV sets from 53.3% to 60.8% and 
also in the percentage of viewers with satellite (67.1% to 71.9 %) and digital platform 
(1.6% to 12.6%) subscriptions.
327
 There are thousands of local and national radio 
stations however radio’s presence in the media market is fast declining. Newspapers and 
print media, too, are losing blood over the impact of global trends in paper production 
and use and the shift in consumer trends towards e-content.  
Digital communications is the future in Turkey, as well as in most developing 
and developed markets around the world. In 2012, 943 million TL (approximately 500 
million USD) was invested into digital advertising in Turkey, up by 30% from 721 
million TL. This was the fastest growing medium in Turkey, as well as globally, and 
consisted of 18% of the total ad revenue in Turkish media sector.
328
 The rise of digital 
advertising as an extremely popular advertising medium corresponds to the widespread 
usage of the internet in Turkey. In 2012, the number of 3G users totaled 40 million, 
which is one of ‘the highest social media usage through mobile internet’ worldwide, 
which shows the strength of mobile communications providers in the Turkish media 
market.
 329
   
PwC’s Global Entertainment and Media Outlook 2013-2017 report reveals that 
Turkey’s entertainment and media industry grew to ‘a size of over USD10.2 billion in 
Turkey in 2012, [and that] the sector is expected to hit USD11.6 billion by the end of 
2013, and approximately USD17.5 billion by 2017, with an annual average growth rate 
of 11.4% through the next five years’.330 This makes for a very attractive site for 
domestic and global investment.  
In Turkey, entering into the media sector makes political sense, too. From a 
political economic point of view, Turkey’s media is not atypical to the media 
landscapes of other developing countries. Turkey’s media sector has an oligopolistic 
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structure and four to five corporations hold the majority of the market share. Doğan 
Group and Doğuş Group are both market leaders with 12% each in total revenues in 
television. Turkuvaz Group is a close second with 11% and is followed by Murdoch’s 
Fox channels (8%) and the public broadcaster TRT (8%). Doğan Group is stronger in 
the newspaper (25%), magazine (22%) and digital (4%) segments, when compared to 
the other media conglomerates. Consolidated market shares are not the only indicators 
to the market presence and penetration of these media groups. Figure 2 shows the 
distribution of the total advertising revenue among five commercial media groups, 
which together make up almost 40% of total ad sales captured by all the players in the 
media sector. Between 2010 and 2013, all media groups increased their ad revenue, 
however, Doğan Group faced a dramatic rise between 2010 and 2011 and a severe drop 
between 2011 and 2012. On the other hand, Dogus Group recorded a steady and 
impressive rise from 3% to 12% in just three years.   
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Turkuvaz Group 
• License owner: Ahmet Çalık (Çalık Holding) 
• Acquired via TMSF-led public tender in 2007 from Ciner Group. 
• Çalık Holding active in textiles, energy, construction, finance, logistics and communications (Albania)  
• ATV, ATV Avrupa, A Haber, Minika TV, Turkuaz News Agency, Radyo City, Sabah, Sabah Avrupa, Takvim, 
Günaydın newspapers, periodicals, magazines and Turkuaz Distribution and Marketing co. 
Doğuş Group 
• Large industrial conglomerate, owned by Ferit Şahenk. 
• Entered into broadcasting in 1999 by purchase of news broadcaster NTV. 
• Active in banking (Garanti Bank) and finance, automotive, construction, tourism and hospitality, entertainment 
and energy. 
• Star, NTV, Cnbc-E and other thematic channels, online sales portals, Virgin Radio Turkey and 3 other radios, 
Vogue, GQ, National Georgraphic and 4 more domestic journals. 
Doğan Group 
• Aydın Doğan's first entry into the media sector was with Milliyet newspaper in 1980. 
• Active since 1950s in automotive industry, the Doğan Group now owns energy companies, industrial production 
companies, financial services providers and tourism companies. 
• Doğan Publishing co. has a digital platform, 27 TV channels, 4 radio channels, 5 newspapers and 27 magazines, 
as well as several other media companies. 
Beyaz / Yeni Dünya Communications  
• Established by Erdoğan as Minicipal TV when the PM was Istanbul mayor, Beyaz Holding now belongs to 
Zekeriya Karaman, Erdoğan's son's father-in-law. 
• Beyaz Holding also operates the Istanbul Metropolitan municipality's free public courses and trainings.  
• The holding company has three media companies Hayat Görsel Co, Nokta Electronic Media Co, and Beyaz 
Iletisim Co with 6 TV channels and 1 radio station. 
Çukurova Group 
• Owned by Mehmet Emin Karamehmet, Çukurova Group's media division started its operations with Bulvar 
newspaper in 1982. 
• The Group also controls ''one Switzerland bank, two insurance companies, a company making investment in 
controlling finance companies directly or indirectly and the companies in the industry, construction, trade, 
media, communication and information technology, energy, transport and service sectors.' (Tayanç&Özkoçak, 
2013, 35) 
• The Group has 22 media outlets, including news and entertainment channels, a digital platform, and Turkey's 
mobile communications leader, Turkcell. 
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Figure 2: Share of advertising revenue of major media groups (Source: Carat, 2013) 
In countries with a history of military authoritarianism and endemic clientelism, 
an exaggerated departure from media independence is observed.
332
 Due to self-
censorship or existing legal barriers to free media and expression, an overwhelming 
mass of mainstream news contains counterfactual or incomplete information. 
Preventing access to plural and fact-based news and information puts democratizing 
countries in greater danger. Incidentally, research and empirical evidence find a positive 
correlation between freedom of expression/media and democratic consolidation. The 
curtailment of media freedom by way of self-censorship also undermines the 
development of a competitive and liberal media market. However, quite possibly, media 
owners and operators preach self-censorship with the expectation to acquire greater 
economic gain and more political influence. The following subsection offers an 
observation of media governance in Turkey, with a discussion on how structures of 
media policymaking and regulation foster the patronage of a few businesspeople, 
associations and politicians. 
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Media ownership and governance in Turkey: then and now 
Turkey’s media companies depend on the state for services, advertising revenue, 
economic incentives to drive competition in the media market and for the fast adoption 
of legislation to align Turkey’s media market with international markets. Media bosses 
and journalists, columnists and news anchors nurtured their companies and careers by 
building close personal relationships with members of the security sector, bureaucrats 
and elected officials, and by exercising favouritism towards their ‘friends’ in the 
government, the Turkish Armed Forces, and in ministries. Ceren Sözeri and Dilek 
Kurban argue that a strong tradition of patronage between the media and the civilian 
political and military elites contributes to social and political polarisation and media’s 
self-censorship.
333
 The media ownership structure in Turkey has traditionally worked 
against editorial independence and pluralism. 
Before the 1980s, it was very uncommon for businessmen to own newspapers 
and leading newspapers were owned and managed by journalists. ‘Professional 
identities and the journalism background of the owner were very important for the 
readers’.334 Towards the end of the 1980s, the technological sophistication of print and 
broadcasting media and the adjacent developments in the Turkish market replaced 
entrepreneurial journalists with businessmen. 
The highly centralized decision making authority gave a strong power to the prime 
ministries and their associates to be used to influence business and media for their own 
sakes. As a result, strongly embedded relationships between government representatives, 
businesspersons, and media owners unfolded.
335
  
As the space for private media opened up in mid- to late 1990s, newspaper 
owners began setting up private television channels and radios. The tradition of family-
owned newspapers disappeared as a result of the diversification of the media sector in 
Turkey. In the meantime, media companies evolved into larger groups of companies in 
which a parent holding company coordinated the present and future investments into the 
private media companies within the group. The proliferation of large industrial groups 
in the media sector meant the influx of business actors that did not have a background in 
media management and an affiliation with media ethics, content, etc. Quite simply, 
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Turkey’s new ‘media bosses’ were not equipped with the necessary skills that they 
needed to operate in a sector that was quite unlike other commercial sectors that these 
men had made their fortunes. The third trend was for media conglomerates to merge 
with smaller domestic media outlets to minimize competition in the domestic market. 
The fourth and final trend was for Turkey’s media conglomerates to merge with 
international groups, as Doğan Group did with TimeWarner, and then to enter new 
regional markets, such as Doğan Group’s launching of its leading entertainment 
channel, Kanal D, in Romania.
336
  
These four trends strenghtened a handful of media conglomerates, which were 
owned and managed by capitalists seeking to accrue political and economic benefits 
from their presence in the domestic and regional media sectors. Turkey’s emergent 
media conglomerates were pragmatic actors who had sharpened their business skills 
outside of the media industry and then transferred their capitalist instincts to the media 
sector. Their presence in a booming sector with incremental links to the political and 
public spheres required them to negotiate with governments and state bodies to survive. 
According to most students of media history and politics in Turkey, Turkey’s media 
bosses have been cronies of the political elite since the early days of commercialization 
in media. Seasoned journalist, Şahin Alpay offers a striking account of the close and 
corrupt relationship between the political elite and the business community in Turkey in 
his analysis of the ‘two faces of the press’.337  
Businesspeople in the 1990s were motivated by the publicity and outreach that 
media companies provided and most bankers owned and operated media companies. In 
2002, after a radical makeover of the banking sector in Turkey following the financial 
crises of 1999 and 2001, media companies were turned over to industrial groups. Unlike 
Turkey’s collapsed private banks, which were able to channel extraordinary amounts of 
funds into media companies during the height of unregulated commercial banking in the 
1990s, industrial groups in the 2000s set up media companies for commercial reasons 
and sought profitability.
338
 The political motives behind media ownership are clear 
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however these motives and the pursuit for profits and economic success are not 
mutually exclusive. More specifically, media and communications scholar Can Bilgili 
suggests that the media bosses of 2000s care equally about their business and their 
influence over national politics.
339
 Evidently, Turkey’s oligopolistic and corporatist 
media landscape is driven both by political and commercial interests.  
National and local media are the foremost sites of ‘power play’ in Turkey, 
according to Nuri Çolakoğlu. His assertion is backed by Günseli Ocak Özenoğlu, 
columnist at Zaman newspaper and editor of a marketing communications journal, who 
observed on her tour of media outposts across Turkey’s various provinces that 
provincial governors polish their authority over their area of jurisdiction by controlling 
local media outlets. Both Çolakoglu and Özenoğlu agree that the monopoly public 
advertiser, Press Advertising Council (Basın İlan Konseyi, BİK), holds the lifeline of 
smaller players in the media sector, and has also a sizeable share in the amount of 
advertising revenue that larger media holdings generate.
340
  
There are five key problems afflicting freedom of speech and editorial 
independence in Turkey’s media today: conglomerate pressure, judicial oppression, 
online banishment and surveillance defamation and accreditation discrimination.
341
 In 
other words, Turkey’s establishment and mainstream media was suppressed by a 
number of judicial, legal, administrative and social tools while new, so-called liberal 
media actors flourished under the guardianship of the AKP. Several academic and 
countless non-academic sources present Erdoğan and the AKP as authoritarian, based 
on their treatment of journalists, media outlets and businessmen in the media sector. 
This section does not deal with the several landmark cases of media suppression in the 
decade between 2002 and 2012, such as the prohibitions on the use of the world wide 
web, including the ban on accessing Youtube in 2010, the detention and imprisonment 
of Kurdish, socialist, secular and ultra nationalist journalists and media personnel and 
the widespread breach of rights to privacy via wiretapping of phones and other 
telecommunications equipment of various public and political actors. It is worth noting 
however that the cases focused here, i.e. the government’s pressure on the economic and 
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financial interests of companies, owned by media conglomerates and the transformation 
of the communications infrastructure through Turk Telekom’s sale, occurred in a 
politically charged, eventful and contested media environment.  
Turkey’s media sector liberalization and democratization are hampered by the 
slow pace and inadequacy of reforms.  
The draft law on data protection was submitted to Parliament in 2008 and the draft 
electronic commerce law in 2010. For example, the electronic communications law of 2008 
introduced a general authorisation scheme, but did not abolish the old concessions. Also, 
the regulation of content transmitted over the internet and internet service providers’ 
liability is not aligned with EU policy and legislation. Turkey regulates these issues in law 
no. 5651, which was adopted in 2007, but is not based on the EU Electronic Commerce 




For Turkey’s media conglomerates, legislative reforms to facilitate business relationships 
between media sectors in European countries and Turkey are crucial, since sector leaders 
such as Doğan and Doğuş Groups have operations and commercial interests in central and 
southeastern Europe.
343
 For Turkey’s media workers, better and faster integration with 
European legislation is crucial to advance legal guarantees to ethical and humane conduct 
in the industry. Finally, legal alignment with European norms in media business would 
expand and diversity the sector, eliminating the obstacles to editorial independence and 
sound media ethics that are usually attributed to the present ownership structure in Turkish 
media. 
Despite the lethargy of the legislative to pass complete media reforms in line 
with the EU Acquis, Turkey’s media landscape is not short of policymaking and 
regulatory bodies that exercise influence over the politics and business of media 
communications in Turkey. The executive (particularly the Prime Ministry, the Ministry 
of Trade, EU Ministry, and the Ministry of Transport and Communications), the 
parliament, and the civil and criminal courts, the independent or public media regulatory 
bodies govern Turkey’s expanding media sector, populated by Turkey’s private media 
companies (printing and publishing houses, newspapers, radios, TV channels, news 
agencies, production companies, broadcasters, cable/analogue, digital and online 
broadcasting service providers, media planning companies, advertising and public 
relations agencies), the consumers of media services in Turkey and abroad. Turkish 
Armed Forces’ de jure involvement in media regulation ended with a 2004 amendment 
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to the Law on the Radio and Television Supreme Council (Radyo ve Televizyon Üst 
Kurulu, RTÜK), however the TAF remained a de facto policy actor in the media 
landscape, until the second term of AKP when security sector reform deepened and 
expanded across the ranks of the TAF.
344
  
Chief among these actors are sector-specific associations, such as the 
Association of Advertisers (Reklamverenler Derneği, RD), the Society of Turkish 
Journalists (Türk Gazeteciler Cemiyeti) and the Press Council (Basın Konseyi), and 
regulatory organizations such as the Supreme Board of Radio and Television (Radyo ve 
Televizyon Üst Kurulu, RTÜK) and the Telecommunications Authority 
(Telekomünikasyon Başkanlığı).  Sector specific associations have traditionally been 
secular and Republican. Media associations and the corporatist hierarchy that governs 
the media sector in Turkey are conveniently separated from the associations 
representing the core business sectors, such as industrial and financial goods and 
services. Whereas in industrial and commercial sectors, corporatist organizations seek to 
control the business transactions and to steer the course of business development, in the 
media sector the corporatist machinery seeks to control the content, as well. In other 
words, media sector associations and the pertinent regulatory or policy bargaining 
organs recognize media companies as agents of social control and attempt to manipulate 
their actions according to the interests and agenda of the state.  
Government officials politicize the market market by way of semi-public bodies. 
For instance, the Ministry of Customs and Trade houses the Advertising Council, 
mandated to regulate the advertising and marketing activities of private sector 
companies by collecting, evaluating and responding to inquiries made by persons or 
companies. The Council is typically corporatist; it sits three representatives from 
TOBB, nine representatives from various ministries, and one representative from each 
of the main union confederations. The advertising industry is represented with one seat 
for the Association of Advertisers; publishers and the media are not represented. Oddly, 
the Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı, DİB) has a seat on the 
council. Clearly, some of the complaints raised by consumers require the technical skills 
of an expert from DIB. First established in 1995, the current Advertising Council is set 
up by a 2003 statute, which grants the Council the authority to accept, review and 
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decide on the moral and professional aspects of advertising content. By regulating 
content, this association facilitates the government’s involvement in the industry. 
Locating the Islamic in Turkey’s media landscape 
Why is the media sector in Turkey particularly important to Islamic 
businesspeople and to associations that represent their interests? An immediate 
explanation is that the media in Turkey – much like in the rest of the world – is critical 
to the shaping of a national identity and cultural politics of the country. Until the mid 
1990s, Turkey’s state-controlled media was able to nurture a generation of viewers and 
consumers that absorbed and responded to similar messages. Public broadcasting 
transmitted narratives of a glorious nation, an omnipresent state, and a paternal military 
and helped to build a collective sense of nostalgia for Kemalist modernity.
345
Turkish 
Radio and Broadcasting Authority (TRT) represented the voice of the state and in 
practice catered to the political interest of ruling parties. TRT’s corporatist program 
content and strict organization hierarchy was established and reaffirmed by successive 
coups in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. A second and related explanation to the 
significance of media to Islamic business associations is that a free and liberal media 
landscape facilitates a more pluralistic policy environment for businesses to negotiate 
with the state. By extension, a stronger and more vibrant media market strengthens the 
financial and political capacity of new (Islamic) economic actors vis a vis the state. 
Furthermore, a media landscape that once represented elite status and a 
Republican value system changed into a more diverse space between 1999 and 2011 
and this broadening and widening of the public space via the media attracted Turkey’s 
power-hungry Muslim bourgeoisie and conservative pious politicians. EU accession 
reforms partially loosened the legislative grip on media freedom, thereby allowing for 
the development of alternative media content. Particularly pronounced was the 
broadening of the political debate via a more expansive media sector in the 2000s. 
Radio channels, newspapers and private television channels broadcast news and news-
related entertainment more than any other type of content. Ferhat Boratav comments 
that Turkey has more news channels than any other average media market in Europe.
346
 
Moreover, broadcasters provide a significant and unrivalled channel for public debate 
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on social, political and economic issues in Turkey, where television viewers outnumber 
followers of any other medium.
347
 Thus, media outlets showcased the vibrancy of a 
growing public debate, which was joined not by secularist, elite actors but also by 
alternative political, cultural and religious communities. The media’s function in 
facilitating and hosting political communication in contemporary Turkey inspired 
journalist and academic Şahin Alpay to call Turkey ‘a media democracy or a 
‘mediacracy’, a polity in which the media plays a decisive role in the shaping of public 
opinion and in the political decision making process.’348  
Before moving onto the Islamic business’ presence in and dealings with 
Turkey’s media in the 2000s, it is useful to remember the media’s dealings with Islam 
and Islamic business community until late 2000s. As pointed out in previous chapters, 
Turkey’s nation-building project engendered a uniform conception of the Turkish 
Muslim identity. Certainly, the public broadcaster TRT and the organization of a state-
controlled media landscape in Turkey facilitated the construction of a state-sanctioned 
Muslim identity, embedded within the imagination of a supra Turkish identity.  
In the collective memory of Turkish nationalism, the dark face of Islam belongs to a distant 
past, banished once and for all together with the Sufi orders, the Arabic script, the 
Khalifate, and the Sharia. In the discourse of secularism, it has remained very much alive, a 
primordial force lurking in the interstices of everyday life and practice, and ready to 
assume public form and substance, unless closely monitored and contained. Hence ‘we’ as 
enlightened Muslim, must be on constant guard against the hidden enemy within ‘us’, lest 
its dark face reappear. The other dark face of Islam has thus been as familiar for Turkish 
audiences as its visible ‘civilized’ face.349  
Turkey’s journalists and media professionals, who viewed journalism as an elite 
profession, portrayed an imagined divide between an enlightened secular media and a dark, 
uncivilized and uneducated Muslim culture. Journalists in Turkey competed with political 
elites in their claims to the true expression of popular aspirations; they themselves defined, 
in a truly Jacobinist manner, what those aspirations should be. As representatives of a civil 
society, they challenged political governments when those governments did not hold the 
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same views that they themselves espoused, or when these governments did not function in 
a manner journalists thought they should.
350  
Öncü’s account of the framing of Islam in the Turkish media culture provides an 
excellent framework to understand some of the reasoning behind how the Turkish 
Republican regime utilized media sources and figures to foster public support and 
legitimacy in mid 1990s against the Welfare Party (and later the AKP), which 
manifested the ‘dark face’ of Islam in party politics, and how the media has become a 
‘front’ in Turkey’s secularists’ fight against Islamism. Turkey’s mainstream media 
asserted its strength to inspire public fear and anger against a so-called Islamist agenda. 
Until the commercialization of broadcasting in Turkey, the military easily concentrated 
its public diplomacy work in the TRT broadcasts. However, after the 1990s,  
the vast variety (both in content and ideology) of information transmitted produced a 
situation where citizens were suddenly and consistently empowered to make choices and 
take ownership of the information they choose to receive in the complete privacy of their 
own homes. Society, increasingly aware of itself as a consumer, led to power-seeking 




Welfare Party appealed to the latent Islamic core in many Turks, thus, the messages of 
political Islam did not fall entirely on deaf ears.
 352
At the same time, the Welfare Party 
began as early as 1991 to utilize advisors and marketing agencies to package and 
communicate its political message in more familiar, mainstream terms. In other words, the 
Welfare Party ‘cleaned up’ for television; its party representatives and elections campaign 
materials became simple, sincere, and light. Despite the expectations of the Turkish 
military and secular elite that perhaps the former public image of the Welfare Party and its 
leader Erbakan as propagating radical Islamic lifestyles and government, the Welfare Party 
performed very well in the realm of commercial broadcasting.  
Before the obvious prevalence of an Islamic counterelite in late 2000s, Islamic 
business community worked for many years to build solid and profitable businesses in 
the different sections of Turkey’s media sector. There were notable printing and 
publishing houses that produced the type of content that helped shape a twenty-first 
century Turkish Muslim popular culture. The Zaman newspaper constituted a key 
player in the world of print media and stood out not only for its unique model of 
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voluntary subscribers but also for its professionalism in management, award-wining 
layout and its expansive network of local and international reporters. Published and 
distributed widely around the world, Zaman has enjoyed wide circulation since 1986. 
Zaman is owned by the Feza Group, which also owns the Cihan News Agency (Cihan 
Haber Ajansı, CHA). CHA emerged as a formidable rival to the state controlled 
Anadolu Agency (Anadolu Ajansı, AA). ‘Feza has a partnership agreement with 
Samanyolu Group. Both groups are affiliated with the Fethullah Gülen movement.’353 
Notably, media companies owned by Fethullah Gülen movement’s loyalists are 
alledgedly funded by the movement itself.  
A mid-sized group, Ihlas Group’s media companies, had entered into Turkey’s 
media sector via the conservative and right wing Türkiye newspaper as early as 1970s 
and rose to nation-wide prominence with the TV channel, TGRT, launched in 2003. 
However, the news agency, TV channels and radio channels owned by the Ihlas Group 
were partially turned over to the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund (Tasarruf Mevduatı 
Sigorta Fonu, TMSF) after the Group declared financial difficulties. The Group’s 
former owner, a WP politician, had a history of financial fraud and embezzlement via 
the finance division of the Ihlas Group, Ihlas Finance Co.
354
  
An Islamic NGO that rose to prominence over the course of media sector’s 
expansion in the 2000s is the Journalists and Writers Foundation (Gazeteciler ve 
Yazarlar Vakfı, GYV). I was personally referred to the GYV when I approached a 
contact about interviewing business associations loyal to the Gülen movement. I was 
asked to show up to a meeting at the state-of-the-art facilities of the Foundation in 
Istanbul’s Altunizade neighbourhood and explain my thesis topic, my background and 
my affiliations to a handful of men, apparently high-ranking Gulen-loyalists, whose 
names I was unable to catch. After being advised to submit my PhD thesis to the 
Foundation upon its completion, I was given a few contact names for business 
association leaders in Anatolia. My personal experience with GYV pinpoints to the 
foundation’s role in producing, facilitating, distributing and collecting Gülen 
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movement’s academic, cultural and media content and relationships. GYV assumed a 
critical role in shaping the cultural habitat of the Gülen movement loyalists and their 
audiences in Turkey. From organizing a succession of high-level meetings in Abant to 
discuss key democratization issues with leading public intellectuals, business figures 
and politicians to hosting countless foreign delegations to visit Turkey’s ‘cultural’ 
sites
355, GYV occupied a considerably larger space in Turkey’s booming civil society its 
name suggests: a foundation for writers and journalists.  
Finally, the media sector domiciles an industry association that is the equivalent 
of MUSIAD or TUSKON for the world of media communications: the Television 
Broadcasters Association (Televizyon Yayıncıları Derneği, TVYD). Founded in 1999, 
this association brings together the main actors of the new Islamic media, namely 
Samanyolu Group, ATV, Beyaz TV and Beyaz Group channels, Channel 24, and the 
public broadcaster TRT. Crucially, TVYD represents 95% of the sector and is 
considered the sole representative of the media sector’s interests by the government and 
regulatory institutions like RTUK.
356
 The association was a key party to the negotiations 
to change the RTUK Law in 2011. A RTUK Board member suggested that associations 
of broadcasters effectively lobbied to insert a clause that requires companies, which 
enter public tenders for broadcasting licenses, to have had at least two years of 
broadcasting experience. Though he supported that first time broadcasters were also 
permitted to enter the bidding process, allegedly, TYVD and RATEM pushed for the 




By late 2000s, Turkey’s media landscape reflects a friendlier imagination of 
Muslims, Islam and the Islamic. Increasingly, Islamic culture and lifestyles and 
practicing Muslims fill the frontlines of national news and entertainment channels. Once 
inconceivable and fear-inspiring, headscarved media figures hold significant positions 
in newspapers, televisions, radio shows and internet media. Conservative, traditional 
and pious media consumers inspire a new brand of entertainment that caters to their 
lifestyle choices. This transformation also includes a coming to terms with the past for 
Turkey’s practising and political Muslims. Channel 24, a private channel which 
broadcasts on public transportation lines, broadcasts documentaries on past military 
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coups, attempting to portray the suffering endured by Turkey’s conservative Muslims at 
the hands of a brutal military and state. Muslim festivals are widely celebrated and 
coverage of religious debates and issues are more prolific on a number of commercial 
channels. These basic channels demonstrate an easing of the state’s tension and control 
over Islamic culture, as captured by the media. 
The forming of AKP’s media and Islamic business associations  
The case of ATV-Sabah and TMSF 
The euphemism for present day media companies and channels in Turkey is 
‘Erdoğan’s media’ or ‘partisan (yandaş) media’. Turkey’s media organizations and their 
outlets have lost their credibility in the view of many Turks, who accuse media bosses 
for yielding to the demands and expectations of the Prime Minister. Beneath the surface 
of polemic, however, lie pieces of solid evidence to suggest that media owners and 
editors, who aim to align with the AKP, compromise pluralism and media 
independence. The determinants of press-party alignment are party ownership of media 
outlets, partisan bias in media organization’s editorial policies, and party membership 
and support of readers, according to Seymour-Ure (1974). Ali Çarkoğlu and Gözde 
Yavuz use the PPP framework and election polling data from 2002 and 2007 to examine 
the obstacles to pluralism and media independence that the partisanship of media 
owners, workers and newspaper readers present in the AKP-era. They find that,  
newspapers are increasingly dependent on politically more homogeneous readership 
communities. Such, readership might be the outcome of an increasingly more partisan 
coverage. Alternatively, the newspapers when faced with more partisan readership might 




Though limited to one medium (newspapers) and a particular political event 
(general elections), Çarkoğlu and Yavuz offer a convincing overview of the interaction 
between media consumers and media outlets in the years of the AKP rule. Media 
content is increasingly designed to reflect the AKP’s point of view and this constructs 
the image of a powerful political party that is able to dominate the agenda. At the same 
time, media consumers’ choices mirror the political choices of Turkey’s electorate. 
Media-party alignment then becomes a consequence of the social and political 
transformation that Turkey underwent and a product of AKP’s consolidation of power. 
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Three cases are crucial to demonstrating the strengthening of AKP’s hold over Turkey’s 
media and the role of Islamic business associations:  the Sabah-ATV sale, the Doğan 
Group’s dealings with the government since 2005, and the Türk Telekom privatization 
process. 
The formation of an AKP’s media depends on the way in which media 
companies changed hands. TMSF played a critical role in the handling of the financial 
dissolution and resale of large groups of companies, which owned and operated media 
companies. In the 2000s, TMSF coordinated the transfer of media ownership from 
secular capitalists to business actors, allegedly close to the AKP, as part of a larger 
attempt to regulate the market and to eradicate corrupt and financially unstable 
elements.  
The measures taken to regulate the banking sector also had an impact on the restructuring 
of the media sector, since some of these banks were owned by business groups also 
operating in the media. These groups’ media assets were overtaken by the newly 
established Savings Deposit Insurance Fund (Tasarruf Mevduatı Sigorta Fonu, TMSF) and 
later acquired either by barons that already controlled a large portion of media or by new 
business groups entering the media sector. The AKP promoted its close business circles to 
benefit from this wave of restructuring and own media outlets on sale from 2005 
onward.
359 
TMSF’s cleansing process nurtured the growth of the Turkuvaz Group, owned 
by Ahmet Çalık, a businessmen with a reputation for his proximity to PM Erdoğan. 
Çalık, in his fifties, presides over a corporation, with operations in banking, textiles, 
industrials, energy and media. He is best known for his Group’s commissioning for the 
massive Samsun-Ceyhan pipeline (TAPCO) project.
360
 Before Turkuaz Group bought 
ATV, this popular entertainment channel belonged to Turgay Ciner’s Ciner Media 
Group, along with 21 other media companies. Ciner had bought ATV in 2000 and 
developed the media division of his industrial and commercial corporation remarkably 
in less than ten years. In 2005, 2006 and 2007, Ciner Media Group’s flagship channel 
ATV and Kanal 1 ranked the second largest among broadcasting networks of media 
conglomerates in Turkey. ATV attracted 90% of all advertising revenue that flowed into 
the Ciner Group and between 2005-2007 the Group was able to collect around 20 % of 
the total ad revenue. The Group’s Sabah daily newspaper was also a key competitor to 
other popular dailies, Hürriyet and Milliyet of the Doğan Group. In newspaper and 
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magazine distribution, Ciner’s Media Group was the only competitor to Doğan Group’s 
YAYSAT. The media distribution market was split fourty to sixty by these two media 
conglomerates.  
Turgay Ciner purchased ATV and Sabah from Dinç Bilgin via TMSF’s sale of 
Bilgin’s confiscated media assets. In 2005, Ciner signed a contract with TMSF to take 
over all of Bilgin’s media assets in return for a transfer of 433 million USD to the public 
fund over ten years. TMSF discovered in 2007 a secret agreement or protocol between 
Dinç Bilgin and Turgay Ciner that violated the sale and asset transfer protocols that 
TMSF signed with Ciner. Apparently, Bilgin had remained a silent partner and Ciner 
had promised to share the media group’s future revenues with its former owner. TMSF 
promulgated the sale protocol and Ciner Media Group shrunk considerably. In 2008, 
TMSF approved Ahmet Çalık’s bid for ATV-Sabah, setting the sale price at 1.1 billion 
USD.
361
TMSF President Ahmet Ertürk declared his confidence and trust in Ahmet 
Çalık and his capacity to fulfil the payment conditions according to the protocol. Ertürk 
also criticized the Ciner Group for cheating the public fund by committing to a payment 
plan that the Group was unable to follow and at the same time generating advertising 




 In the last round of the public tender for the sale of ATV-Sabah, Çalık was the only 
bidder. It was alleged later that a Qatari investor had contributed 125 million USD to the 
1.1 billion sale total. The allegations of the Qatari involvement were confirmed by Ahmet 
Çalık, who announced after the sale and the cash transfer were completed that the Qatar 
Investment Authority’s Al Wasaeel International Media Company was a junior partner in 
the bid. The main opposition party, CHP, raised serious objections to the sale, based on the 
fact that Çalık Holding announced the name and share of the junior partner after the tender, 
not before as the law dictates. RTUK concurred with CHP’s legal objection. CHP opposed 
the sale also on political grounds because PM Erdoğan’s son-in-law Berat Albayrak 
manages Çalık Group and Berat’s brother was appointed as the CEO of the company set up 
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to take over Sabah-ATV.
 363
 The misconduct in the public tender was overlooked by TMSF 
and the involvement of family members of the Prime Minister raises the likelihood of 
political motivations behind Çalık’s successful bid to take over these media houses. 
A high level executive from the Competition Authority declared that the allegations of the 
government’s manipulation of the Sabah-ATV sale were not based on facts. He announced 
that CA’s investigation of the public tender showed no sign of fraud or political 
manipulation. Samanyolu Broadcasting Group Chairman, Hidayet Karaca testified that as 
the chair of Television Broadcasters Association (Televizyon Yayıncıları Derneği, TVYD), 
he had been a part of the negotiations for the sale between domestic and foreign bidders 
and had not seen any evidence to prove that the government preferred one bidder against 
the others. Conversely, Nuri Çolakoğlu, acknowledged that political involvement in large-
scale transactions in the media sector is quite common to Turkey as well as to other major 
media markets around the world. He implied that though AKP did not directly favour or 
oppose any particular proposal in the public tenders for media companies, political 
involvement was manifested indirectly. He gave examples from his experiences in setting 
up TV channels in central and eastern European markets to show that whereas Romanian 
government removed the legal and administrative obstacles for foreign companies 
investing in the Romanian media market, Polish government delayed the entry of foreign 
companies through a number of legal and administrative mechanisms. Ferhat Boratav 
pointed out that the Sabah-ATV sale was not well received by the Turkish public opinion 
and that even if the legal basis for the sale was sound, the public did not perceive the sale 
as an apolitical and objective exercise.
364
   
 From the perspective of Islamic business associations, Çalık has been a great 
promoter of their business interests, not only in media but also in the energy, banking and 
other industrial sectors at home and in countries like Iraq, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan 
where TUSKON is very invested.
365
 One of Turkey’s top 100 billionaires, Ahmet Çalık, 
and Çalık Group executives have been active in many foreign trade summits organized by 
TUSKON and TUSKON President Rızanur Meral praised the entrepreneurial spirit and 
business success of Ahmet Çalık. Çalık also engages in a collaborative working 
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relationship with MUSIAD, hosting commercial and social visits with the business 
association’s top leadership. Neither TUSKON nor MUSIAD criticized the Sabah-ATV 
sale. These organizations did not comment on the Newscorp bid to purchase Sabah-ATV 
from Çalık in 2012,366 nor did they provide their insights on the slow decline in the 
advertising revenue generated by the flagship ATV that same year.
367
 Publicly, Islamic 
business organizations stood behind Çalık’s media establishment. 
The case of Doğan Media Group 
Pluralism is further circumvented in Turkey’s oligopolistic media market by 
informal obstacles to market competition, which are set by the major market players. 
Just as global media corporations dampen the chances of smaller, independent media 
organizations to survive and to build up a sufficient following, Turkey’s media 
conglomerates hamper independent televisions, radio channels, newspapers and other 
conventional media outlets to flourish.
368
 Media conglomerates engage in a close 
commercial relationship with advertisers, large industrial and services corporations in 
Turkey, thereby concentrating the mahjority of the total advertising revenue in a handful 
of TV channels and other media.  
Media sector’s strength and total worth may be measured to a great extent based 
on the total advertising revenue that media companies generate, according to political 
economists and scholars of media and communications in Turkey. However, as Can 
Bilgili warns, media companies and advertisers do not reveal the net advertising sales. 
RTÜK, which is technically authorized to collect information from all media 
companies, and Rekabet Kurumu, with a mandate to regulate competition in all sectors 
including the media sector, were either unable or unwilling to generate and make 
publicly available advertising sales revenues of media companies. Ferhat Boratav, an 
experienced media analyst and former editor of CNNTurk, argues that making the 
volume and net total of advertising revenue in TL and the net ad sales of each media 
outlet or medium publicly available, will hinder free competition in a sector populated 
by domestic and foreign companies.  
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Judging from the distribution of total advertising revenue between 2008 and 
2013, as shown in Figure 2, the largest commercial media group in Turkey is the Doğan 
Group. Aydın Doğan has weathered many storms in the 2000s to maintain the media 
division of his Group’s leading position in the sector.  
Doğan Group’s relationship with Erdoğan’s AKP has either been cooperative or 
confrontational. Putting political pressue on media company owners has been a tactic 
that PM ErDoğan employed effectively since his confrontation with Cem Uzan and the 
Uzan family in 2007, which ended with the legal and political decline of Cem Uzan.
369
 
Erdoğan’s animosity towards the Doğan Media Group began in 2008, when the Group’s 
flagship newspaper Hürriyet reported the details of financial fraud in an international 
charity, Deniz Feneri and its affiliate in Germany. The charity had collected donations 
from Turkey’s Muslim immigrants in Europe and Turkey’s Muslims and had then 
channelled the donations to undisclosed and corrupt activities. Doğan Group media 
published allegations that some of the donations were used to fund AKP activities. 
Erdoğan solemnly denied these allegations and accused Doğan Media companies of 
fraudulent and unethical reporting, calling on AKP supporters to boycott Doğan Group 
newspapers and TV channels.  
The government also used other discursive tools to control the media, the most common 
being the portrayal of Doğan Media and other similar groups as rich, snobbish, high class 
and bourgeoisie. The group’s response to these tools has been to change its stance from 
gatekeeping to priming; that is, presenting a flood of negative portrayals of the government 
through all its media channels.
370 
 The confrontation between Doğan Media Group and the AKP peaked as the 
government pushed for a tax fine on the Doğan Group in 2009. Fined for billions of 
dollars, Aydın Doğan responded by pulling out of sectors where he had to engage in direct 
dealings with the government, i.e. oil and energy, and by firing public opinion leaders and 
journalists that had attracted Erdoğan’s scrunity by their fiery anti-AKP 
statements.
371Although Doğan Holding attempted to sell its media business to interested 
foreign buyers, the tax authorities stopped the sale on the grounds of tax irregularities.  
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When the Doğan Group received the punitive tax fine, Aydın Doğan’s daughter Arzuhan 
Doğan Yalçındağ was the Chair of TUSIAD. She served as Chairperson between 2007 and 
2010. Looking back on her term, Doğan-Yalçındağ commented n 2010 that she was 
surprised to receive the criticism she did for her silence over the government’s targeting of 
Doğan Group. She confessed that she strategically remained neutral on the Doğan Group 
tax fine issue as TUSIAD Chair because she did not want to burden the business 
association with a potential political debate. She added, however, that she had endured the 
most taxing time of her career and that her vice chair, Mustafa Koç of the Koç Holding 
helped her through the difficulties she faced during her term. Her defense reflects two 
importans truths about secular business community’s reaction to political pressure from 
Erdoğan on secular businesses: TUSIAD almost always maintains a safe distance from 
heavily charged political debates since the emboldening of Erdoğan after the 2007 
elections and though silent and understates, secular business community nevertheless 
stands in solidarity against political interference into the free market. 
Doğan remained in the media sector and made concessions to survive and to 
maintain its market advantage. Most recently, Aydın Doğan – now Chairman Emeritus of 
the Doğan Group - announced the Doğan Media Group’s renewed ethical code in early 
2013.
372
 This announcement followed Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s lunch with media owners 
where the Prime Minister pleaded for more responsible and compassionate reporting of the 
renewed round of peace talks between PKK leadership and the Turkish government.  
The case of the privatization of Türk Telekom 
The Turkish telecom operator, Türk Telekom A.Ş. (TTAŞ), was privatized in 
2005 after many years of political wrangling between the Ministry of Transport, the 
Privatization Authority, and MPS and government ministers, who were either opposed 
to or in favor of the privatization of the public telecom company. TTAŞ public tender 
process and its current ownership structure present a third and final case of the way in 
which an Islamic business community providing support to and supported by the AKP 
assumed a key role in the media market and policies. 
TTAŞ’s privatization was a political matter, not least because it was a major 
public employer.  
Auriol (2005) argues that privatization of telecoms leads to a substantial reduction in 
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employment and real output (by and large, the decrease in the latter effect is dominated by 
the former, which leads to an increase in labor productivity), as well as a price increase.
373
  
Thus, the governments that sought to privatize the public telecommunications monopoly 
faced the risk of poor performance and a reduction in profits. Controlling the 
telecommunications infrastructure, the privatized Turk Telekom also ran the risk of cutting 
back on infrastructure development if it faced financial difficulties. For the AKP 
especially, getting the best and most financially sound proposal for the sale of the 55% 
majority share of TTAŞ was a key performance indicator. The AKP was obliged to 
respond to privatization pressures from international organizations, the EU, the WTO, the 
World Bank, and also to domestic pressures from Turkey’s business community. 
The Telecommunications giant’s sale was a matter that concerns the highest level of 
Turkey’s business elites and hence, long serving TOBB Chairman and DEİK Chairman 
Rifat Hisarciklioglu was closely involved in informing the public debate on the 
privatization of TTAŞ. Before the sale materialized in 2005, Hisarcıklıoğlu was quoted to 
have supported a hasty resolution to the public bidding for Turk Telekom. He added that 
the Turkish government ought to have guaranteed a competitive and transparent bidding 
process.
374
 Shortly after his statement at a MUSIAD Summit, Hisarcıklıoğlu’s prophecy 
came true: Oger Telecoms Group (Oger Italia and Saudi Oger, with BT Group PLC) outbid 
the other other entrants of the public tender for the majority share of Turk Telekom on 25 
July 2005.
375
 MUSIAD advocated for the sale of the TTAŞ by a clear, transparent process 
that would not lead to the transfer of a public monopoly to a future private monopoly. 
MUSIAD President Ömer Bolat warned against the salvaging of ‘national values for the 
sake of private gains’, meaning the telecommuniations giant ought not to be given away to 
foreign buyers for a price below its real value.
376
 This meant that MUSIAD expected a 
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proportion of Türk Telekom’s shares to be offered to the public, after its majority sale was 
realized.
377
 Türk Telekom was made public in two successive rounds, as MUSIAD 
proposed. 
On the other hand, Carlyle Group
378
 and its Turkish partner, Koç Holding, were 
one of the three losers of the public tender for Türk Telekom. The telecom company, 
thirteen largest in the world,
379
 would have made a lucrative investment for Carlyle and 
Koç but the Koç family’s obvious objections to the AKP and to the consolidation of 
political Islam in Turkey would not have made this group an excellent choice to take 
over the majority share of Turkey’s main communications infrastructure. Although 
Mustafa Koç gave several public statements in early 2005 on TUSIAD events, declaring 
his holding company’s interest in purchasing the majority share of TTAŞ, Koç and 
TUSIAD did not offer any comments on the finalization of the sale in late 2005.  
Since its privatization, TTAŞ and its subsidiary TTNet cater to the majority of 
the Turkish market for telecommunications and internet. TTNet alone boasts of over 
80% of the market share in 2010.
380
 Moreover, TTAŞ monopolizes the communications 
infrastructure and disables the fast expansion of competitors in new communications 
technologies. For instance, operators competing with the Turk Telekom to offer xDSL 
connections depend on bitstream services. Finally, Turk Telekom offers the fastest 
connections and downloads of more than 100 MBps to rule out competition from other 
service providers that lack the technical infrastructure and the access to policymakers 
that TT enjoys.
381
 In short, TTAŞ bore elements of a private monopoly, which 
MUSIAD cautioned against. 
At the same time however, the corporatist institutions in Turkey’s media 
landscape closely monitored and regulated the commercial behaviour of TTAŞ, seeking 
to tame this giant media company if needed. The Telecommunications Authority (TA) 
was set up two days before the sale of TTAŞ was finalized, on 23 July 2005. It was a 
semi-civilian corporatist council that set representatives from the Central Intelligence 
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Agency (MIT), the gendarmerie, and the national police. The TA is mandated to surveil, 
audit and investigate the commercial players in the communications sector, and to start 
disciplinary and legal action against companies that breached the commercial and 
security protocols.
382
  The TA dealt and continues to deal with wholesale broadband 
transactions of communications companies however it does not exercise its regulatory 
powers over the retail broadband market, which is overseen by the Competition 
Authority (Rekabet Kurumu). The jurisdictional areas of TA and CA are not clearly laid 
out in the relevant law, and hence both councils have taken action in cases regarding 
TTAŞ.383 
The privatization of Türk Telekom is a success for the AKP and for the Hariri 
family of the Oger Group. TTAŞ remains the market leader and has the advantage of 
being recognized a former public company, with the benefits of unlimited access to the 
realm of politics and to consumers everywhere. TTAŞ towers over a media sector that 
continues to be associated with Erdoğan and his powerful hold over this sector. 
Conclusion 
Turkey’s media sector demonstrates with surprising clarity the transformation of 
the power structures and powerholders since end-1990s. Activist and jailed journalist, 
Ahmet Şık defined the media sector as the only public face of powerholders in 
Turkey.
384
 The Turkish state, which was once the most defining source of power over 
and in Turkey’s media, maintained its corporatist machinery to govern and regulate 
media policies however the patronage networks that were once held by a secularist state 
elite dissolved. ‘What defines Turkey’s media sector today is the extent of influence that 
patronage networks enjoy, not the boundaries of the state.’ In other words, Turkey’s 
Muslim conservative business community established a formidable presence in 
Turkey’s media sector and an equally powerful bargaining position in media policies by 
engaging closely with the AKP leadership. The AKP, in turn, tamed media 
conglomerates by several judicial and administrative tactics, thereby ensuring their 
compliance with the party’s hold over media policymaking and absolute sovereignty.   
Policymaking in media will continue to be shaped by the AKP leadership. The 
discussion in this chapter demonstrated the extent to which AKP followers have 
                                               
382 Telekomünikasyon İletişim Başkanlığı (TİB) http://www.tib.gov.tr/en/  
383 Ibid. Atiyas and Doğan, p.273. 
384
 ‘İnsan Hakları ve Emek Çalıştayı’, TESEV Media and Democratization Project, Istanbul, 2011.  
 181 
infiltrated into the policymaking structures impacting media policies. Media 
conglomerates that engage in close crony relationships with the government, primarily 
Turkuvaz Media Group and most recently Doğuş Media Group, are reaping the benefits 
of political approval by securing broadcasting space on public transportation lines, for 
example. Critical corporatist institutions, such as RTUK and RATEM, are governed by 
AKP partisans. A RTUK Board member, who participated in my fieldwork workshop, 
declared over lunch that he intended to run for office the following year with the AKP. 
RATEM’s chair is Hidayet Karaca, who openly supports the Prime Minister and his 
political vision. Mehmet Atalay, the Chair of the Press Advertising Council, who was 
among the participants of another fieldwork workshop that I organized for 
TESEVserved until 2000 as Erdoğan’s Chief Sports Advisor in the Istanbul Municipal 
Administration and was later made the General Manager of Yeni Şafak, a conservative 
right-wing newspaper.
385
 In short, Turkey’s media sector is gradually moving towards a 
full press-party alignment, assisted by the leadership of media associations. 
Three emerging trends will determine media policies in the short-to-mid term in 
Turkey: The global shift from conventional to new media; the citizens’ resistance 
movements in Turkey against the political and economic pressures on the media sector; 
and the continuation or possible end of Turkey’s bid for EU membership, which will 
affect legal and administrative reforms in the media sector. Turkey’s media sector has 
been acclimated to the dawn of new media through the fast adoption of technological 
equipment, i.e. smart phones, tablets, and broadband television, by consumers. 
However, the communications infrastructure needs to be developed, along with 
pertinent legislation on the business and consumption of new media. In 2013, several 
thousands of citizens organized via social media to protest against various local and 
national policies of the AKP. These movements prompted the government to search for 
technological and legal barriers to the free exchange of information and messages via 
new media tools. The tug of war between the government and the representatives of an 
internet and social media savvy Y generation and underground networks of hackers will 
shape the future of political debate in Turkey. Finally, Turkey’s relationship with the 
EU soured towards the end of 2000s. The media policy reforms that were driven by 
Turkey’s alignment with the EU Acquis are likely to slow down to a halt if either 
Turkey or the EU decides to leave the accession process.  
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Chapter 6: Gender policies  
Gender policies in Turkey refer to social policies and programs targeting women 
and girls, particularly economically disadvantaged women, single, divorced or widowed 
mothers, illiterate women, ethnic-minority women and wives of veterans and martyrs. 
As of June 2011, the AKP government administers gender policies via the Ministry of 
Family and Social Policies, responsible for enacting positive discrimination policies for 
the above-referenced categories of women and children. This chapter will address two 
specific issues on which Islamic and secular business associations delivered public 
statements and engaged with the government to try and shape gender policies: The 
headscarf issue
386
 and healthcare policies in maternity, child birth and abortion. These 
two policies are selected because they are directly linked to women’s entry into and 
retention in Turkey’s job markets, a policy agenda that the AKP government and all 
business interest groups have announced an interest in pursuing. I argue that two 
opposite trends shape gender policies in Turkey: perpetuating traditional and 
conservative gender roles whilst at the same time advancing freedom, equality and 
liberalism for women.  
There are two reasons why gender policies matter to the debate on whether 
Islamic business community is a dominant force in Turkey’s policymaking. On the one 
hand, the secular and the Islamic business cultures offer different conceptions of women 
in social and economic life and therefore their respective positions vis a vis women’s 
employment, for instance, show how each business interest group conceives Islamic 
culture and lifestyles. On the other hand, all businesses in Turkey will benefit from the 
insertion of more skilled women in the workforce because of the potentially positive 
impact that higher levels of women’s employment have on income levels.387 In addition, 
employing more women in leadership roles increases the profitability of companies.
388
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Aligned with international and EU-level policy priorities to empower girls and women 
economically, policies to promote gender equality in Turkey are designed to attract and 
retain more women into the domestic job market.  
The headscarf issue 
The headscarf issue or problem refers to the ban in public and private 
institutions and the public sphere on women wearing a veil, burqa or any other form of 
religious head covering or attire. This prohibition applied to young girls and women 
who were stopped at the gates of public high schools and public and private universities 
across Turkey by security personnel, asked to remove their headscarves or barred from 
entering campuses and classrooms. Mainstream analyses on the headscarf ban in Turkey 
concentrate on the prohibition of the religious headscarf on university campuses and 
base their arguments on the right to access education. However, pro-bono work and 
legal analysis carried out by Fatma Benli, several reports by the Association of 
Women’s Rights Against Discrimination (Ayrımcılığa Karşı Kadın Hakları Derneği, 
AK-DER) and Human Rights Research Association (İnsan Hakları Araştırmaları 
Derneği, İHAD) demonstrate the many different instances of discrimination against 
headscarved women, in exercising their political and social rights, freedom of assembly 
and freedom of speech. Furthermore, Fatma Benli asserts that the multiple instances of 
right abuses committed against headscarved women had no legal or constitutional 
basis.
389
 Cindoğlu and Ilhan find that public sector companies and public or semi-public 
institutions, such as vocational associations, chambers, etc, discriminate against 
headscarved women in their recruitment policies, often without needing to present a 
legal basis.
390
 Genç and Ilhan argue therefore that the headscarf ban is much more 
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Indeed, Muslim women and men provide horrifying accounts of the abuses they 
had to endure from public servants, prosecutors, judges, media and public intellectuals 
and the private sector. One woman in a group interview in Ankara confessed that she 
had shaven her head completely for work one day, to protest against the decision of the 
public school, where she had taught for many years as a headscarved teacher, to 
suddenly expel her. A pharmacist from Istanbul talked about the mobbing she was 
subjected to at a public (SSK) hospital, where she attempted to put her pharmacy degree 
to use by working as a nurse. But after the ban was put into effect in 1998, the hospital 
dean who hired her told her to take off her headscarf if she wished to keep her job.
392
 
One male interviewee in Istanbul and another male participant of a group interview in 
Ankara allege that Koç Group companies refrain from hiring headscarved women.393 
Other interviewees assert that all large corporations discriminate against headscarved 
candidates in their recruitment. CVs bearing photos of headscarved candidates are 
turned down automatically at the very beginning of the recruitment process. CVs 
bearing no photos were evaluated and headscarved candidates called for interviews in 
the corporate companies were turned down for reasons undisclosed or for excuses such 
as the candidates’ lack of potential or experience, etc.394 In any case, a headscarved 
candidate may and does feel discriminated against because of her headscarf in a 
corporate world that she believes is fundamentally opposed to her religious identity. 
Finally, although the interviewees did not identify the discrimination they faced along 
the lines of social class, they were all attempting to fill professional positions in a 
competitive, middle class, corporate world. It was, therefore, possible for the recruiters 
to have exercised religious and social prejudices against headscarved women.  
Men understand the challenges that headscarved women faced before and during 
the 28 February process as a traumatic episode in which a hostile state and its 
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 Group interview with headscarved women professionals, 26 March 2010, Ankara. 
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representatives, bureaucrats, public servants, media, harass Muslim women. In this 
conceptualization, the headscarved woman is the perpetual victim and does not have a 
voice in the unequal relationship of an oppressor state and an oppressed Muslim. This is 
clear in for instance the account of a man from an Ankara workshop about the encounter 
that his wife had with most likely a public investigator from Ministry of National 
Education in Trabzon. The investigator suggested that the wife, a teacher in a public 
school, ought to resign because she is unfit to act as a teacher. In addition, the same 
participant conveys that his community and classmates who were involved as he was in 
student movements to promote Islamism in Turkey believed that teaching was suitable 
profession for women because it was not physically demanding and that women were 
better with children/students. Therefore, the assertion made by a state official that a 
headscarved woman cannot and should not teach is as absolute and presumptuous as the 
assertion made by the headscarved woman's husband that his wife and other women are 
naturally inclined to teach.  
Moreover, businessmen and male professionals approach the prohibition of the 
headscarf in Turkey as a rights and liberties issue.  ‘I expect others to tolerate my wife's 
headscarf as I tolerate the way that some men wear their hair long... I did not offend 
anyone who wore the communist-style green parkas in the early 1980s,’ exclaimed a 
participant who attended one of the fieldwork workshops in Ankara.
395 
Salim Uslu, the 
former chair of HAK-IS labour union and Ahmet Gundogdu the chair of Turkey’s 
largest public sector employees’ union, MEMUR-SEN lamented the 28 February 
process as a time when the direst abuses of the rights of Turkey’s Muslims were 
recorded due to the headscarf ban. The culprit in the troubled history of human rights 
abuses caused by the headscarf ban is therefore, the Turkish state. Whoever was holding 
public office at the time of the application of the headscarf ban is believed to be 
personally responsible in a collective act of rights violations against women and their 
families.  
Hence, coming to terms with the 28 February regime via due process and by 
reversing the discrimination seems like the logical next step for a political party that 
plans to replace secular authoritarianism with a moderate Muslim democracy. However, 
the AKP and the Muslim conservative business community did not take significant 
steps towards resolving the headscarf ban legally, institutionally and culturally across 
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institutions and the public. Even as late as 2010 when the AKP, then in its second term 
in office, some public servants were still acting on behalf of an imaginary secular 
authoritarian state to impose the headscarf ban. One participant alleged that the Dean of 
Kırıkkale University, a devout man who supports the freedom to practice Islam in 
public and in private spheres, still hesitates to lift real and imagined barriers for 
headscarved students on campus.  
So, why did the headscarf ban persist and what role did the corporatist 
structures, erected by the Turkish state, in sustaining the discrimination against 
headscarved women in private and public sector companies and institutions? The first 
and most immediate answer lies in the Muslim men’s imagination of ‘their women’. A 
group interview in MUSIAD reveals significant insights into the way empowered 
women evaluate the society’s gaze on their piety and their choice of wearing 
headscarves. One participant offers the following statement: 
When you engage in a business interaction wearing a headscarf, you are immediately 
treated as a second or third-rate business contact. Your correspondents behave as if you are 
invisible to them. Headscarves bother secular and devout Muslim people equally. A pious 
old man with a long beard will sneer at a woman in a headscarf driving a car. Honestly, I 
have never seen or heard of a headscarved senior executive, have you? [Author’s own 
translation] 
The stigma against wearing a headscarf and working in a professional 
environment stems from two presuppositions: First, women in headscarves are 
conservative and religious Muslims and hence they belong in their homes. Second, 
women are created by God to assume more docile roles in servitude and motherhood. 
These presuppositions have been cited by practicing Muslim women, who work in 
professional jobs with (and rarely without) their headscarves, as obstacles to equal 
opportunities in Turkey’s job market, and confirmed by Muslim conservative men, 
usually as absolute truths. Men and women often used the word, fıtrat, to mean ‘a 
woman’s nature’ and to justify gender roles, arguably sanctioned by Islam.  
Similarly, in cases when secular Muslim men engage in a business relationship 
with headscarved women, the relationship becomes more complex than ordinary 
business interactions among men, devout or irreligious. In both cases, regardless of the 
strength of the man’s conviction, the headscarved woman is viewed as the symbol of 
virtue and Islamic morality. Therefore, she inspires feelings of shame and frustration in 
her male colleagues or counterparts as they carry out everyday business interactions, 
especially when the occasion calls for drinking alcoholic beverages, venturing into 
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heavy industrial zones or for other activities that are conventionally considered unfit for 
women. A headscarved woman professional or business entrepreneur also deters devout 
Muslim colleagues and business partners for she inevitably violates their imagination of 
a meek, gentle housewife, who ought not to interact with them as their equal. 
Furthermore, when those MUSIAD members, who were headscarved business owners 
of very lucrative companies, I interviewed attempted to get their money’s worth or 
apply the tricks of trade in their everyday business transactions, they are instantly 
accused of stepping over a moral boundary that is expected from all headscarved 
women. One businessman asked Zehra, a PhD holder who runs a successful company in 
carbon emissions offsetting and trading in Istanbul, for a discount on her consultancy 




The second reason why the headscarf ban persisted highlights a fundamental 
problem with the morality codes and practices of Turkey’s devout Muslims. With the 
exception of the Directorate of Religious Affairs, there is not a sharia council or a 
democratically accepted body to govern the moral aspects of everyday business life of 
Muslims in Turkey. In the absence of an independent moral authority that would govern 
everyday business conduct of Muslim women and men, what do headscarved women 
and practicing Muslim men do? For example, headscarved women who were business 
owners and better off financially declared that they positively discriminated against 
headscarved job applicants. To them, this was an act of morality and empathy not 
bestowed upon them by the majority of the society. Some devout and conservative 
headscarved women have refused to shake the hands of male customers or colleagues. A 
few others in the healthcare sector have been treating female patients only.  Most of the 
headscarved professionals in my fieldwork were not comfortable with working in an 
office filled with men or with having to work late with a male colleague so often they 
avoided such work environments.  
Most devout, conservative Muslim men gave similar accounts of their 
understanding of moral and acceptable working conditions for men and women in an 
Islamic society. Some men, assuming that working with an uncovered woman would 
upset their wives, chose to employ headscarved and married secretaries and workers. 
Most men and women employed various strategies to live their professional lives in 
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ways that did not severely violate their personal or group (confessional, tariqat, family, 
regional) moral codes. However, women and men who were employed in a variety of 
sectors, from banking to construction, endured situations where their expectations of 
morality were not met. In practice, then, Muslim women and men discovered almost on 
a daily basis that a pure form of Islamic morality did not exist and that they were to 
negotiate their own terms of morality with their colleagues, customers, community, the 
larger society and of course the Turkish state.  
The absence of a moral guardian that was able to punish misdemeanour allowed 
practising and conservative Muslim businessmen to abuse the headscarf ban by two 
means: (1) urging headscarved women to turn to household chores, child care or NGO 
work to make use of their wives’ university degrees or many talents and (2) employing 
headscarved women for lower wages and under poor working conditions. A testimony 
by a participant of a group interview in Ankara demonstrated the hypocrisy behind 
Muslim business owners’ abuse of headscarved women as a cheap and unemployable 
labour force: 
So, instead of ‘you’re a woman, stay where you are’, it becomes ‘you’re a woman, you’re 
headscarved, so accept the lower wage...’ But if they really cared about religion, they 
would have known what our prophet said –pay the worker before his sweat dries up. From 
that perspective, reducing what she is entitled to just because she is headscarved is a 
violation of her God-given right…397  
Third, the choice to wear a headscarf often is unacknowledged and confused by the 
majority of Turkish society as a provincial habit. A common presumption in Turkey is that 
pious people are middle class or poor and are provincial. The implication of this maxim for 
headscarved women is that men, working in low-ranking positions in the service sector, 
treat headscarved women with exaggerated gestures of kindness and respect. A highly 
acclaimed owner of a publishing house, also an A-list MUSIAD member, remembers a 
doorman suggesting to take her to a doctor as she was entering the doorman’s building, 
barely able to catch her breath. She had been running to make it in time for a meeting but 
the doorman had assumed this helpless headscarved lady had come into the building 
looking for help or medical attention. Another respondent shared a similar experience 
when a young waiter gave her a discount at a luxurious Istanbul restaurant simply because 
she was the hostess for a party of twenty-four guests, twenty-three of which were 
businessmen in dark suits. The waiter was not sure whether to congratulate her for her 
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success as a businesswoman or to save her from the embarrassment of not being able to 
take care of the check at the end of the meal.  
A fourth and final reason that I find beneath the surface of a persistent 
discrimination against headscarved women in Turkey is a culture of patriarchy that is 
embedded in institutional corporatism. To begin with, the patriarchal Turkish state 
perpetuated the headscarf ban on women. Ali Bulaç observed that when the public 
schooling system or the public sector employers discriminate against a particular 
community or group, then the rest of the state organization as a whole pushes that 
particular community out.
398
 Then, the private sector, the society at large and other non-
state actors adopt the state’s discriminatory policies too. Furthermore, even in 
organizations where they would be expected to be hailed as heroines, headscarved 
women are held back from rising to management positions or from accruing power in 
the Muslim conservative community. For example, headscarved businesswomen who 
have joined MUSIAD to build business acumen and networks feel discriminated against 
by the business association. In the group interview with members of the MUSIAD 
Women’s Branch, one respondent claimed that headscarved women are 
underrepresented everywhere, including in MUSIAD. She alleged that although the 
official figure released by the business association of the percentage of women among 
its members is around 10%, the actual number is much lower. She added that the 
business association’s leadership roles are not open to women. None of the other 
participants of the group interview concurred with her, but their silence may have been 
a sign of their agreement with that respondent’s comments.  
None of the top business associations, representing Muslim conservative 
businesspeople, have women leaders or spokespersons. The highest-ranking woman in 
Turkey’s Islamic business associations is Rana Tezcan Açıkgöz, Vice President (VP) of 
the TUSKON Board. Tezcan Açıkgöz is one of the four women on the 42-member 
TUSKON Board and the only woman among nine VPs on the Board. Significantly, 
Tezcan Açıkgöz does not wear a headscarf so her rank in the decision-making hierarchy 
of Turkey’s most effective business confederation does not negate the claim that 
headscarved women face additional barriers to leadership roles. Melike Günyüz, one of 
the respondents on the fieldwork, has since 2012 been appointed to the MUSIAD Board 
and her photo appears next to the 25 Board members on the MUSIAD official website. 
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She has yet to appear publicly to represent the business association, though. During our 
interview with a MUSIAD board member in Istanbul, the respondent bluntly pointed 
out that as a leading Islamic business association, MUSIAD chose not to employ or 
promote headscarved women to avoid the possible confrontation with Turkey’s secular 
state organizations.
399
 By confining their activities to strictly business-oriented ones and 
by trying not to draw attention to their Islamic identity, MUSIAD leadership and 
secretariat secured a safe distance from what the board member called, ‘a 28 February 
legacy’. When asked whether they have placed headscarved women in key management 
positions within their organizations, MUSIAD, TUMSIAD and two labour union 
confederations, MEMURSEN and HAK-IS declared in 2010 that they had not. In the 
offices and headquarters of the various types of associations visited during the TESEV 
project fieldwork and my own PhD fieldwork, there were not any headscarved women 
employed as full time staff, except for maintenance and kitchen staff.  
Peak-level confederations, TOBB, TIM and TISK do not have a history of 
promoting women leaders within their ranks, either. However, TUSIAD has had two 
chairwomen, Arzuhan Doğan Yalçındağ (2007-2010) and Ümit Boyner (2010-2013). 
Boyner was particularly vocal about women’s rights and lifting the gender gap in the 
labour market before and during her term as TUSIAD Chair. The examples of Doğan 
Yalçındağ and Boyner at TUSIAD’s helm further testify to the claim made by the 
respondent, quoted above, that some business associations choose to disqualify women 
from the leadership game while others choose not to. It is questionable, though, whether 
TUSIAD general assembly would ever elect a headscarved woman as the chair of this 
traditionally secular association. 
Other organized interest groups and associations discriminate against 
headscarved women, too. Chambers and vocational associations, mandated to grant 
licenses to holders of certain professions such as journalism, pharmaceuticals, dentistry 
and medicine, violate the rights of headscarved women, who apply to these 
organizations for membership or other services. Dilek Cindoğlu’s report for TESEV 
demonstrated several cases where journalists and pharmacists were allegedly 
discriminated against by the Press Council (Basın Konseyi) and the Turkish 
Pharmacists’ Association (Türk Eczacılar Birliği), respectively. In the cases featured in 
the TESEV Report, a headscarved journalist alleged the Press Council of denying to 
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issue press cards (licenses) denied to headscarved women who refused to submit photos 
on which they had no head covering. The Pharmacists’ Association was charged with 
the allegation that its officials conducted frequent and very thorough on-site visits to 
pharmacies, owned and run by headscarved women, to check for ethical violations. 
Both associations, which are mandated to govern the ethical conduct and licensing 
activities in their respective sectors, have semi-public statuses and are therefore able to 
sanction journalists and pharmacists for their actions. Both organizations were believed 
to be Republican and secular and therefore sought to keep headscarved women, a threat 
to the secular identity of the regime, in check. The third Turkey-wide association that 
was alleged to abuse its public authority to coerce headscarved women professionals 
was the Union of Turkish Bar Associations (Türkiye Barolar Birliği). The Union and its 
member bar associations in cities determine whether or not headscarved lawyers may or 
may not sit their bar examinations, submit their photographs to register as lawyers in 
their chosen district’s bar, and operate with legal licenses in private practices of as part 
of law offices. The report found that headscarved lawyers, who were not allowed in 
courthouses due to the headscarf ban, were further discriminated against bar 
associations in major cities like Istanbul and Ankara and were obliged to complete their 
compulsory legal apprenticeship and obtain their license through bar associations in 
Konya or other cities where the ban is barely applied.
400
 
Overall, Islamic business community’s interests did not lie in protecting the 
rights of headscarved women by standing against the abuses conducted by corporatist 
organizations governing the private and public sector jobs. Though vocal about the 
pains suffered by the devout Muslim women of Turkey, Islamic business associations 
were nevertheless not the pioneers of a social and economic transformation that would 
have allowed headscarved women to participate in the labour market freely and equally 
and to assume leadership roles in the management of business associations. It is this 
hypocrisy that prompted headscarved women professionals and intellectuals to develop 
a bold and inspiring culture of criticism towards the lifestyles, morals and choices of 
Turkey’s Islamic bourgeoisie. Elements of this critical culture were visible in the novels 
and non-fiction articles and books, authored by headscarved women intellectuals such 
as Fatma Barbarosoğlu, Nazan Bekiroğlu, Yıldız Ramazanoğlu and Cihan Aktaş, in the 
form of inquisitive female characters that challenged the convenience with which 
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devout and conservative Muslim men adapted to social mobility and nouveau riche 
lifestyles. Devout and conscientious Muslim women, on the other hand, did not so 
readily accept the morals and culture of capitalism and the perseverance of gender roles 
in the bourgeois brand of Islam.
401
Similarly, headscarved women who had actively 
engaged in politics via the AKP, such as Fatma Bostan Ünsal, did not excuse the AKP 
for its decade-long delay in forwarding headscarved party members as candidates for 
MP and local office in elections.
402
 The critical voices of headscarved women transmit a 
unified message of discontent with the male-dominated business and politics of 
Turkey’s Islamic bourgeoisie. 
Social policies on maternity, childbirth and abortion 
Women’s health seems unrelated to business interest mediation at first. 
However, public debates on maternity, childbirth and abortion and AKP’s policy 
formulations to address these health issues attract criticism or approval from different 
actors within the business community, a clear sign of the business community’s 
involvement in these social policies. AKP is very politically invested in keeping an 
excellent record of women and children’s healthcare and a strong bond exists between 
the government’s and the Islamic business associations’ ambitions in healthcare 
provision. Turkey’s healthcare performance improved dramatically in the first two 
terms of AKP rule, particularly for girls and women. The AKP built state-of-the-art 
public healthcare institutions and its aggressive social welfare programs or reforms, 
particularly the program to offer free healthcare to the poor via the Green Card Scheme, 
were referenced to explain the party’s success in the 2007 and 2011 general elections.403 
The AKP’s successfully provided better healthcare and improved children’s access to 
pre-school and primary education. Turkey’s healthcare spending rose to 6.7% of GDP404 
in 2009 and the downward trend in the under-5 mortality rate picked up in the past 10 
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years, bringing Turkey’s figure very close to European average.405 The government 
performed exceptionally well in reducing maternal mortality levels from 70 out of 
100,000 births in 2000 down to 19 out of 100,000 by end 2009.406 
Nonetheless, compared to most European and some developing countries, 
Turkey still underperforms in crucial areas of universal healthcare, such as 
contraceptive use and infant mortality. Results of the Turkish Demographic Health 
Survey from 2003 show how men and women have negative attitudes towards using 
modern contraceptive methods: ‘Only one third of ever-married women aged 15 to 49 
resorts to a modern method.’407 Turkey’s conservative, traditional and devout 
communities perceive birth control methods and contraception as undesirable and even 
blasphemous. AKP leadership has also openly advocated against birth control, feeding 
their supporters’ doubts about the medical benefits of contraception.408 Turkey still 
ranks far lower than most OECD countries in infant mortality: thirteen out of every 
1000 children die before they turn one. Furthermore, only 68% of Turkey’s adults report 
to being in good health. Finally, despite a 6.3% average annual increase in health 
expenditure per capita in real terms, total public healthcare coverage remains at 80%, 
which is well below most European and OECD countries.409 
Two broader trends in social policy have affected the specific health policy issue 
of maternal and infant/child health that I focus on here: The AKP was bound to comply 
with international healthcare standards for the sake of maintaining a good reputation 
internationally and for being on track with its liberal and democratic reform agenda. 
Furthermore, arguably most if not all of the AKP’s social welfare programs, including 
the Green Card Scheme, child protection services and the World Bank-backed 
conditional cash transfer programs, were designed to reduce the role of the state in 
social protection.  
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[W]ith its firm belief in the unregulated market economy as well as with its socially 
conservative outlook, the [AKP] government seemed to be more inclined to prefer 
traditional forms of solidarity to redistributive social policy.410  
In other words, the AKP’s social policy reforms served to delegate some of the 
roles that ought to be performed by the state to families, charities, religious foundations 
and philanthropists.
411
 Also, social welfare transfers were not as effective as they ought 
to have been. Based on 2008 data, social welfare transfers fail to reach almost 30% of 
Turkey’s poor, which is about 1 million people working in informal sectors.412 At the 
same time and as a result of a second broad trend in AKP social policy vision, maternal 
and child healthcare policies reflected the government’s understanding of traditional 
gender roles and conservative family values. One of the ways in which healthcare 
policies were corrected was by introducing a universal system of ‘family clinics’ and 
‘family GPs’.413 Even in its formulation, family clinics and appointing healthcare 
professionals to families reflects the tendency of the AKP to reduce women’s health to a 
family issue, as previous governments have done.  Therefore, the state would delegate 
its social welfare roles to organizations that share the ruling party’s conservative and 
religious outlook.  
Erdoğan and his party’s socially divisive policy positions on maternity and 
childbirth were difficult issues for the Islamic business community and its interest 
groups to publicly support. On the one hand, Islamic capitalists have branched into the 
healthcare sector with groundbreaking profits incurred by businessmen, like Ethem 
Sancak of the Hedef Group (pharmaceuticals)
414
 and the Medical Park Hospitals Group 
(hospitals and clinics).
415
 In 2005, a change in legislation allowed for the forming of 
public private partnerships (PPP) to build public hospitals.  
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Adding an item to the Health Services Basic Law NO 5396 in 2005 makes the first 
concrete PPP arrangement. According to the item, if the Supreme Planning Council decides 
to health facilities build on treasury lands by the private sector can be leased, and all of the 
services other than medical services can be provided by the private sector. It is a PPP 
model and is called the Build-Lease-Transfer and has come into affect in July 2006.
416
     
The favourable legal conditions brought to fruition the key pillar of AKP’s 
healthcare reform for the planning years of 2011 and onwards: the building of large-
scale health care facilities that would convert Turkey’s developing cities into ‘Health 
Cities’. Based on a policy map developed by the Supreme Planning Council (Yüksek 
Planlama Kurulu)
417
, the Ministry of Health oversees the commission of private sector 
companies to build before the end of 2014 over ten new ‘City Hospitals’ in Ankara, 
Izmir, Adana, Yozgat, Manisa, Konya and other cities to cater to over 25,000 new 
patients.
418
 Although the main opposition party, CHP attacked the PPP bid in healthcare 
on the grounds that the government rigs (or intends to) public tenders in order to assign 
contracts to private sector companies that support the AKP, the building sites had 
already been opened. The City Hospitals’ potential detriment to the future of 
welfare/social policies in Turkey is that they fuel the aggressive privatization of 
healthcare, in my view. Some fear that the retreat of the state would inevitably erode the 
ability of larger sections of Turkey’s society to access free and universal healthcare.419 
Others fear that PPPs will enrich Turkey’s Islamic capitalists to the extent that they will 
claim full ownership of the country’s healthcare sector.420 In any case, a potentially 
wider Islamic capitalist presence in the healthcare sector will prompt Islamic business 
associations and their members to publicly back ErDoğan’s conservative policy stance 
on maternity, childbirth and abortion.  
In February 2012, TUMSIAD’s General Assembly meeting featured a keynote 
speech by the long-serving Health Minister, Recep Akdağ, who presented the business 
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case for the government’s plans to finance city hospitals in the next couple of years. 
Akdağ forecasts significant profits for those companies that cooperated with the 
government to modernize Turkey’s healthcare facilities by end 2015.421 A public 
procurement process of the scale that Akdağ referred to would attract any investor, most 
primarily companies that are in construction and building products. Emrah Göker422 
explains that most of the MUSIAD and TUSKON presidents and board members have 
construction and building products companies.
423
 Hence, Islamic business associations 
have the capacity and the immediate business interests to engage in a close working 
relationship with the government and thereby to back the government’s policy vision on 
nurturing healthy families. 
Another implication for state-business relations of the AKP’s ‘family-centred’ 
social policy line is explored by anthropologist Berna Yazıcı, who points out that the 
1980 junta regime created a system wherein the state nurtured the next generation in 
Turkey by providing for children-in-need in public housing and care facilities. This 
system established a corporatist structure to govern the services that single and poor 
mothers and orphans and children-in-need would receive.
424
 This changed with the 
neoliberal globalization of Turkey’s social policy landscape in 2000s and the AKP’s 
moves to further privatize the healthcare sector replaced the state-controlled system of 
maternal and child care with a mixed model, where certain state functions are delegated 
to private or non-profit organizations. Therefore, similar to the proliferation of after-
school tutoring centres (dershanes) and private education institutions operated by 
religious confessional networks; there will be multiple sponsors or benefactors to the 
provision of medicine and care to mothers, children and ‘families’. These sponsors are 
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likely to propagate the same broad ideal that state-centric social welfare models of 
1980s held as sacred, parents nurturing a generation of children to serve the ‘Nation’, 
however the allegiance constructed in return for the care provided would not be to a 
‘State’ but to a number of possible organizations.  
C-section versus natural birth was another policy debate that began with PM 
Erdoğan’s pledge to severely limit the frequency of C-sections performed in public and 
private hospitals and that engaged Turkey’s public opinion for many months in 2012. 
The international medical community is divided between advocates of C-sections as 
procedures, which decrease complications and mortality during birth, and proponents of 
natural births, which does not contain the risk of post-surgical complications and ease 
mothers’ transition from delivery to nursing. Maternal and child mortality rates 
decreased due to several incremental measures or policy changes that the AKP 
government implemented, based on programs advised and partially funded by 
international organizations, i.e. the UNDP, World Health Organization and EU. A study 
conducted in 2000 in Turkey reveals that around 60% of mothers that delivered their 
babies via a C-section procedure felt anger, fear or frustration about their delivery 
method.
425
 A more recent study in 2013 offered a radical increase in the rate of C-
sections performed in Turkey in public and private hospitals from 7% in 1993 to 45% in 
2010. The World Health Organization recommends developed and developing countries 
to limit C-sections to only 10-15% of all births in a year.
426
  These findings confirm 
some of the medical reasons that the Minister of Health and the Minister of Family and 
Social Policies gave to support PM Erdoğan’s plans to prohibit or severely limit C-
sections. However, cause for public criticism of the AKP’s offensive on C-sections 
emerged not due to the medical arguments they offered by due to the ethical 
implications of using public authority to restrict women’s choices of delivery.  
That the government’s references to a possible C-section ban were almost 
always given in conjunction to the anti-abortion debate shows how the potential public 
healthcare benefit of promoting natural births may at best be a tertiary consideration for 
Erdoğan and his aides. International medical organizations recommend the medical 
practitioners to consult with mother-to-be to determine the delivery method. From a 
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women’s right perspective, the way a mother chooses to bring her child to earth rests on 
her informed decision.
427
 However, Erdoğan’s statements inspire anger and frustration 
in Turkey’s women’s movement and rights-based organizations for the PM’s disregard 
for the women’s right to choose the terms of their pregnancy, delivery, nursing and 
motherhood freely.  
During the fieldwork for the TESEV headscarf report with Dilek Cindoğlu and 
my own fieldwork in Istanbul, Ankara, Konya and Gaziantep, devout and conservative 
Muslim men and women declared that they had at least two children. They were quite 
content with being parents and committed to teaching their children to follow Islam 
faithfully and methodologically. I deduce therefore that practising Muslims, especially 
women, in Turkey are quite sensitive about procreation and parenting. Having said that, 
I also sense that tradition dictates married couples to produce multiple children, to carry 
the male bloodline and to prove their union fertile and sacred. Healthcare programs to 
complicate delivery (possibly through C-sections) and to prevent or delay pregnancy 
through the use of contraceptives are not well received by a society that considers 
childbirth and procreation as integral parts of faith and tradition and hence there is a 
very tedious relationship between healthcare policymakers and their constituents. It is 
not surprising then that AKP configures its healthcare policy reforms by transmitting 
political and cultural messages to its voters and to an elite that it has helped build. In 
response, TOBB, TIM, TUSKON and other smaller Islamic business associations did 
not dwell on the AKP leadership’s plans to limit or ban C-sections. By comparison, 
TUSIAD’s leadership framed arguments against the AKP leadership’s disregard for 
women’s right to choose and for the medical community’s responses in defence of C-
sections. 
This tenuous relationship becomes even shakier when a globally disputed issue, 
such as abortion, is concerned. Like many of its siblings in other Western and non-
Western countries, a religiously-motivated and conservative AKP not only defended the 
right of an early human being to life but also condemned the termination of life by a 
mere mortal, whatever the motivation may be to choose adoption, as an act of sin. 
Erdoğan and successive members of his cabinet incorrectly associated the proponents of 
abortion, both within and outside the medical community, with aggressive secularism. 
In fact, a conventional, patriarchal and conservative perspective, held by both the 
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secular Republican and the conservative centre right policymakers of modern Turkey, 
has long been shaping the politics of maternity. Abortion was legalized in Turkey as late 
as 1982 and until early seventies; legalizing abortion was not even publicly debated. In 
1930s, the early Republican governments emphasized the significance of reproduction 
to building a powerful Nation and thus banned contraceptives and abortion. After thirty 
years of uncontrolled population growth and a worrying rise in deaths caused by illegal 
abortions, a new policy of ‘Population Planning’ was introduced in 1965 to encourage 
the use of contraceptives. The 1965 Population Planning programs and family clinics 
that were opened to carry out these programs at the grassroots level received 
considerable public criticism. State propaganda materials silenced cultural, religious and 
nationalistic concerns of the Turkish public, by broadcasting the message, ‘the attributes 
and capacity of a population are more important than its size’.428The secular and centre-
right/religious camps in the abortion debate in Turkey between 1970 and 1983 held 
almost exactly similar positions then as they do in late 2000s: The secular camp stressed 
that abortion and contraceptives are medically sound methods to avoid unwanted 
pregnancies and that women were entitled to their right to choose to give birth. The 
opposite camp argued that population planning programs jeopardized the sanctity of the 
‘family’ in Turkey and that abortion was amoral.429 Regardless of the seeming 
difference in the positions of these two camps, when abortion was finally legalized in 
1982, the bill introduced a precondition of written consent from both spouses to the 
abortions carried out in hospitals and clinics. Thus, legalizing abortion did not end the 
social control over women’s bodies.  
In 2012, critical healthcare reform legislation, combining amendments to the 
administrative structure of the Health Ministry and new regulations on the terms and 
procedures of abortion and C-section operations in public and private hospitals, was 
drafted by the Chair of the parliamentary commission on health; passed overnight by the 
commission and submitted to vote at the TGNA.430 Recep Akdağ, Health Minister from 
2002 to 2013, defended the new reforms, which permitted abortions only within ten 
weeks of pregnancy and if the pregnancy presented serious risks to the baby’s and 
mother’s health. Natural births were vehemently encouraged and C-sections were to be 
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offered only as a last resort, if and when the health professionals and operators 
presented evidence of physical and psychological obstacles to natural delivery. 
Additionally, the Health Ministry pioneered a nationwide pregnancy tracking system to 
regularly collect information from expecting women and to then assist them through to 
healthy delivery. The national database was open to the access of health professionals 
but also of administrative staff, a factor that risked the confidentiality of the information 
stored on the database.
431
 
Then a newly appointed MUSIAD President, Nail Olpak, offered his support to 
PM Erdoğan’s pro-life statements in the summer of 2012. Olpak argued that though he 
was not an expert in the legal or the medical aspects of maternity and childbirth, he 
supported the principle of an individual’s right to life, regardless of whether life begins 
inside or outside the womb.432 In sharp contrast to Olpak’s and MUSIAD’s position, 
TUSIAD’s Ümit Boyner backed the pro-choice camp and stated that the public 
statements of AKP leadership have deeply offended not only women but also all 
concerned and conscientious sections of Turkey’s society. She proceeded to say that 
TUSIAD has a fundamental interest in social and gender issues not only because of the 
business association’s commitment to democratization but also because equal 




The two specific cases of the headscarf ban and the prohibitive policies on 
maternity and childbirth do not capture the entire universe of gender policies that have 
galvanized social and political debates and concerns over the three terms of the AKP in 
office. Yet, over these two issues, Turkey’s Islamic and secular business associations 
and the communities they represent are deeply divided. At the core of this divide rest 
secular and Islamic interpretations of women’s equality, freedom and liberation. The 
literature and discourses to which TUSIAD and its women representatives refer are 
secular, Western and modern and as such, do not appeal to Islamic business 
associations, nor to devout Muslim women. Even so, devout Muslim businesswomen 
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employ familiar, indigenous and at times, Quranic references to oppose patriarchy and 
the mechanisms and structures through which Turkey’s new, Muslim conservative 
power holders exercise discrimination against ‘their women’.  
Adverse labour market conditions for single mothers, married women, and 
women with caregiving responsibilities; widespread discrimination based on race, 
ethnicity, language, social class or physical appearance; persistent legal and extra legal 
obstacles to the wider recruitment and career development of women, and gender pay 
gap are found in Turkey and the headscarf ban is surely not the only nor the most 
serious obstacle to women’s equality in economic participation. Equally, the AKP’s 
attempts to control women’s bodies and choices as mothers and caregivers are not the 
most immediate solutions to women’s economic and social empowerment in Turkey. 
Finding employment does not warrant against living above the poverty line, especially 
for women and other vulnerable sections of Turkey’s society.434More women than men 
seek and cannot find jobs and consequently lose all hope of ever finding employment in 
Turkey.
435
 Most of the acts of discrimination experienced by headscarved women were 
not exclusively targeting headscarved women, per se, but were features of a system of 
inequalities that affected Turkey’s minorities and disadvantaged communities as well. 
What Cindoğlu (2011) and Genç and Ilhan (2012) have shown, however, is that the 
headscarf, being a visible and easily detectable feature, immediately attracts public 
scorn and discrimination without any further exploration on part of the perpetrator of 
the grounds for which the unequal and discriminatory treatment may be reconsidered. It 
is an immediate disqualifier for secular and Muslim conservative sections of Turkey’s 
society and the economic marginalization of Turkey’s headscarved women continues 
despite the strengthening of a Muslim conservative business community in policy 
bargaining.  
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Chapter 7: Islam as the red herring or the proverbial 
foe in state-business relations in AKP-era Turkey 
Against a backdrop of growing uncertainty and social unrest about the global 
business community’s role in shaping international monetary, financial and social 
policies, this dissertation looks at the agents and structures in contemporary business-
state relations via the analytical framework provided by interest group theories. 
Theories of interest group politics establish meaningful connections between interest 
groups – specifically business associations, chambers and peak associations – and state 
and society actors. By maintaining the primary focus of academic inquiry on the interest 
group and the individuals that are assembled by a shared interest, interest group theories 
observe the broader social, economic and political context within which the 
representation of interests does/ ought to occur.  Following the trajectory set out by 
twentieth century interest group theorists, this dissertation established the importance of 
a fair, equitable and sound representation of business interests to a well functioning 
democracy and free market. In other words, better representation through business 
associations contributes to the institutionalization of democratic policy negotiations 
between multiple actors, and, by extension, to the development of democratic states. It 
was also argued that the processes of interest group representation, both in theory and 
practice, are in constant transformation and that the various features of corporatism, 
clientelism and pluralism combine to accommodate the contemporary changes in the 
structure and actors of policymaking and interest mediation.  
This pattern of constant transformation coincides with the development across 
the globe of alternative channels of influencing governments and institutions.  Political 
communication digitalized with the proliferation of smart phones, tablets, personal 
computers and other media through which connected individuals engage with and 
challenge the policy choices made by elected representatives, ministers, leading public 
servants such as police or military leaders, and local government officials. Global social 
movements such as the ‘Occupy Wall Street’ movement, organized against the 
inequalities perpetuated by the international financial system, the more recent ‘Tahrir 
Square’ protests, communicated passionately via the Twitter and Facebook accounts of 
young Egyptians, and the 2012 Gezi Park protests in Turkey – which are further 
discussed below– excited and convinced some analysts and scholars to speculate that 
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social media curbed the power of elites, pluralized policymaking and revolutionized 
traditional power relationships between the state and non-state actors.  
Critics oppose these optimistic readings of a new, digitalized era of global 
politics on the grounds that (a) social media and other digital channels are yet to become 
available universally and therefore exclude millions, who have no connectivity or digital 
literacy, and that (b) traditional agents and structures of policymaking continue to 
dominate politics.
436
 One case in point is the presidential campaign for Barack H. 
Obama. Obama has effectively garnered the votes of digitally-native Americans in the 
past two Presidential elections in the United States by utilizing state-of-the-art social 
communication tools in his campaigns. However, the Obama campaign was also 
impacted by the lobbying power of big American businesses and their monetary and 
ideational support to the presidential race.
437
 Rahm Emmanuel, Obama’s former White 
House Chief of Staff said, “the first third of your campaign is money, money, money. 
The second third is money, money, money. And the last third is votes, press, and 
money,”438 to testify how central campaign donations and their donors are to electoral 
politics in the US.  
From electoral politics to policymaking during term time, politicians continue to 
respond to and engage with established institutions, especially those representing large 
corporations around the world.  Contemporary business associations, often organized 
around or embedded in networks, provide the impetus for attaining more representative 
and pluralistic interest mediation processes even as states strive to maintain elements of 
traditional, often corporatist, arrangements. Observations from business associations 
and their policy negotiations with states in Europe, North and South America 
demonstrate that established structures of interest representation - when tested by time, 
significant social and economic changes, internationalisation and globalisation -
transform into hybrid structures. By extension, these hybrid structures bring together 
elements of pluralism, corporatism and occasionally of monism or clientelism.  
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Another preoccupation of this dissertation was to establish what ‘Islamic’ means 
to the members, representatives and correspondents of business associations in Turkey, 
as well as in the broader Muslim world.  In the first couple of chapters, this dissertation 
evaluated whether the label ‘Islamic’ is a meaningful qualifier to define a group of 
devout practising Muslim businesspeople, subscribed to a business association that 
operates according to often secular laws of the countries where they are registered. In 
countries like Turkey where the references to religion are dictated by authoritarian 
forms of state secularism, the choice to use the label ‘Islamic’ alone requires the 
business association to risk stigmatization and prosecution on moral and religious 
grounds by secular public bodies and governments. Therefore, I argue that under such 
circumstances, the fact that an association chooses to call itself ‘Islamic’ deserves some 
merit. At the same time, however, a discussion of Islamic economics and morality, 
offered in Chapters 2 and 3 demonstrate that even in Muslim-majority societies, 
members of ‘Islamic’ business associations may not follow a business discourse or 
adopt business practices that are completely sharia-compliant, i.e. carry our financial 
transactions via conventional banks and are bound by conventional taxation systems 
instead of a zakat-based redistribution of wealth. Aligned either by choice or by 
obligation with conventional and secular monetary and fiscal policies, members of 
Islamic business associations operate in such policy contexts without dropping their 
claim to the title, Islamic. Consequently, this dissertation concludes that ‘Islamic’ 
business associations claim varied conceptualizations of Islam and are willing and able 
to negotiate the terms of their faith with the policy actors and structures in the countries 
where they are registered or operational. 
Islamic morality is quite crucial to Islamic business associations in Turkey, 
however, as they have endorsed Muslimness as a panacea to the corrupt business and 
political engagements of secular and established business elites of the 1980s and 1990s. 
Chapter 4 proves that business-state relations do not occur in an abstract political 
science laboratory, where business organizations only approach the state through 
various legitimate and transparent channels and across policymaking structures that are 
made available by the state. There is overwhelming evidence from Turkey to prove the 
existence of a deep state network, which includes prominent business people as 
members, and to show that corporatist/clientelist policymaking structures encourage 
deep state actors to build and maintain powerful links with policymakers. Thus, the 
advent of a new Muslim business elite and the entry into Turkey’s associational 
 205 
landscape of Islamic business associations held strong implications for either the 
crumbling or the perpetuation of amoral and crony power relationships between various 
business, security and state actors. 
Business associations and the state in the Turkish twenty-first century 
The findings presented here on Turkey’s secular and Islamic business 
associations, which were founded in a corporatist fashion but later included pluralist 
elements and thus hybridized, add to a growing body of literature on the future of 
industrial relations, as global economic and political trends change the way business 
interacts with states, international governance mechanisms and communities. Since the 
business community that is being observed is Muslim and conservative, the contribution 
made by the dissertation also aims to deepen the grasp of state and business 
transformation in predominantly Muslim democracies. I found that state-business 
relations in Turkey have advanced remarkably since 1999. Ayşe Buğra’s 1995 book on 
state-business relations serves as an excellent template to observe the social class 
values, cultural and religious identity and political affiliations of businessmen, 
constituting Turkey’s diverse business communities. This dissertation begins where 
Ayşe Buğra left off, to explain who the nascent actors in Turkey’s business-state 
relations are, what their roles have become and to what extent are business actors able to 
exert their influence. There is also another layer to the academic inquiry in this 
dissertation, which concerns the values and worldview of Turkey’s Muslim 
conservative business champions and whether those values and worldview impact their 
policymaking. 
Previous chapters established that business associations were regarded as the 
leading actors of Turkey’s civil society, since the early years of marketization. The 
tradition of state corporatism dominated policy bargaining between state institutions, 
politicians and official and state-sanctioned associations. The leading business 
associations of TUSIAD and MUSIAD, and the umbrella organizations of TUSKON, 
TOBB, TIM and TISK, negotiated their communication with and proximity to the 
Turkish state, replacing its corrupt, politically unstable, securitized and largely secular 
infrastructure with democratic, pluralistic and professional organizations. Overall, these 
associations and organizations sought to preserve a smooth working relationship with 
the AKP, which consolidated its power over the Turkish state by flexing its economic 
muscle, and to support the government towards common goals of maintaining at least 
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6% annual economic growth, a stable and globalized financial market, a lively labour 
market and a balanced domestic budget. Though their motivations were dissimilar, 
secular and Islamic business associations backed Turkey’s bid for EU membership as 
well as its plea for deeper engagement with international organizations, too. Both 
secular and Islamic business associations worked side by side in old and new 
policymaking bodies, including AKP-era ad-hoc commissions, therefore, different 
sections of Turkey’s business community became well versed in cooperating for 
effective economic, commercial, financial policies.  
It is useful to remember that Turkey’s business associations target legislators, 
cabinet members, technocrats and public opinion leaders to exercise policy influence 
over (1) legal reforms, (2) public and private procurement and privatization processes, 
(3) administrative appointments and structural changes, (4) public discourse and mass 
(consumption) trends. However varied the motives and agendas of business associations 
may be, their communication with their target groups traces the following pattern: A 
policy position is formed at the top by the leadership of the association concerned, 
usually inspired by the ideological and political positioning of the association, rather 
than scientific or policy research.
439
 The policy position is communicated to the target 
institution or group via a press statement, a written statement or an official/semi-official 
meeting with the pertinent parties (the government officials, the association leadership, 
etc.). Unofficial mechanisms, such as providing gifts, favours or other non-material 
incentives to the targets of the policy negotiation, operate throughout the policy 
bargaining process. At times, the extension of the concessions precedes the official 
engagement of the business association in the policy negotiation process. The greater 
the political, economic, social or other benefits to be accrued by the policy change, the 
more eager are the public officials and government representatives to recruit 
organizational support for the policy change – sometimes, the passing of a new reform 
package is a source of greater motivation than any private gains that might be expected 
by the government or public institutions.  
This pattern survived the decade of legal, economic and structural reforms in the 
2000s and present-day business associations continue to be pervaded by obstacles to the 
satisfactory integration of pluralism and to have democratic deficits. This is particularly 
evident in the way in which Turkey’s Islamic business associations, i.e. TUSKON and 
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MUSIAD, and pro-government peak associations, i.e. TOBB and TIM, have an 
exclusive communication with and a proximity to the top AKP leadership, which is not 
enjoyed by other interest groups. Erdoğan makes regular appearances on the annual 
conventions of these associations where the PM delivers critical political messages, 
along with his take on relevant economic policies. In leadership roles in Islamic 
associations and interest groups, future politicians thrive and either become AKP 
parliamentarians or assume significant roles in public service jobs. In the case of TOBB, 
especially, TOBB leadership and experts from TOBB-affiliated organizations are able 
to directly inform commercial, trade, customs and financial policies as technocrats in 
pertinent ministers or advisors to the Prime Minister’s or the President’s offices.   
The Islamic business community’s current proximity to the AKP leadership is 
the result of decades of struggle against similar ‘foes’: global market dynamics and 
systemic crises afflicting Turkey’s fragile financial markets and real economy, a deeply 
securitized and corrupt political class and security elite, a corporatist system that 
concentrated capital and resources in the hands of a select few and a body of public 
servants that methodologically applied the state’s recipes of secularism on devout 
Muslims. 
The 1990s economic turmoil and crises hung over a society that was torn 
between the world of Washington Consensus neoliberalism and its anti. Fringe/smaller 
political parties, labour unions, associations and intelligentsia on the left identified their 
position as anti-neoliberalism. As such, anti-neoliberalism opposed Turkey’s foreign 
trade, economic and diplomatic relations with particularly Western European and North 
American countries and markets, membership in and creditor-debtor relationship with 
the IMF and the World Bank, accession into the European Union, and any other larger 
associations with globalization and imperialism. Ercan and Oğuz claim that these 
maxims define the national-developmentalist vein in the majority of Turkey’s organized 
labour and socialist politics. National-developmentalism, assumed by political parties 
such as Turkish Communist Party (Türkiye Komünist Partisi, TKP), Party of Labor 
(Emek Partisi, EMEP), Worker’s Party (İşçi Partisi, IP), conceives of the Turkish state 
as ‘an ally of labour against neoliberal globalization and imperialism.’440 Left-leaning 
and nationalist labour union confederations that were revived in early to mid 1990s, 
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following a decade of prohibitions after 12 September 1980, namely the confederations 
of public servants, KESK (left-leaning) and TÜRKİYE KAMU-SEN (right-
leaning/nationalist), and the confederations of workers, DİSK (left-leaning) and TÜRK-
İŞ  (centre-left), followed the national-developmentalist trend and positioned 
themselves against the invasion of Turkey’s markets, resources and territorial, national 
and cultural integrity by global forces. Thus, a coalition of opposing corporatist 
institutions ossified around the ideal of a ‘developmental state’,441 which defied 
mainstream economic theory in favour of the interests of civil servants and public sector 
workers. 
Meanwhile, and not unlike just before 12 September 1980 coup, which was 
explored in Chapter 3, the military hierarchy also objected to domestic and international 
pressures Turkey faced in the wake of the banking crisis. Pragmatists among Turkey’s 
business community and politicians who trusted Turkey’s economic recovery with 
Kemal Derviş, a seasoned international bureaucrat, tolerated the Washington Consensus 
rescue model and the Copenhagen and Maastricht criteria. The carrots offered to 
Turkey’s business elite by IMF, World Bank and the EU were better financial and 
economic management, loans to support rotting markets, smaller state and larger private 
enterprise, and gradual commercial, political and social engagement with Europe. 
Conversely, Turkish security sector elite, who sought to maintain semi-authoritarianism, 
was threatened by accountability, austerity, and foreign involvement in Turkey’s public 
administration. Their objection to deeper engagement with Europe emanated from 
economic, industrial, agricultural and financial considerations, however, the source of 
almost an instant aversion to Europe was ideological: Europe respected human rights 
and democracy and (yet) it harboured Turkey’s archenemies, namely the Kurdish 
diaspora, Kurdish politicians in exile, PKK leadership, and Muslim conservative 
politicians, émigrés, and extremists.442 
More significantly, Turkey’s left-leaning political parties and interest groups 
adopt the discourse of isolationism and patriotism, which is usually associated with 
Turkey’s right-wing nationalism. In other words, these confederations occasionally 
downplayed class-based considerations and in their stead, emphasized the integrity and 
sanctity of Turkey’s human and natural resources. Unions’ messages of anti-
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Europeanism, anti-globalization and anti-privatization resonated with disgruntled 
sections of society and business community that lost to globalization and intense 
liberalization/marketization. Several episodes of direct confrontation between various 
business interest groups, governments and left-leaning confederations occurred during 
the 1990s and early 2000s. These two decades also witnessed strikes, marches, sit-ins 
and other instances when organized workers movements publicly challenged 
authorities, including members of international financial community. Some of the 
strongest messages against neoliberalism and Europeanization, perceived by leftists as a 
euphemism for global imperialism, were voiced against international financial 
organizations and foreign companies looking to invest into Turkey.  
While Turkey’s large, established and leftist workers union confederations were 
once members of a strong anti-privatization coalition, Turkey’s policymakers, economic 
and financial administrators, public sector managers, and business associations and 
unions representing private sector employers were not entirely convinced that 
radical/aggressive privatization was the only way forward for public sector 
corporations. Entertaining alternative paths to public sector reform did not, however, 
prevent the gradual application of large-scale privatization in late 1990s and throughout 
the 2000s.  
Even though the coalition of centre right, nationalist and Muslim conservative 
politicians assisted the development Islamic business and finance before 2000s, it took 
three terms of the AKP rule to democratize and widen the reach of business and state 
actors in the periphery/ in the middle-to-lower rungs of the state machinery to accrue 
power and profits. Until after 2007 elections, pious conservative Muslims were not fully 
integrated in the corporatist-clientelist forms of policymaking and interest mediation. 
These structures were still occupied by actors who were either secular or implicit about 
their piety. By 2012, most if not all of Turkey’s business-state relations are dominated 
by Turkey’s Muslim capitalists. 
A recent and fundamental challenge to the AKP’s claims of democratic 
policymaking: the Gezi Park movement 
Over the summer of 2013, Istanbul staged Turkey’s largest public protests in the 
AKP era.  Better known as the ‘Gezi Park’ protests, the civil resistance movement 
engulfed multiple sections of Turkey’s society, including devout Muslims, Gülen-
loyalists, some of Turkey’s ‘liberal’ journalists and public intellectuals that have long 
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supported the AKP, and older, otherwise apolitical and conformist middle class urban 
Turks. Business associations, whether their membership constituted conservative, 
devout Muslims or modern, secular, establishment elites, avoided publicly commenting 
on the disproportionate use of force by the law enforcement units in Istanbul, Ankara, 
Izmir, Eskişehir, Hatay, and Adana, which has left seven minors dead and several 
hundred injured. Prompted by a local exercise of civil and social rights against the 
planned demolition of a public park in Taksim, the Gezi Park protests escalated to a 
national civic activism movement against the indifference and defiance of the AKP 
leadership to the excessive use of police force and subsequent unlawful arrests and 
detentions across Turkey.  
The Gezi Park movement and its reception by the business community in 
Turkey provide food for thought on this dissertation’s main preoccupation: In times of 
critical social and economic transformation, how does the Islamic business community 
react, when compared to the secular business community? What sort of policy reflexes 
do Islamic business associations have? The previous couple of case study chapters have 
demonstrated that Islamic business associations reveal their true colours when the focus 
of the policy bargaining shifts from economic and financial policies – since ideological 
or cultural differences barely matter in a business environment inhabited by liberal 
capitalists – to culturally, politically and socially significant policies on gender and 
media. Hence, as an internationally-acclaimed and popular citizens’ movement, the 
Gezi Park movement attracted the attention and criticism of all sections of Turkey’s 
business community and unveiled the sentiments that conservative Muslim and secular 
businesspeople held towards democracy, freedom of assembly and speech, 
authoritarianism and the AKP’s handling of popular dissent. 
Interpreted by the AKP as a Republican/deep-state conspiracy to undermine the 
legitimacy and success of Turkey’s Muslim democrats, the public protests that spanned 
several Turkish cities roused anger and resentment among many sections of Turkey’s 
government and public institutions. PM Erdoğan was the most vocal and ardent critic of 
the protests and in turn attracted the majority of the scorn, mockery and dissent of the 
protestors. Crucially, cabinet members such as the EU Minister Bağış firmly supported 
the government’s argument that the Gezi Park movement was a coordinated effort by 
the opposition and ‘foreign powers’ to topple the AKP and pull Turkey into chaos. 
Bağış acclaimed his government for having advanced democratization in Turkey to 
allow the innocent, free and democratic voices of the Gezi Park, however few they may 
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be, to be heard.
443
 The government’s refusal to assign political significance to the 
demands made by the protestors and the protestors’ failure to engage in a meaningful 
and organized dialogue with the government – especially as part of a reconciliatory 
dialogue attempt by Erdoğan with the Taksim Solidarity Platform members and a 
follow up meeting with artists, journalists and public opinion leaders- pushed the 
multiple sides of the conflict into a deadlock. 
Turkey’s business community was taken aback by the fast disintegration of 
Turkey’s financial and cultural capital Istanbul and other major industrial cities into 
stages of everyday violence. Erdoğan and his government ministers’ hardliner approach, 
coupled with the uncertainty about the potential outcome of the months of public 
protests and quotidian police violence, confused Turkey’s businesspeople and leading 
business associations about whether to formulate and articulate their opinions on the 
Gezi movement. In June 2013, TOBB published an announcement on the behalf of the 
chambers and other civil society organizations with which it drafted the public 
statement, calling on a peaceful and democratic end to the Gezi protests. The public 
announcement claimed that though the movement was triggered by civilians and 
environments, who meant well and were only concerned with preserving nature 
(referring to the trees in the Gezi Park), it was quickly engulfed by ‘marginalized 
groups’ that politicized and securitized a civilian movement. TOBB declaration 
matched the public statements made by members of the AKP government and was a 
clear sign that the business community sought a comfortable distance from a heated 
political conflict and wanted an end to street protests. There was unanimous agreement 
that the protests damaged Turkey’s reputation and jeopardized the business ventures of 
Istanbul’s shop owners, artisans, and service sector companies.444  
A handful of businesspeople, on the other hand, were quick to respond to the 
Gezi movement by condemning the police violence and the reluctance of the AKP 
government to cease its law enforcement units’ confrontation with civilians. Chief 
among them was the Koç family. The Koç Group’s Divan Hotel opened its doors and 
showed utmost hospitality to groups of women, children and young people who had 
escaped tear gas and water cannons at the Elmadağ exit of the Gezi Park. Divan Hotel’s 
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institutional backing of the Gezi movement was shared – behind the scenes – by 
members of the Koç family and executives of the Koç Holding.  
After domestic and international news outlets broadcast scenes from the Divan 
Hotel’s lobby and meeting rooms, turned into makeshift emergency care centres for 
people suffering from exposure to excessive tear gas, an infuriated Erdoğan lashed into 
the Koç family, declaring them… Subsequently one early morning in May 2013, a 
delegation of tax authorities from the Ministry of Finance accompanied by about twenty 
police officers raided Turkey’s largest publicly traded company, the oil and energy giant 
TÜPRAŞ in Kocaeli. Minister of Finance, Mehmet Şimşek, declared that the raid was 
carried out as part of a routine check; however, the Energy Market Regulatory Authority 
(Enerji Piyasaları Düzenleme Kurulu, EPDK) announced that no routine check was 
scheduled and the arrival of the tax authorities was unexpected for TÜPRAŞ.445 
TÜPRAŞ executives and the Koç family declined to comment on the timing and 
abruptness of the raid and only confirmed to the media their compliance with the tax 
authorities.   
Mehmet Boydak, President of the Kayseri Chamber of Industry (Kayseri Sanayi 
Odası, KAYSO), released a statement three days after the TÜPRAŞ raid to support the 
Koç family and to warn the AKP government not to authorize an unfair and 
McCarthyist cull of the pro-Gezi businesses. Highlighting the importance of the Koç 
Group to the Turkish economy, Boydak reminded the AKP government and the public 
that the fresh memory of the 28 February 1997 coup and its aftermath ought to urge 
democratic-minded leaders not to divide the business community into two subjective 
camps of AKP opponents and supporters and to penalize the latter.
446
 Boydak presides 
over a chamber that represents Turkey’s powerhouses, industrial and agribusiness giants 
that represent Turkey’s Muslim conservative Anatolian tigers. His family has been an 
ardent supporter of the AKP and as the previous sections have shown, Boydak was 
prepared to make concessions to back AKP’s economic policies under very difficult 
financial circumstances. Only a month before his July statement in support of the Koç 
Group, Boydak backed the TOBB statement as a fully representative and authoritative 
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indicator of how the Turkish business community viewed the Gezi Park events.
447
 So 
what turned a powerful businessman and a long-time ally of the AKP from remaining 
quiet and reticent about a political debate? 
 Before attempting to answer this crucial question, it is useful to remember that 
TUSIAD assumed a position similar to the TOBB position with regard to the Gezi Park 
movement. TUSIAD Chair Muammer Yılmaz called on the authorities to opt for open 
and transparent dialogue with the relevant stakeholders instead of resorting to non-
peaceful methods. This short statement was released within the first week of violence in 
Istanbul.
448After the TÜPRAŞ tax raid, TUSIAD did not officially declare its solidarity 
with its most influential and oldest member, the Koç family. The political pressure on 
the Koç Group in fact served to reduce TUSIAD and its member businesses to a state of 
silent submission to Erdoğan’s unquestioned authority. The members of the Koç family 
criticized this submissive state heavily during closed-door meetings held by TUSIAD 
top leadership.
449However, publicly, the Koç family accepted PM Erdoğan’s rebuke and 
the consequences attached and joined the rest of the business community in an open call 
to return Turkey to its peaceful and solid track of growth.
450
 
In terms of personal wealth, business clout and international recognition Mustafa 
Koç outweighs KAYSO Chair Mehmet Boydak. However, Boydak outcompetes Koç in 
attempting to keep the authoritarian tendencies of the AKP in check. Boydak, speaking 
as the president of a semi-public business interest group, the Kayseri Chamber of 
Industry, raises public awareness on a crucial dimension of Erdoğan’s assault on 
business-state relations in Turkey: the PM’s disregard for the strides that Turkey’s 
business-state relations have taken towards democracy and pluralism. Boydak notes that 
a divided business community would ultimately harm everyone, including Erdoğan and 
the Islamic elite that emerged under his leadership.  
Meanwhile, TUSIAD and the individual members of Turkey’s secular, old 
business elite are cowed by the AKP’s impending authoritarianism. Opting for self-
censorship has not delivered the results that the secular elite or businesses that expect 
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favours from Erdoğan’s AKP expected, however. The Doğuş Group’s media division, 
with its flagship news channel NTV, was publicly disparaged for failing to offer a 
transparent and full coverage of the Gezi Park events. Doğuş Group’s restaurants, 
entertainment companies, media companies and commercial bank, Garanti Bank, were 
boycotted by thousands of Gezi Park supporters. President of the Doğuş Group, Ferit 
Şahenk, was reputed to have ordered a coverage freeze of the Gezi Park, hoping to 
please the Prime Minister, and instead news channels aired documentaries and other 
content unrelated to the public protests. Erdoğan responded harshly by accusing Doğuş 
Media Group with deliberately censoring Gezi Park protests by airing ridiculous 
content, thereby encouraging the public to realize the government’s irreverence towards 
a citizens’ movement. Self-censorship backfired on Şahenk and the Doğuş Media Group 
was unable to appeal neither to the government nor to the supporters of Gezi movement. 
In short, the Gezi Park movement unravelled the democratic potential of 
Turkey’s secular and Islamic business associations and the communities they represent. 
Broadly, the business community chose to remain non-aligned in a politically contested 
movement, which some commentators have justifiably called a bourgeois revolution for 
the overwhelming presence of affluent urban Turks among the ranks of protestors in 
Istanbul and other major cities. The movement was also championed as a democratic 
and secular revolution in international media, primarily in the prestigious media outlets 
of the New York Times, the Guardian, CNN International and BBC, and this message, 
cheered by the main opposition CHP, was an outright offense against Turkey’s Islamic 
capitalists, who were not secular or West centric. The way Gezi movement was received 
internationally (as a liberation movement against a Muslim oppressor, Erdoğan) 
galvanized nationalistic impulses among not only public servants and the AKP 
leadership but also the powerful and globally aware Muslim capitalists. Though the 
business community strategically avoided taking sides on the Gezi movement, secular 
business elites were particularly wary of being associated with the protestors and more 
importantly, with the prosecution their businesses were likely to face afterwards. 
Inevitably, secular businesspeople were associated with the secular and urban protestors 
chanting against the police barricades in Istanbul, Izmir, Ankara and Hatay.  
Muslim conservative businessmen and Turkey’s powerful associations were 
better placed to remain nonpartisan and nonaligned during the Gezi resistance. 
However, they were also able to raise critical voices – as Boydak did – from within the 
Muslim conservative community. Boydak’s comments were testament to the democratic 
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potential that Turkey’s globalized Muslims have. Etyen Mahçupyan referred to the 
natural fit between global and democratic attitudes and piety in Turkey on countless 
occasions:  
It was possible to continue to be religious and even improve religiosity while heading 
toward democracy, which could be defined as a "supra-identity" reference, which 
Westerners had failed to stick to and improve on although they had originally developed 
it. Given the fact that in a global world, democracy would spread on a global scale, 
there was nothing more natural than Turkey cooperating with the West and creating the 
future world in tandem with the West.
451
 
Mahçupyan’s faith in the democratizing potential of Turkey’s Muslim 
conservative elite emanates from two truths that this dissertation has so far shown: 
Turkey’s secular business elites have been reluctant democrats and shied away from 
questioning the state thoroughly and broadening the space for democratic dialogue 
between the state and society. Furthermore, Turkey’s mainstream political Islamic 
movements were ready to deconstruct the authoritarian elements of the state since the 
members of these movements had been oppressed by the authoritarianism and 
corporatism/clientelism of the Republican state. Previous chapters alluded to the 
Welfare Party’s pledge to solve the Kurdish Question by altering the traditional national 
security approach and to the AKP’s execution of a ‘democratic Kurdish opening’, 
however limited its results may have been. A democratic solution to the Kurdish 
conflict demanded the security sector organizations, i.e. the state elite, to cooperate with 
a governing elite on a democratic solution and to consider breaking up existing 
coalitions between the military, big business and politicians.
452
 Broadly speaking, 
Turkey’s Muslim conservative businesspeople were on board with realizing a 
democratic roadmap to resolve the political, social and cultural deadlock between the 
Turkish state and Turkey’s Kurdish community. 
Wherefore art thou not reforming, TUSIAD? 
TUSIAD fights an existential battle, without a pleasant and promising end in 
sight. It is still a very significant organization for a privileged group of business elites, 
politicians, media figures and international spectators for two reasons: TUSIAD 
continues to represent a large chunk of Turkey’s powerful businesses, which boast 
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highly-developed corporate structures, extensive access to the global markets and highly 
skilled professional workforces. TUSIAD taps into the potential of these powerful 
companies and their working professionals to expand and advance its services to its 
members and to offer opportunities for building their members’ social capital. For 
instance, TUSIAD leads the Turkey businesses’ adoption of a sustainability agenda, 
facilitates its members’ engagement with international sustainability initiatives, such as 
the UN Global Compact, the Climate Change Convention. Sustainability in and through 
business is a globally significant trend and only TUSIAD is able to pursue this trend on 
behalf of its members, so far.  
Secondly, the presence of TUSIAD in an associational landscape that is 
dominated by new, Islamic actors is crucial to maintain a plural policymaking 
environment for businesses in Turkey. TUSIAD members, Turkey’s top industrialists, 
consultants, service sector companies, still control most of the industrial and financial 
capital in Turkey. This economic muscle provides TUSIAD with the ability to assume a 
leading voice in Turkey’s civil society and its opinions echo farther and wider than 
economic, industrial and trade policies. TUSIAD is a political actor and occupies a 
significant space in Turkey’s political scene. TUSIAD is the secular democratic 
contingent in Turkey’s increasingly Islamic business landscape. 
Prime Minister Erdoğan publicly threatened TUSIAD in 2010 with the words: 
‘Those [business associations] that do not side with us will be cast out’. TUSIAD has 
refrained from taking sides on the eve of the 12 September 2010 referendum, according 
to Erdoğan who had demanded from TUSIAD, as well as from TOBB, to speak in 
support of the constitutional reform package that was to be voted on. TUSIAD released 
a public statement in response to Erdoğan’s outcry against the democratic sentiments of 
the business association. In the public statement, TUSIAD reaffirmed its commitment to 
Turkey’s democratization process, including the path to drafting a new, civilian 
constitution and its respect for the will of the people. It added, however, that the 
referendum ought not to have been politicized.
453
 
The offensive on TUSIAD does not stop with the Prime Minister’s occasional 
attempts to silence the business association. As mentioned in Chapter 4, pro-AKP 
business leaders such as Ethem Sancak announce their interest to take over and reform 
TUSIAD. Before the AKP consolidated its power through a constitutional referendum 
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in September 2010, business leaders known for their proximity to Erdoğan and the AKP 
were not vocally against the institutional makeup of TUSIAD. They had accepted 
TUSIAD as the home of secular business elites and that Muslim conservative 
businesses had been turned down at TUSIAD gates in the past for not complying with 
the high standards of this exclusive association.
454
By 2012, powerful Muslim 
conservative businessmen, who have a history of working closely with secular business 
elites, are able to publicly announce their plans to reform TUSIAD into a more liberal, 
democratic and pro-Muslim business association. 
What options does TUSIAD have? There are three possible scenarios for 
TUSIAD in the next decade until /if the AKP’s vision 2023 for the Republic’s 
centennial is realized. The first scenario spells TUSIAD’s gradual decline into a smaller 
and ineffective organization. Businesses may leave TUSIAD to move onto more 
effective business interest groups that would ensure their proximity to the government. 
Secondly, TUSIAD may be reinvented as a pro-Muslim democracy business hub 
that competes with MUSIAD and TUSKON affiliated organizations for access to policy 
circles to which its prospective Muslim conservative member businesses already have. 
This scenario is the most likely if Ethem Sancak is serious about his intentions to 
colonize TUSIAD. 
Third and the least likely but the most desirable path for TUSIAD would be for 
TUSIAD to orchestrate its own democratization process. This is the least likely scenario 
because TUSIAD members have a history of rejecting change. İshak Alaton remembers 
a previous existential crisis that TUSIAD experienced in late 1990s, when a 
democratization attempt, culminated in a report by Bülent Tanör, was stymied by the 
overwhelming majority of TUSIAD members. Strong businesses that wanted to 
maintain status quo and elitism within the organization. Alaton was among a handful of 
members that backed the Tanör Report and the idea of a democratic, liberal, pluralistic 
and more open TUSIAD, which would have opened its doors to the blossoming 
Anatolian Muslim capital.
455
 Though the three-year term of Ümit Boyner created the 
impression of a more effective and democratizing TUSIAD, the following term of 
                                               
454 Columnist Süleyman Yaşar writes that Abdulkadir Konukoğlu of the industrial giant Sanko in 
Gaziantep alleged that his businesses had been denied membership to TUSIAD in the 1990s.  Süleyman 
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Available from http://www.taraf.com.tr/makale/4658.htm.  
455 Songül Hatırasu (2011) ‘İshak Alaton: TÜSİAD Türkiye’ye 13 Yıl Kaybettirdi’, Milliyet, Online. 7 
February 2011. Available from 
www.milliyet.com.tr/Yazdir.aspx?aType=HaberDetayPrint&ArticleID=1349170.  
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Muharrem Yılmaz disappointed those who waited on TUSIAD to catch up with the 
larger democratizing trends that sweep Turkey, both in the secular and the Islamic 
space. 
Concluding remarks on the bumpy road ahead for Turkey’s business 
associations and the communities they represent 
Is there a clear and present danger posed by the Islamic character Turkey’s 
powerful business elites and their associations? Or is Islam the red herring in the debate 
on Turkey’s contemporary business-state relations? Not unlike the 1990s, Turkey in the 
2010s inspire security experts, international commentators and Turkey’s secular and 
left-leaning analysts to concoct conspiracy theories of the imminence of Islamic 
fundamentalism or sharia rule. Islam had always been the proverbial foe in Turkey. 
Evidence to back this scenario comes from current events in the Middle East and North 
Africa where populist parties with strong Islamist tendencies overtook secular regimes. 
Hudson Institute, for one, detects the onset of a pernicious Islamist agenda to overturn 
the secular democracy in Turkey in the foreign and domestic policy moves of the AKP. 
Hudson draws this conclusion from its assessment of the political restructuring process 
in Egypt, after the 2011 revolution and toppling of Mubarak was conducted by the 
Muslim Brotherhood in collaboration with social and political groups of secular or non-
Muslim convictions. Identified as ‘hybridization’ under the roof of the New Center 
Party, this initial stage of democratic political development in Egypt is observed 
internationally as a test case of whether political Islam and democratic consolidation are 
compatible. A pessimistic reading of Egypt’s hybrid political scene in the aftermath of 
the revolution expects the Muslim Brotherhood to persist more rigorously to side-line 
other social and political groups in order to enact its political Islamist agenda. 
Alternatively, the post-Tahrir hybridization stage curtails the Islamist agenda that the 
Brotherhood allegedly has and serves as a preamble to a more pluralist political system 
in Egypt. An analyst at the Hudson Institute discredits such an optimistic reading of the 
Morsi’s term in power and cautions against ‘hybridity operating to reclaim non- 
committed or disillusioned populations for Islamism.’456 
Obviously, Turkey’s democratization experiment was critically shaped by the 
forces of globalization, which encouraged the development of what has been idealized 
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 Hassan Mneimneh ‘The Turkish Model in Arab Islamism: Rejection or Emulation?’ In Hillel Fradkin 
et. al. (Eds) Current Trends in Islamist Ideology Vol 11, Hudson Institute, Washington D.C., 2011, p.21. 
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as a “Muslim awakening” in Turkey. Turkey’s experimentation with Islam, economic 
liberalism and democracy galvanized a significant social awakening, among the ranks of 
secular and pious Muslim middle classes. Islamic transnational networks that emerged 
out of Turkey, particularly the Gülen Movement, fuelled the development and 
broadening of a democratic mindset among Turkey’s Muslim communities and forced 
state institutions out of their rigid formulations of power, authority and sovereignty. 
Muslim conservative businesspeople built on intricate/clientelist relationships with 
politicians, bureaucrats, public and private sector actors via existing religious, cultural 
and social networks to penetrate into the hostile and defensive secular elite. Economic, 
social and political changes on a global scale affected the inner workings of Turkish 
state corporatism and broke down some of those (loose or institutionalized) coalitions of 
power between businesspeople, security sector and criminal organizations, state 
agencies and politicians. Ultimately, Turkey became a safer and more permissible place 
for Islamic businesspeople.  
As effective the global context may have been on Turkey’s corporatism, the 
breakdown of traditional coalitions has been precipitated by the strengthening of 
domestic political actors, chiefly the AKP. The Islamic movement in Turkey gradually 
and strategically mobilized support for cultural and social change. Cihan Tuğal argues 
that the Turkish Islamic movement chose to mobilize in the realms of Turkey’s society 
and culture because its primary focus was to win the hearts and minds of Turkey’s 
communities to support an Islamist agenda. Coerced away from the realms of the state 
and its security sector, Islamists chose instead to slowly and at a grassroots level 
transform secular cultural and economic practices and according to Tuğal, this was a 
pragmatic choice.
457
 Assuming Tuğal’s analysis is up to the mark, then the years of 
investment that Turkey’s security sector organizations have made in assessing and 
trying to uproot Islamic fundamentalism have been in vain. In fact, as the discussions in 
Chapters 3 and 4 show, the strategies employed by Turkey’s military-deep state 
emboldened Turkey’s politically and economically motivated Muslims to form the AKP 
brand of moderate Islamic politics and encouraged new generations of political 
Islamists to respond in kind or equally to the Republican, secular and nationalist state 
elite.  
                                               
457 
Cihan Tuğal (2009) “Transforming everyday life: Islamism and social movement theory”, Theory and 
Society, 38: 423–458. 
 
 220 
The prevalence of Muslim conservative actors in Turkey’s society, culture, 
politics and economy, as observed via Islamic business associations in this dissertation, 
do not pose a clear and imminent threat to the regime for two key reasons: Muslim 
conservative businessmen are pragmatists, who recognize and respond to domestic and 
transnational social, economic and political dynamics. Also, their religious affiliation is 
exaggerated to the extent that their Muslimness became a red herring, diverting the 
attention of spectators and analysts from the real problem with Turkey’s 
democratization and marketization process: the lethargy of the government to 
implement institutional reforms that would bring about a plural, transparent and 
accountable policymaking environment.  
The piety and conservatism of Turkey’s Muslim capitalists have been softened 
down by capitalistic impulses and market incentives. Turkey’s Islamic business 
associations possess the democratic potential that Mahçupyan and others have alluded 
to. The headscarf issue is an excellent case in point: Though the liberation of the 
headscarf and the entry of headscarved women into the workforce has moral 
significance to all Muslims, including the Muslim conservative business elites, they 
have not confronted the Turkish state or the AKP for not lifting the headscarf ban until 
2012. Very generally, Islamic business associations did not volunteer to rise to the 
defence of headscarved women’s rights in the job market and did not work to promote 
the engagement of headscarved businesswomen or professionals in the business interest 
groups and the business community in Turkey. Slowly and gradually, the stigma on 
promoting headscarved members and staff lifts and Islamic business associations and 
their member companies are revisiting their discriminatory practices against 
headscarved women. Though the human rights abuses conducted for many years have 
not yet been undone, several companies’ policies towards erasing the legacy of a 
headscarf ban are hopeful and inspiring. With the increase in the public visibility of 
headscarved women and the increase in the number of headscarved women in the labour 
market, especially in professional jobs usually filled by secular men and women, 
Muslim capitalists expect a painless and non-confrontational solution to the headscarf 
problem. 
The portrait of a Muslim conservative elite taking the peaceful and consensual 
road to tackle some of its deep-seated problems with the Turkish state tells only half the 
story of contemporary business-state relations in Turkey. There are at the very least two 
discursive sides or camps, the secular and Islamic, in Turkey’s business community, 
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according to those actors who fill the ranks of secular voluntary associations and to the 
broader public opinion. The language of appeasement insinuates the existence of a 
much-dreaded but obvious divide in Turkey’s civil society or more alarmingly in 
Turkey’s middle class. The old bourgeoisie no longer feels secure in its access to public 
and private resources and this creeping sense of insecurity is justified in the vendetta 
that Erdoğan pursues against some of Turkey’s oldest business families. Their fears may 
not be allayed until Turkey’s institutions complete their democratic consolidation 
process and the popular AKP government ceases to undermine the fundamental legal, 
constitutional and institutional mechanisms through which citizens and interest groups 
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